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This thesis examines fiscal policy coordination in the EU during the Great Recession 
(2008-2010). For the first time since the Maastricht Treaty heralded the coordination 
of macroeconomic policies among EU Member States, public finances were 
collectively focused on stimulus policies. In sharp contrast to the preceding decade 
of consolidation and constraint, fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession 
presents a novelty: a study in fiscal expansion. Drawing on Mancur Olson’s Logic of 
Collective Action, this thesis uses a mixed-methods approach that combines the 
insights from over 40 in-depth interviews and econometric analyses. The central 
argument of this thesis is that the fiscal crisis responses of EU Member States were 
not coordinated. Yet despite this lack of coordination, free-riding was kept at bay. 
First, the overarching consensus on the need for counter-cyclical fiscal policies 
prevented growth free-riding (i.e. a situation of limited domestic stimulus and free-
riding on other countries’ expansive fiscal policies). Second, discipline imposed by 
financial market participants contributed to policy-makers’ awareness of their limited 
room for fiscal manoeuvre, which meant that stability free-riding (i.e. stimulus 
policies that exceeded a country’s fiscal space) did not occur. The first finding 
suggests the importance of shared policy ideas in achieving collective action; the 
second points to the role of financial markets in constraining public finances. 
Ultimately both, shared policy ideas and market discipline, can function as a 
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‘The levers of government, the instruments of the European Union, the influence of 
intelligent coordination add up to a potent force to arrest the trend towards a deeper 
recession. […] We sink or swim together’ (EERP 2008). 
The preface of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) emphasised the 
necessity for fiscal policy coordination during the economic and financial crises of 
2008-2010. The plan sought to provide a framework for counter-cyclical policies as 
European Union (EU) governments stepped in with a range of national fiscal 
stimulus measures, amounting to a total of 1.9 per cent of EU Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (European Commission 2010)1, in order to mitigate the global 
economic fall-out. For the first time since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 had heralded 
the coordination of macroeconomic policies among EU Member States, the ‘potent 
forces’ of public finances were collectively directed towards stimulus. In sharp 
contrast to the past decade of consolidation and constraint, fiscal policy coordination 
during the Great Recession2 presents a novelty: a study in fiscal expansion.
This development has to be viewed against the backdrop of an economic crisis that, 
according to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) was ‘every bit as big as the Great 
Depression shock of 1929–30’.3 The World Bank (2010) estimates that the Great 
Recession has resulted in an increase in poverty of 64 million people globally. From 
the start of 2008 to the spring of 2009, the crisis knocked $30 (US) trillion off the 
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1 Not counting off-balance sheet measures and the economic support provided by automatic fiscal 
stabilisers.
2 For the purpose of this study, the temporal scope of the term Great Recession covers the years 
2008-2010, see also below.
3 However Romer (2009) does not agree with this juxtaposition and argues that the ‘current recession 
[…] pales in comparison with what our parents and grandparents experienced in the 1930s’.
value of global shares and $11 trillion off the value of homes (the Economist 
1.11.2009). At their worst, these losses amounted to around 75 per cent of annual 
world GDP. The EU economy has been hit particularly hard by the shockwaves of 
the financial and economic crisis; unemployment increased from an average of 7.1 
per cent in 2008 to 10.5 per cent in 2012, GDP declined by almost 4 per cent in 2009 
and growth rates remained below expectations five years after the collapse of the 
global financial system. When recession struck many national economies in the fall 
of 2008, policy-makers around the globe speedily abandoned the fiscal and monetary  
orthodoxies of economic policymaking that had been widely accepted since the 
1980s (Armingeon 2012). The first step of many governments was to support ailing 
financial institutions with substantial bailout programmes. With regards monetary 
policy, the European Central Bank (ECB) and other national central banks have 
reduced interest rates to unprecedented lows and many central banks have engaged in 
'unconventional' direct operations in financial markets to ease liquidity constraints. 
As the room for monetary easing shrank due to a lack of space for additional interest 
rate cuts and impaired monetary transmission channels, fiscal policy became a key 
tool for stimulating recovery. The fiscal cost of the economic and financial crisis is 
considerable; in the EU, debt increased from 59 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 83.3 per 
cent in 2012 (European Commission 2011), whilst budget balances deteriorated from 
an average deficit of 0.9 per cent of GDP to over 6.8 per cent (ibid.) between 2007 
and 2009. Given the magnitude of discretionary spending, Skidelsky (2009) 
proclaimed the ‘return of the master’, referring to the Keynesian style policy-mix of 
providing tax rebates or subsidies for private spending and big increases in loan-
financed public spending. Even Robert Lucas, high priest of Chicago economics, 
conceded that ‘we are all Keynesians in the foxhole’ (quoted in Skidelsky 2011: 4).
However the fiscal policy legacy of the Great Recession goes beyond the 
deterioration in public finances bought about by financial sector bailouts, falling tax 
revenues, the operation of automatic stabilisers and deliberate additional Keynesian-
style expansion. Firstly, the events of 2008-2010 lead to a reconsideration of what 
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constitutes group oriented behaviour in the realm of fiscal policy coordination. As 
Member States turned to discretionary fiscal policy, the concern for coordination no 
longer focused on respecting existing deficit ceilings, but on providing sufficient 
stimulus spending. Free-riding refers to the absence of a contribution towards the 
provision of a public good by a group member who stands to benefit from the public 
good in question (see Chapter 2). The onset of the economic crisis redefined the 
scope of free-riding by considering both growth and stability as public goods4. The 
first (and predominantly, pre-crisis) type of free-riding, stability free-riding, 
addresses the hazard of ‘too much’ fiscal expansion relative to a given country’s 
room for fiscal manoeuvre and free-riding on other Member States’ sound fiscal 
policies. The second type consists of ‘too little’ fiscal expansion in response to the 
Great Recession and free-riding on the expansive fiscal policies of other Member 
States. This dissection of free-riding, with growth on the one hand and stability on 
the other, has outlasted the 2008-2010 period and is likely to establish itself as a 
reference point in EU macroeconomic policy coordination. Secondly, and related to 
the first point, the traditional consensus on the ‘sound money and finance paradigm’ 
has not survived the economic fallout unscathed. Faced with an incapacity to explain, 
let alone prevent, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, policy-makers at the domestic 
and EU level are increasingly looking for more nuanced guidelines on 
macroeconomic management. The field of policy contestation is wide open and it 
remains to be seen whether we will witness the funeral or the resurrection of old 
policy paradigms. Yet it already appears in 2013 that, contrary to Blyth’s (2013: 21) 
dismay, austerity politics are not ‘perceived as the only possible response […] in 
Europe’. Finally, amidst the on-going Sovereign Debt Crisis, policy-makers have 
implemented the most substantial overhaul of EU economic governance since the 
Maastricht Treaty, with the causal link running from the crises experience to reforms.
11
4 A public good is a good whose consumption cannot be limited to group members who contributed to 
its production but is available to all, also free-riding, group members (Olson 1965: 35).
By examining fiscal policy coordination during the 2008-2010 period, this thesis 
seeks to enrich our understanding of fiscal policy coordination in ‘hard 
times’ (Gourevitch 1986). Drawing on Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action 
(1965), the focus will be on the determinants of group-oriented behaviour in the 
context of fiscal crisis responses. The central argument of this thesis is that the fiscal 
crisis responses of EU Member States were not coordinated. Yet despite this lack of 
coordination, I find no strong evidence for free-riding behaviour. On the one hand, 
the overarching consensus on the need for counter-cyclical fiscal policies prevented 
growth free-riding (i.e. stimulating ‘too little’). On the other hand, discipline 
imposed by financial market participants contributed to policy-makers’ awareness of 
their limited fiscal space which meant that by and large, stability free-riding (i.e. 
stimulating ‘too much’) was not an issue either. The first finding suggests the 
importance of shared policy ideas in achieving collective action, whilst the second 
points to the role of markets in constraining public finances. I argue that ultimately, 
both can function as a substitute for strong institutional commitment in order to 
shape group oriented behaviour. 
This chapter is organised as follows: The central research question of the thesis will 
be discussed and the framework for the analysis of fiscal policy coordination during 
the Great Recession presented. The next section presents the central research 
question, before placing the study into context with a brief overview over the two 
crises that occurred during the 2008-2010 period. Consideration is then given to the 
broader literature of ‘crisis studies’ and I will place this thesis within this body of 
literature. The main aim of this section is to make the case for an in-depth study of 
EU fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession. Subsequently the short 
history of fiscal policy coordination in the EU, beginning with the creation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997 and ending with the agreement on the 
European Economic Recovery Plan in 2008, will be presented. This provides an 
important backdrop for the analysis, without which we would likely lose the 
significance of the divergence from the old regime in some aspects of fiscal policy 
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coordination when compared to the surprising continuity in other aspects. The 
chapter ends with an outline of the structure of the remainder of the thesis.
Research question
This thesis explores fiscal policy coordination between 2008 and 2010, situated 
during two interrelated crises – the economic and financial crisis which erupted in 
the EU in 2008 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis which began in late 2009. 
Thus the main dependent variables with which I am concerned are fiscal policy 
outcomes. As such, this thesis does not merely consider discretionary stimulus 
packages, but uses a broader set of fiscal policy variables in order to capture the full 
spectrum of fiscal responses to the crises. On the one hand, discretionary fiscal 
policy measures are notoriously difficult to quantify (see Chapter 4). On the other 
hand, I argue that ignoring seemingly ‘automatic’ fiscal policy outcomes fails to 
consider that automatic and discretionary fiscal policies are interrelated choices and 
may furthermore lead to an underestimation of the magnitude of any fiscal crisis 
response strategies. I thus consider four fiscal policy variables  – the budget balance, 
the primary budget balance, the structural balance and the primary structural balance 
– as regressands in the quantitative models of Chapter 5 and 6. Supplemented with 
estimates of fiscal stimulus packages made by the European Commission, the ECB 
and international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these 
measurements allow for a consideration of national response strategies vis-à-vis the 
challenge of EU-wide fiscal stimulus coordination. My central research question is 
thus: 
What are the determinants of fiscal policy coordination in the EU during the 
Great Recession? 
In answering this question, this study makes use of Olson’s (1965) theory of 
collective action. According to Olson, the theory refers to a situation where a 
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collective good provides benefits and/or costs for more than one individual, hence 
requiring coordination of actions. This raises concerns over the issue of free-riding 
which, in the context of fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession, refers 
to growth and stability free-riding. Applying and developing Olson’s approach, I 
seek to explain the limits of fiscal policy coordination in times of crises. Olson 
(1965: 50) distinguishes between three kinds of groups, namely privileged, 
intermediate, and latent. The latter is characterised as suffering from chronic 
collective action failure. As a result, group latency is then inversely related to the 
probability of a public good being provided. However collective action failure in a 
latent group can be overcome by the provision of separate and selective incentives 
(ibid.). This thesis adopts a three-step testing design to systematically develop its 
three main hypotheses from Olson’s theory of collective action. In a first step I 
examine whether, in terms of fiscal policy coordination, EU Member States can be 
characterised as forming a latent group. By specifically identifying the determinants 
of fiscal policy outcomes, I am able to draw inference on group latency. If group 
latency is found to be a problem, Olson suggests the need for incentives to motivate 
group members to contribute to the production of the collective good in question. 
Thus in the second step I examine the workings of different separate and selective 
incentives, identified through fiscal rules/fiscal policy agreements and market 
discipline and consider whether or not they mattered for public finances in times of 
crises. Weak incentives, in turn, would imply a high likelihood of free-riding 
behaviour/collective action failure. The third step of this thesis therefore considers 
the evidence in favour or against stability and growth free-riding during the Great 
Recession.
In the tradition of International Political Economy (IPE) and specifically European 
Political Economy (EPE), this thesis will consist of empirical social science research 
based on direct observations as the foundation or source of knowledge. Observable 
information found in quantitative analyses, along with interview material from key 
actors working on EU fiscal policy coordination, will be employed as the means of 
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answering questions and testing hypotheses. This study seeks to comprehensively 
answer the question of what drove fiscal policy and its coordination in times of 
financial and economic crises. Such an approach implies an appreciation of the 
values and benefits of interdisciplinary research, which the matter under 
consideration requires. In so doing, it will transcend the quantitative/qualitative 
distinction, guided by the methodological framework of the so-called mixed-methods 
approach. Cini and Bourne (2006: 7) remind us that the past 25 years of European 
integration scholarship should give reason for taking this ambition with a pinch of 
salt; the clarion call for interdisciplinary is most often mere window-dressing for 
studies that are in fact multidisciplinary. Avoidance of falling into this camp is part of 
the challenge embraced herein.
A tale of two crises 
In scrutinizing fiscal policy coordination during the 2008- 2010 period, this thesis 
spans both the economic and financial crisis erupting in 2008 and also the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis that erupted in 2009. The analysis of this particular aspect of 
economic policy cooperation therefore considers a tale of two crises. A word on the 
temporal boundaries; setting start and end points for a series of events as complex as 
an economic and financial crisis with its various channels and different effects on 
Member States’ economies is bound to present stylised facts. In the following 
discussion, the Great Recession is situated between the fall of Lehmann Brothers in 
the autumn of 2008 and the agreed end of the EERP in late 2010.
The economic and financial crisis
European leaders were slow to grasp the scope of the financial crisis and to gauge the 
true rate of exposure of their banking sectors (Almunia 2008a). Their view was that 
the crisis was made in the USA, blaming it on ‘irresponsible Anglo-Saxon Financial 
Capitalism’ (Barber 2010) and believing that it would mainly be confined to its 
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geographical boundaries.5 In the words of the former German vice Chancellor Peer 
Steinbrück (2008a) ‘there is no reason  – and I do say this very intentionally – to 
doubt the stability of the German financial system. The German system of universal 
banking has been shown to be more robust and resistant than the American banking 
system’. It was only in mid-2008 when several financial institutions in the UK 
(Northern Rock), Belgium/the Netherlands (Fortis), Germany (Hypo Real Estate), 
Belgium/France/Luxembourg (Dexia), and Ireland (notably Anglo Irish Bank) had to 
be rescued by their respective governments, that the true scope of the crisis became 
clear. European financial institutions, inflicted with a severe shortage of capital and 
substantial asset write-downs, were not immune to the global financial turmoil and 
governments were jolted into action. As policy-makers implemented emergency 
bailout plans to prevent the banking sector from collapsing, the near simultaneous 
break down in demand in almost all of the EU's major trading partners further 
aggravated the shock to the real economy and the financial sector, pushing most of 
Europe’s economies into recession. Unsurprisingly, subsequent stimulus 
programmes, in addition to the working of automatic stabilisers, came at a high and 
immediate fiscal cost. Alongside the abrupt decline in economic activity and revenue 
losses caused by the recession, financial sector support programmes, automatic 
stabilisation and discretionary fiscal packages contributed to a rise in government 
deficits and debt in all EU countries as revenues collapsed. Countries, who prior to 
the Great Recession experienced the build up of large macroeconomic imbalances, 
experienced a more pronounced and protracted economic downturn. These 
imbalances worsened during the Great Recession as credit and housing booms 
evaporated (European Commission 2011). Moreover, crisis response measures also 
impacted on countries’ sovereign risk where bailouts had no immediate balance sheet 
implications and did not show up as rising debt or deficit burdens. The bulk of 
measures aimed at stabilising the financial sector consisted of so-called ‘contingent 
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5 The portrayal of the crisis as a crisis was however hardly accurate, as was the claim of European 
banks being more sound than their US counterparts (Carmassi et al. 2009). Furthermore, five years 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers it appears that overall US banks have had a ‘better crisis’ with 
‘Europe’s banks […] on their knees and Wall Street […] resurgent’ (the Economist 11.05.2013).
liabilities’. These encompassed both obligations dependent on the occurrence of 
some uncertain future event such as government guarantees or non-performing loans, 
and also liabilities that stemmed from the operation of public corporations. 
Contingent liabilities were used extensively in Ireland, the United Kingdom and 
Germany. For example, contingent liabilities taken on by the Irish government in 
2008 amounted to EUR 350 billion and in the EU27 as a whole, the stock of 
contingent liabilities reached 10 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 2009 respectively 
(European Commission 2010). Given that the underlying weaknesses and 
interdependencies of the financial system remained inadequately addressed, these 
contingencies, although not impacting on the headline deficit and debt numbers, had 
implications for the sovereign risk evaluation of the Eurozone and to a lesser extent, 
EU Member states. Thus the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 not only 
fertilised, but in some instances even sowed the very seeds of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis.
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Just one year after marking a decade of existence, the Eurozone descended into the 
most serious crisis of its short history. In contrast to the economic fallout of the Great 
Recession that has proliferated across many Western economies, the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis is a markedly Eurozone phenomenon. That is to say, it is a homemade 
European banking crisis that reflects macroeconomic imbalances and consequently, 
the exposure of banks in numerous Member States to potential debt default (Schelkle 
2011).6 In similar fashion to the events of 2008, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
has been met with surprise by European policy-makers. At the end of 2008, the 
possibility of a full-blown Sovereign Debt Crisis was considerably underestimated 
(European Commission 2009). Through 2008 and 2009, European sovereign debt 
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6 It follows that the very name ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis’ is misleading and can, at best, only account for 
half of the crisis that is shaking the eurozone’s sovereign debt market at the time of writing. Blyth 
(2013: 5ff) discusses the political ramifications of giving labels for this ‘financial-cum-debt-crisis’; 
Rana (2012) examines the economic consequences of crisis mislabelling drawing lessons from Asia.
raised little concern; the focal point of worry was still the stability of the banking 
sector. Yet the global financial crisis caused a reassessment of asset prices and 
growth prospects, particularly for countries with growing macroeconomic 
imbalances (Lane 2012). When the Greek Finance Minister announced in October 
2009 that the debt ratio for 2009 had been ‘miscalculated’ by the previous 
government and was 12.8 per cent of GDP, substantially higher than the 3.6 per cent 
initially reported, Greek access to global capital markets began to decline. The 
unfavourable country-specific shift in market expectations increased the penalty 
already imposed by markets due to the country’s deteriorating macroeconomic 
performance (Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2011). Concerns over Greece's solvency 
were further stirred when the then ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet announced 
that the central bank would phase out acceptance of BBB- rated bonds7 in 2010. This 
raised concerns that Greek bonds would become ineligible for the ECB’s long-term 
refinancing operations (LTRO). The ECB’s LTRO provide financing to banks in the 
Eurozone (see Cour-Thimann and Winkler 2012), with the central aim of providing 
sufficient liquidity. Since domestic banks are usually key purchasers of sovereign 
debt, this mechanism was considered as a way to circumvent the ban on bond 
purchases by the ECB. When the ECB temporarily suspended Greek government 
debt from being used as collateral in LTRO, all three major credit rating agencies 
further downgraded Greece’s status to that of ‘junk status’.8 The resulting adverse 
borrowing conditions forced Greece to accept the conditionality of EU financial 
assistance and to give up large parts of its sovereignty in matters of national 
economic management. Since May 2010, after ‘several long months of protracted 
negotiation’ (Hodson 2011: 231), eurozone Member States and the IMF have been 
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7 Credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch use an alphabetical system to 
denote the credit worthiness of debt securities. AAA is accordingly the highest/best rating. Anything 
lower than a BBB- rating is considered a speculative or junk bond. In addition to the ECB, many 
government pension funds are required by law to only invest in highly rated bonds (Langohr and 
Langohr 2008:15). Insurance companies and mutual funds often have similar internal thresholds (ibid. 
147).
8 The initial credit rating downgrade of Greek bonds proved to be the first of many. Overall, between 
October 2009 and July 2011 Greece was downgraded 6 times by S&P, 6 times by Moody’s, and 7 
times by Fitch (Ardagna and Caselli 2012: 4).
providing financial support to Greece through, as of November 2013, two Economic 
Adjustment Programmes.
The Sovereign Debt Crisis has not been confined to Greece alone; it has put severe 
pressure on the bonds of other EMU countries and in so doing, bought the focus of 
free-riding back to the question of stability free-riding. Policy-makers were propelled 
into creating new institutions in order to provide financial assistance to Member 
States; the first wave of such assistance was provided under the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). As it became increasingly clear that the turmoil in the 
sovereign debt and financial markets was unlikely to come to an end soon, EU 
policy-makers agreed to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM, see 
Gocaj and Meunier 2013). It was installed in October 2012 as a permanent 
intergovernmental organisation and took over provision of stability support to 
eurozone Member States, ring fencing some !750bn for countries in need. Since 
Greece first received assistance, a further four Eurozone Member States have asked 
for financial support9. In November 2010, Ireland officially requested financial 
assistance from the EU amounting to a joint financing package of !85bn; this was 
followed in April 2011 by Portugal, who received a package of !78bn. Spain 
requested financial assistance in June 2012, worth a total of up to !100bn. At the 
time of writing, the last country to request financial assistance is Cyprus; it was 
agreed in April 2013 that the ESM would provide !10bn to the Republic. However 
concerns remain that other countries may need financial assistance from the ESM. 
Even six years after the global crisis erupted, EU Member States find themselves 
with disquietingly fragile macro economies and financial sectors. The contagion 
effects, particularly felt in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, reinstalled 
‘stability’ as the key public good which needed protecting from free-riding 
behaviour. The conditionality of the EU financial assistance seeks to provide 
Member States with an incentive to introduce what is perceived to be group oriented 
behaviour, namely swift fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic reforms.
19
9 As of late 2013.
In the shadow of the Sovereign Debt Crisis
The Sovereign Debt Crisis has sparked a rapidly expanding literature on the EU’s 
experience, analysing the crisis’ causes, considering appropriate policy responses and 
comparing the trajectories of different countries.10 In light of the enormous 
challenges and far-reaching consequences of the Sovereign Debt Crisis, this 
burgeoning body of work is centred on possible solutions, identified predominantly 
in new financial regulation and reforming EU economic governance. This focus is 
understandable. The study of fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession 
has been eclipsed by the events of 2010/2011. What is more, given the renewed 
concern about fiscal consolidation and the quest to identify appropriate instruments 
to rein in public deficits, the short period of stimulus spending (2008-2010) 
throughout the developed world seems but a distant memory. This thesis is an 
attempt to pay attention to a short-lived period of commonly agreed fiscal expansion.  
I argue that a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of fiscal policy outcomes 
and their coordination in exceptional times is of interest to those who wish to better 
understand the possibilities and conditions for collective action in times of crisis and 
beyond. 
New aspects of fiscal policy coordination
Both the rationale for and direction of fiscal policy coordination were shifted by the 
two crises. Firstly, as will be further explored in Chapter 2, the need and scope for 
the coordination of fiscal policies was both greater and potentially more beneficial in 
times of crisis; fiscal policy emerged as a crucial instrument in mitigating the crisis 
and as such was used extensively. Second, previously ‘coordination [had to] be 
understood as an agreement to enforce fiscal discipline […] to avoid any spill-over 
caused by irresponsible policies’ (Fatàs and Mihov 2003: 126). It is noteworthy that 
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10 See e.g. Featherstone 2011; Tsoukalis 2011; Begg 2012; Eichengreen 2012; Lane 2012; Schelkle 
2011.
prior to 2008, the notion of ‘irresponsibility’ corresponded to exceeding the SGP's 3 
per cent deficit threshold. Conversely, this thesis presents an appraisal of fiscal 
policy coordination considering fiscal crisis responses. Whereas fiscal policy 
coordination pre-crisis was aimed at curbing Member States’ deficits, the initial goal 
of the EU’s crisis framework was to bring about coordinated expansion. Heipertz and 
Verdun (2010) argue the Great Recession opened a new chapter in the history of the 
SGP. Extending their claim, I argue that the economic and financial crisis has opened 
a new chapter not only for the SGP but also for EU fiscal policy coordination as a 
whole. This thesis will chart and analyse its development.  
The visibility of hard times
I argue that the variation in fiscal outcomes across countries cannot be fully 
explained by differences in the economic environment alone. They are not inevitable 
results of economic imperatives. ‘Public policies seldom, if ever, represent a 
definitive solution of (sic) a problem’ (Majone 1975: 270). Majone’s statement can 
also be applied to the fiscal policy choices made by EU governments. The hard times 
of the Great Recession were times of ‘very visible policies’ (Schelkle 2012a: 375). 
Policy-makers were faced with enormous challenges to stabilise and support national 
economies and the public finance decisions made during the Great Recession will 
cast a long shadow. In terms of fiscal policy outcomes the legacy of the 2008 to 2010 
period reads bleakly. Debt is on course to continue to rise; Projections by the 
Commission show that average debt in the EU will rise well above 100 per cent of 
GDP by 2015 and continue rising to exceed 130 per cent of GDP by 2020 (European 
Commission 2010).
In terms of the political legacy, the Great Recession has reopened old and largely 
dormant conflicts. When is austerity ‘too much of a good thing’ (Corsetti 2013)? 
When is fiscal expansion warranted? When are Member States free-riding on other 
Member States’ growth policies? In the 1990s such questions sparked tensions when 
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designing the architecture for a common European currency, testament to which can 
be seen in the creation and reform of the Stability and Growth Pact whose compound 
name is an attempt to mollify two frequently conflicting policy goals (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999; Heipertz and Verdun 2010). During the Great Recession the 
debate on the merits of active demand management intensified. Since 2008, 
Germany has repeatedly been accused of engaging in beggar-thy-neighbour policies, 
‘waiting for other less well-placed countries to do most of the work and reaping the 
benefits once exports pick up’ (Financial Times 26.11.2008). In the wake of the 
Great Recession, charges of stimulus free-riding were replaced by heated debates 
engaging both policy-makers and academics on the question of austerity policies.11 
Criticism was particularly levelled against the speed of fiscal consolidation. On the 
one hand, Wyplosz (2013) warned that ‘adopting contractionary fiscal policies in the 
teeth of a double-dip recession never made sense’. On the other hand, the ECB Vice-
President Victor Constancio, consistent with the central banks’ reputation as a fiscal 
hawk, proclaimed that seeking to stimulate economies by stopping measures aimed 
at cutting government debt would merely increase countries' borrowing costs rather 
than triggering growth (the Economist 24.4.2013). 
The heightened visibility, or perhaps more fittingly volume, of fiscal crisis responses 
and crucially the significant consequentiality of said makes the study of public 
finances in times of crisis particularly compelling. The Great Recession presents a 
new opportunity to examine EU and domestic level responses to a global economic 
shock, and by comparing national differences, to draw future lessons for fiscal policy 
coordination. It is the opportunity offered by a ‘bad-weather test’ (Heipertz and 
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11 The public row surrounding Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) influential article “Growth in a Time of 
Debt”, which was repeatedly used as justification for austerity-minded policy-makers such as the 
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2011), is perhaps the most prominent example.
Verdun 2010: 174).12 A full appreciation of ‘how we got there’ is especially 
warranted in the context of the shift of scholarly attention to the on-going Sovereign 
Debt Crisis and the revamped architecture of the EU’s economic governance. Whilst 
Featherstone (2012) offers an analysis on the economic governance reform, the 
EERP is relegated to a mere footnote. The fact that he barely acknowledges the crisis 
framework that broke away from the fiscal conservatism of the past 20 years is 
especially puzzling given that his account evolves around the concept of ‘path 
dependency’.13 A deeper understanding of the realties of and processes for fiscal 
policy coordination during the Great Recession should improve our understanding of 
the post 2011 reforms that have lead to the most comprehensive supranational system 
of economic and budgetary surveillance to date.
Crises as engines of reform
A rich body of political economy literature establishes the supposition that crisis is 
the instigator of change (e.g. Nelson 1990; Rodrik 1996). Even prior to Gourevitch’s 
(1986) Politics in Hard Times, social scientists were drawn to the political 
opportunities created by emergency and crisis: ‘That economic crises seem either to 
facilitate or outright cause economic reform is part of the new conventional wisdom 
on reform’ (Tommasi and Velasco 1996: 197).14 Most of these accounts consider 
crises to open a unique window of opportunity for change, whose size corresponds to 
‘the degree and scope of societal demand’ (Cortell and Peterson 1999: 187, see also 
Akerlof 1991). This notion of crises as opportunities is particularly prominent in the 
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12 The qualification of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ economic times remains a comparative exercise and may not 
hold up against future events. For example, Deroose and Langedijk (2002: 216) argue that ‘the rapid 
economic downturn during the course of 2001 is the first real stress test for the macroeconomic policy 
coordination framework’. Along similar lines, in his empirical analysis on the enforcement of the SGP, 
Annett (2006) distinguishes between ‘good times’ (1999-2000) and ‘bad times’ (2001-2004). Revising 
events amidst the unfolding Sovereign Debt Crisis, Schuknecht et al. (2011: 16) conclude that ‘the 
first nine years of the euro – from 1999 to 2007 – can, in retrospect, probably be best characterised as 
“wasted good times”’.
13 See Pierson (2000).
14 The causal relationship between crises and change have been attested in various contexts, be it war 
(e.g. Gilpin 1981, Ruttan 2006) or financial and economic crises (e.g. Noble and Ravenhill 2000; 
Aberbach and Christensen 2001).
literature on institutional change (e.g. Blyth 2002; Widmaier et al. 2007; Amable and 
Palombarini 2009).15 Whereas McNamara (1998) sees EMU as a result of an neo-
liberal ideational shift resulting from the collapse of Keynesian ideas, this thesis 
considers the move away from the dominating ‘sound finance and monetary 
paradigm’ (also called ‘Great Moderation’ paradigm) towards first, a speedy embrace 
of stimulus policies to mitigate the economic fallout and subsequently a deeper 
understanding and broader definition of macroeconomic stability that preceded the 
‘Great Moderation’ paradigm.
Studies on European integration are laden with ‘crisis to change’ accounts (Jo 2007). 
Monnet (1976) famously proclaimed that ‘l’Europe se fera dans les crises et elle sera 
la somme des solutions apportées à ces crises’16. Dyson follows the shift from the 
German position of ‘monetary hegemony’ (2000: 646) under the old exchange rate 
mechanism to a more open competition for cognitive leadership. This initial 
disturbance of ‘hegemonic equilibrium’ offered small states new scope for influence. 
A related body of literature inspired by social constructivism has studied the role of 
ideas on the road to Maastricht and beyond. Marcussen (1998), for example, uses the 
concept of ‘ideational equilibrium’ in the context of the ‘ideological life-cycle’ to 
map the genesis of the ideational set-up of EMU. He argues that the disturbance of 
an ‘ideational equilibrium’ results from external shocks which challenge the shared 
knowledge structure within the macroeconomic organisational field and lead to 
periods of 'critical junctures' (Collier and Collier 1991). It remains to be seen 
whether the crises of 2008-2010 will become known as a ‘critical junction’ or a 
‘tipping point’ for fiscal policy coordination in the EU, but as the fog of the financial 
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15 Amable and Palombarini (2009) use a neorealist approach to analyse different types of institutional 
change that may take place in political crisis or systemic crisis. Blyth’s (2002) study of embedded 
liberalism in twentieth-century Sweden and the United States investigate the relationship between 
economic policy and economic ideas and evolves around the claim that ideas serve as diagnostic and 
prognostic devices in the space opened up by an existing crisis. Widmaier et al. (2007) discuss the role 
of wars and economic crises as ‘socially constructed openings for change’ (ibid. 747). 
16 Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.
and economic fallout is lifting, it is clear that the crises have spurred a flurry of 
potentially far-reaching reforms for EU economic governance.
Pre-crises fiscal policy coordination 
This thesis examines fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession. As such 
it is therefore not the place,for a history of EMU’s creation, nor for an extensive 
review of the SGP application during the first decade of EMU. A little historical 
context and the introduction of key aspects of fiscal policy coordination are desirable 
however, in order to make sense of what follows. To this end, this section considers 
the key development of pre-crisis fiscal policy coordination, before turning to the 
creation of the EERP in 2008. In the course of the Great Recession, the weaknesses 
of the existing framework for fiscal policy coordination have become apparent and 
early warnings about its ability to survey and manage public finance have been 
confirmed (e.g Eichengreen and von Hagen 1996, Kopits and Symansky 1998). 
Despite impressions to the contrary, the procedures for fiscal policy coordination are 
quite extensive, although reinforced with little political and legal power. The array of 
committees, mechanisms and processes aimed at effective fiscal policy coordination 
has progressively been increasing during the last decade. The rationale for, and 
history surrounding, the creation of the SGP are thoroughly documented; Heipertz 
and Verdun (2010), for example, have directed much attention to analysing the 
creation and development of the SGP. Their work remains the most comprehensive 
and insightful study of the Pact to date, amidst a rich body of literature on the SGP’s 
birth, implementation and related questions of fiscal policy coordination.17 Whilst it 
was agreed during the Dublin European Council on 14 December 1996, the Pact’s 
origins date back to a proposal by the then German Finance Minister Theodor Waigel 
(encouraged by the Bundesbank) in 1995, which insisted on the necessity of a fiscal 
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17 E.g. Gros and Thygesen 1992; Eichengreen 1996; Frieden et al. 1998; Dyson and Featherstone 
1999; Heisenberg 1999; Hughes Hallett et al. 1999; Bruncila et al. 2001; Buti and Sapir 2002; Dyson 
2000.
rule that would prevent countries with poor records of fiscal discipline from 
attempting to ‘free-ride’ on the budgetary 'prudence' of other states.
The SGP regulates multilateral budgetary surveillance in a twofold manner. First, its 
preventive arm, as expressed in Regulation 1466/97, specifies a deficit limit of 3 per 
cent of GDP,18 which provides an early warning mechanism that may lead to policy 
recommendations being made to a Member State if deemed necessary.  Secondly its 
dissuasive arm, expressed in Regulation 1467/97, governs the Excessive Debt 
Procedure (EDP), which is triggered if the deficit should breach the 3 per cent 
threshold. The decisions on the EDP are subject to a highly politicised procedure that 
notably involves the consent of Ecofin, the Council of Economic and Finance 
Ministers. Theoretically, non-compliance of Eurozone Member States could lead to 
sanctions of between 0.2 and 0.5 per cent of GDP.
The economic and political logic of the Pact was contested from the first moments of 
its creation. Notably, Jacques Delors, the architect behind the new currency union, 
considered the provisions a ‘great disappointment’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 
741); his vision of EMU was one where a balance between the economic and 
monetary pillar should be ensured by comprehensive economic policy coordination. 
Yet the SGP was strongly biased towards a preoccupation with monetary policy, 
whilst fiscal policy was to be evaluated by its low-inflation merits. This focus 
contrasted with Delors’ plan favouring fiscal and structural requirements of a viable 
EMU that would not only be able and willing to address asymmetric shocks, but also 
be able to advance economic growth and employment. Many prominent economists 
of the time chimed in with their critique of the SGP. Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1998) for instance assess the costs and benefits of EMU’s new fiscal rules, 
concluding that European governments should put more effort into labour market 
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18 This threshold is often portrayed as arbitrary. Larch et al. (2010:18) however explain that this 
reference value was chosen because in the early 1990s it was the maximum deficit that, with an 
average GDP growth rate of 3 per cent in and an inflation target of 2 per cent, was consistent with a 
declining debt level.
reform and not rely on single-minded fixation with deficit reduction. In a similar 
vein, Buiter et al. (1992) argue that the fiscal convergence criteria,19 which later 
morphed into the SGP, should be disregarded entirely or applied only loosely in order 
to avoid the risk of serious ‘fiscal overkill’. 
The SGP in action
The first application of the SGP came in the spring of 2002. Portugal had run up a 
deficit of 4.4 per cent of GDP in 2001 and was expected to continue to run a deficit 
of over 3 per cent the following year. A month after the Commission had issued a 
recommendation for an early warning, Ecofin declined to provide their endorsement, 
arguing that there was not yet cause for concern, even if the government’s budget 
deficit was to rise quickly (Leblond 2006). Despite this, the Commission launched 
the EDP in July 2002 and recommended a programme for the correction of the 
deficit under article 104(6), which was agreed by the Council of Ministers on 5 
November. When a new centre-right government came to power under Manuel 
Barroso in May 2002, the deficit was brought below the threshold. In light of this 
consolidation effort, Ecofin decided to revoke the earlier decision on the existence of 
an excessive20 deficit in May 2004, despite the fact that Portugal was very likely to 
breach the reference value again in that very year.
After this relatively non-confrontational application of the SGP, the real test for 
EMU’s fiscal rules arose in 2003 when the French and German deficits were (again) 
above the 3 per cent threshold. As stated in Articles 104 (9) and 104 (11) of the EC 
Treaty, the Council decided in January and June 2003 on the recommendation to 
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19 The Convergence Criteria presented in Article 121(1) of the EC Treaty establish the degree of 
economic convergence, which the Member States must attain in order to qualify for eurozone 
membership. Economic convergence is evaluated in the annual convergence programmes for applicant 
Member States and stability programmes for eurozone Member States according to a set of 
macroeconomic indicators found in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; inflation rates, interest rates, sound 
public finances, sustainable public finances, and nominal exchange rates.
20 All subsequent mentions of excessive deficits refer to the characterisation of excessive deficits 
according to the SGP (i.e. exceeding 3 per cent of GDP).
Germany and France respectively, labelling their deficits ‘excessive’. In addition to a 
strongly rooted support for fiscal prudence and stability, the symbolism of receiving 
a ‘blue letter’ from Brussels with regards missed deficit targets is particularly 
humiliating in the German context; even schoolchildren know to associate it with the 
embarrassing warning letters schools send out every summer in order to pupils who 
are about to fail a class. Commentators and oppositional politicians echoed this 
‘humiliation’ aspect (see e.g. Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013).
The suspected weakness of the Pact was confirmed, when on 25 November 2003 
Ecofin suspended the EDP for France and Germany. Protest was heard, particularly 
from the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden. The Dutch finance minister, 
Gerrit Zalm, even accused the bigger Member States of ‘bullying’ smaller ones, 
complaining that some countries had been intimidated by France and Germany 
(Sunday Times 30.11 2003). Many observers and scholars observed the absence, and 
eventual suspension, of sanctions as the death of the Pact (e.g. Collignon 2003; de 
Haan et al. 2003; Begg and Schelkle 2004). 
Due to the non-application of the EDP, the Commission pursued legal action against 
the Council (C-27/04), although with little success: The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) ruling scolded Ecofin, stating that it ‘cannot depart from the rules laid down 
by the treaty’ (Financial Times 13.07.2004). However at the same time, the Court 
avoided key questions on the nature and the concatenation of the SGP’s procedure, as 
well as on the division of power between Council and Commission in the 
enforcement of national budgetary discipline (Dutzler and Hable 2005). The ECJ 
ruled that the Council had the right to not adopt the Commission’s recommendation, 
but that it did not have the right to then adopt its own recommendation instead, thus 
overwriting the Commission’s proposal. The decision gave the Eurozone 
governments leeway in interpreting the EU’s controversial set of budget rules 
‘leaving [the Pact] vulnerable to political manoeuvres in Ecofin’ (Sadeh 2006: 11). 
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The decision of the Council of Finance Ministers in November 2003 not to impose 
sanctions on countries that had breached the deficit limit for two years in succession 
left the Pact in limbo throughout 2004. Most Member State governments sought 
reform. Notably, the German Chancellor and French President had both called for a 
softening of the Pact on numerous occasions between 2003 and 2005 (e.g. Le Monde 
16.07.2003; Handelsblatt 18.03.2005). The exact content of proposed reforms 
differed vastly across the political spectrum with some, such as the Netherlands, 
calling for a stronger Pact and others such as France demanding more flexibility and 
stronger engagement in policy coordination (Howarth 2007). In June 2004 the 
European Council asked the Commission to deliver proposals for clarifying and 
strengthening the implementations of the Pact (CEC 2004). A consensus on the 
reform of the SGP was finally reached on the 20th of March, after fierce debates in 
the Eurogroup21, the European Council and Ecofin. 
Reforming the SGP
An important change in the 2005 reform of the Pact was the introduction of 
differentiated ‘medium-term objectives’ (MTOs). Whereas the old Pact merely stated 
that Member States should maintain medium-term budgetary positions that are ‘close 
to balance or in surplus’, under the new Pact each Member State presents its own 
state-specific MTOs. While maintaining a safety margin with respect to the 3 per 
cent deficit limit, the MTOs should take into account the economic characteristics of 
each state, in particular the debt-to-GDP ratio and potential growth. The reformed 
Pact also introduces new provisions concerning the adjustment effort that should be 
made in order to reach the MTOs. This adjustment should be equal to 0.5 per cent of 
GDP per year as a benchmark, with more effort in good times, and possibly less in 
bad times. Furthermore, the Commission may issue policy advice to encourage 
Member States to pursue the structural adjustment path towards their MTOs.
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21 The Eurogroup consists of economic and finance ministers of the eurozone only (although other 
Member States may be invited as well). The Eurogroup is an important forum for dialogue with 
regular attendance of the ECB President and members from the Commission. 
A central revision of the EU’s fiscal rules is the extension of the exemption from the 
deficit threshold. Whereas previously only negative growth and events outside the 
control of the Member States were permissible, a Member State can now evoke, for 
instance, systemic pension reforms or a sustained period of low growth which will 
allow for a postponement of the steps towards being reprimanded or even fined 
under the EDP (Schelkle 2009: 8). The negotiations of these ‘expenditure 
exceptions’ were not unlike a bazaar where each state tried to make bargains and 
cater to their personal budgetary realities and preferences (for a summary see Morris 
et al. 2006).
The existing escape clause within the SGP was left unchanged by the 2005 reform. 
This clause stipulates two specific conditions that warrant the breach of existing 
rules: closeness and temporariness. First, the waiver provision stipulates that a deficit 
of more than 3 per cent of GDP should not be considered excessive and hence may 
warrant an exemption of the rules if and only if it stays close to the 3 per cent 
threshold (TEU 126, 2-3). Concretely, the Regulation on speeding up and clarifying 
the implementation of the EDP (EC Regulation No. 1467/97) specifies that in order 
to fall under the escape clause the deficit ratio has always to remain close to the 
reference value. Secondly, any excess over the reference value must be temporary. In 
order for the excess to be considered temporary, the Commission’s budgetary 
forecast must indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following 
the end of the unusual event or the severe economic downturn. Any deficit above 3 
per cent that is neither close to the reference value nor temporary should be 
considered excessive, irrespective of exceptional circumstances.
The reformed Pact was applied at time of a strong economic upturn. To the degree 
that the economic climate improved, so too did compliance with the SGP. In 2008 the 
Commission presented an optimistic scenario for public finances in the EU: with the 
abrogation of EDPs for the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia in June 
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2008, procedures only remained active for two non-euro-area members, Hungary and 
Poland, with the latter then expected to soon come to a close (European Commission 
2009). Yet despite broad compliance even before the crisis hit, European fiscal policy 
coordination remained contested. In particular the newly elected French President, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, challenged the ‘pseudo-dictatorship of the market’ (New York Times 
5 July 2007) and announced that France would put off balancing the French budget 
until 201222. A likely conflict between Germany and France on a strict 
implementation of the SGP was prevented by the economic and financial crisis. 
After a first decade of seeking to coordinate fiscal policies at the EU level, few 
would argue that fiscal policy coordination was a success. What does the failure to 
coordinate fiscal constraints in comparatively rosy times tell us about the prospects 
for coordinating fiscal crisis responses? An implicit assumption running through the 
SGP literature is that of the ‘deficit and debt bias’ of modern democracies. In a 
nutshell, policy-makers who wish to maximise their electoral support are said to 
incur larger budget deficits than would be advisable according to the ‘sound finance 
paradigm’. The SGP sought to counter-balance this bias with a clear commitment 
towards ‘sound’ fiscal policies. But in times of crisis the challenge was not to 
coordinate fiscal constraints, but fiscal stimulus policies. Given governments’ deficit 
spending propensity, is this task likely to be easier than the task of imposing fiscal 
constraints? If governments resisted a deficit ceiling, would they be more inclined 
towards group oriented behaviour that expressly encourages expansive fiscal 
policies? 
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22 In its 2009 opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit, the Commission report (SEC 2009, 569 
final) calls out a lack of consolidation effort: ‘Apart from the above-mentioned economic downturn 
impact, the excess over the 3 % threshold from 2008 is also a reflection of the fact that, since 2002, 
the deficit in France has been high and, either above, or still close to the 3 % threshold, therefore not 
providing any room for manoeuvre for a downturn, either whether severe or normal. The structural 
balance deteriorated in 2007, although economic circumstances were better and the government did 
not plan a significant structural adjustment for 2008 either, when the economic outlook was sill 
substantially more favourable. Even after the previous existing deficit procedure was abrogated in 
early 2007, and despite repeated commitments for an acceleration of the budgetary adjustment in 
successive stability programmes and related Council recommendations, as well as in its policy advice 
of 28 May 2008, the necessary fiscal consolidation was not carried out or planned.’ 
The framework for fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession: the 
EERP
The first wave of crisis reactions in 2008 did not address the question of stimulus 
coordination, but was instead aimed at the financial sector. In keeping with fiscal 
response strategies, these efforts were predominantly unilateral (Pauly 2009). 
Seemingly oblivious to the clear signs that the financial crisis would have severe 
repercussions for the real economy, the Council’s conclusion (ECOFIN 2008) on 
October 7th 2008 stated that the reformed SGP ‘is the adequate framework and 
should be fully applied. It contains flexibility to allow for fiscal policy to play its 
normal stabilisation function [...] relatively large European automatic stabilisers can 
help cushion the slowdown, while respecting the 3 per cent of GDP deficit 
threshold.’23 That is to say, the Pact did ‘not allow for discretionary fiscal 
expansions, unless a country has significantly over-achieved its budgetary 
objectives’ (Larch et al. 2010). At an emergency summit on October 12, Member 
States reached an agreement on national responses to ensure liquidity for financial 
institutions (Quaglia et al. 2009); yet concrete fiscal policy measures and targets 
were not addressed. Instead, Member States vaguely pledged ‘to coordinate measures 
to address the consequences of the financial crisis on the real economy’ (Eurogroup 
2008); key terms such as ‘stimuli or ‘discretionary spending’ were notable only in 
their absence. On October 29, stimulus measures were publicly, albeit in meaning 
and not in name, on the agenda of the Commission with the Communication ‘From 
financial crisis to recovery: A European framework for action’ (European 
Commission 2008). Here the Commission laid the groundwork for what would 
become an attempt to coordinate fiscal stimulus programmes in the EU. Fifty days 
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23 According to one interviewee ‘the crisis hit us at the Commission by surprise. I remember the very 
same day when Lehman went bust, we were gathering for the autumn forecast and beaming with 
optimism, among other things because it looked like Germany had finally overcome its structural 
crisis’ (author interview, May 2011). Along similar lines one interviewee from the Commission 
conceded that ‘the amplitude of crisis came as a big surprise’ (author interview, March 2011). The 
Commission was hardly alone in its underestimation of the crisis. Jean-Claude Juncker, then chairman 
of the eurozone finance ministers, proclaimed in September 2008 that ‘[it] shouldn't be said that 
Europe is on the brink of recession’ (quoted in Barber 2008).
after the initial re-endorsement of the 3 per cent deficit threshold, the Commission 
finally proposed a more detailed EU recovery framework on November 26.
In the preface of the EERP, the Commission introduced the plan as a bold policy 
initiative in times of crisis, presenting itself as a leader in such times. According to 
the recovery plan, national budgetary stimulus packages should fulfil four criteria: 
First they should be temporary. That is to say, measures under the EERP (2008) to 
boost demand must be designed to deliver ‘immediate effects, be of limited 
duration’. Secondly, they should be targeted. In other words, policy measures must 
be aimed at those sectors most affected and the most important with regards the 
structure of the economy, such as the automotive industry or the construction sector. 
Thirdly, measures should be timely so that they quickly support economic activity 
during the period of low demand, as delays in implementation could mean that the 
fiscal impulse only comes when the recovery is underway. Finally, stimulus packages 
should be coordinated so that they multiply the positive impact and ensure long-term 
budgetary sustainability.
At the heart of the EERP is the call on Member States to implement an immediate 
budgetary impulse amounting to !200bn (1.5 per cent of EU GDP), comprised of a 
budgetary expansion by Member States of !170bn (around 1.2 per cent of EU GDP), 
and EU funding in support of immediate actions of the order of !30bn (around 0.3 
per cent of EU GDP). The EU funding was mainly invested into infrastructure 
programmes and linked to other existing programmes such as the European 
Structural Funds and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: a) !5bn of 
unspent money under the EU budget to trans-European energy inter-connections and 
broadband infrastructure projects, b) !500 million call for proposals for trans-
European transport projects (where this money will lead to construction beginning 
before the end of 2009), c) !5bn ‘European green cars initiative’, which was 
essentially a research partnership between the public and private sectors (including 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), and industry contributions) on smart 
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infrastructures and technologies for using renewable and non-polluting energy 
sources for cars, d) !1bn 'European energy-efficient buildings initiative'. 
Correspondingly, the EIB increased its financing of climate change, energy security 
and infrastructure investments by up to !6bn per year. This is part of a strategy aimed 
at giving the EIB a larger role in economic recovery; its annual interventions in the 
EU were accordingly increased by some !15bn in 2009 and 2010. The European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development added a further !500 million to its present 
level of financing in the new Member States in 2009 and 2010. Given that all initial 
sources for these projects stem from the Member States themselves and that in some 
instances (e.g. the European green cars initiative or an increase in EIB lending) the 
Member States were asked to contribute more money, the official distinction between 
EU funding and national funding is somewhat misleading. 
The EERP (2008) includes the understatement that fiscal efforts ‘may lead some 
Member States to breach the 3 per cent GDP deficit reference value’. In fact, all 
Member States except Sweden and Estonia were in violation of the 3 per cent ceiling 
at some point between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, the EERP (2008) relaxes the 
‘temporary’ criterion of the SGP; the speed of corrective action was contingent on 
the speed of recovery, which meant that the Commission introduced greater leniency 
with respect to rectifying the excessive deficit situation. The EERP neglected to 
make explicit or implicit reference to the ‘closeness’ criterion of the Pact. The 
qualification of Joaquín Almunia ‘that [close] means a few decimals, not many 
decimals’ (quoted in Tait 2008), did not find its way into official agreements or 
guidelines. The EERP does not introduce an actual limit on stimulus spending, either 
in absolute or in relative terms. The European Council approved the EERP on 12 
December 2008, in doing so advocating a recovery plan that was seemingly at odds 
with a strict reading of the SGP. This development is noteworthy. After decades of 
championing low deficits and debt levels, the Commission emerged as an unlikely 
advocate of stimulus policies throughout the European Union, relaxing the 
application of existing rules under the SGP. The crisis framework laid out in the 
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EERP represented a first attempt not to coordinate fiscal constraints, but rather fiscal 
expansion.
The Structure of this Thesis
This study explores the state and dynamics of fiscal policy and its coordination 
amongst EU Member States during the economic and financial crises of 2008-2010. 
The subsequent chapter unpacks the concept of coordination and examines the 
rationales for and against fiscal policy coordination in the EU in the context of policy 
interdependence. The basic argument in favour of fiscal policy coordination is found 
in the need to internalise externalities arising from spillover effects. In times of crisis 
the externalities of fiscal policy choices are potentially greater due to an increased 
scope for government action. The challenge for fiscal policy coordination in times of 
crisis is then to prevent two types of free-riding behaviour. The first, growth free-
riding, arises when one country benefits from other countries’ expansive fiscal 
policies, whilst the second, stability free-riding, considers the hazard of fiscal 
expansion, which would threaten the stability of the eurozone/EU.
Chapter three discusses the conceptual framework, research hypotheses and methods 
of the thesis, beginning with an introduction to the theoretical centre of this research: 
collective action theory. Olson’s (1965) body of work is the starting point of the three 
main hypotheses considering the EU’s group latency, incentives for collective action 
and free riding behaviour. These hypotheses will be tested using a mixed-methods 
approach consisting of qualitative and quantitative methods. This combination of 
nuanced interview material with arguably more blunt econometric techniques 
espouses methodological pluralism and seeks to enrich our understanding of the 
subject at hand. Before engaging in hypotheses testing, the fourth chapter considers 
adequate measurements for fiscal policy outcomes and fiscal policy coordination in 
times of economic and financial crisis. Finding appropriate indicators that are able to 
reflect discretionary policy choices is challenging given the substantial role of 
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automatic stabilisers, dubious aggregation techniques to boost stimulus figures and 
the accounting of financial sector rescue operations. This study therefore adopts a 
centripetal measurement approach, relying on different measures with diminishing 
policy discretion. The four dependent variables measuring fiscal policy outcomes are 
the budget balance, the primary budget balance, the structural balance and the 
primary structural balance.
Having identified suitable fiscal policy indicators, chapter five provides an empirical 
investigation into the determinants of public finances during the Great Recession, 
analysing time-series cross-sectional data from the 27 EU Member States over a 3-
year time period (2008-2010). Post-war economic history provides evidence that 
fiscal authorities in industrialised countries may be prone to a deficit-bias, which 
shows up in large and persistent deficits and growing public debts. The empirical 
analysis shows that this bias is stronger during the Great Recession and that political-
economy factors have indeed shaped public finances. This suggests that fiscal policy 
was not merely driven by economic conditions, but a complex result of intervening 
political features. This finding has important implications for fiscal policy 
coordination. Given the heterogeneous political landscape of EU Member States, 
with a different electoral calendar, partisan outlook, executive and legislative 
makeup, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to be heterogeneous across Member States. 
The importance of political determinants of crisis responses suggests that there was a 
danger of Member States either under- or over-stimulating their national economies, 
in other words free-riding. Deterrents to free-riding are thought to be found in the 
provision of separate and selective incentives. 
Chapter six scrutinises two types of different incentives that are thought to affect 
fiscal policy choices; fiscal rules and market discipline. The empirical findings 
suggest that domestic fiscal rules such as debt brakes, did not impact on the fiscal 
policy responses to the Great Recession. Similarly, EU level fiscal agreements, the 
SGP and the newly created EERP, did not impact on fiscal policy choices. In contrast 
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to these fiscal rules and intergovernmental agreements, the incentives provided by 
market discipline are found to steer public finances. Importantly, this effect is 
stronger for eurozone Member States, whose fiscal policy choices and outcomes – in 
the absence of debt monetization – are viewed more critical by financial market 
participants. These findings show an asymmetry: while stability free-riding was 
punished by the existence of separate and selective incentives in the form of market 
discipline, there were no effective incentives in place to limit growth free-riding. 
Neither fiscal rules, be they EU or domestic in nature, nor market participants 
disciplined policy-makers who failed to stimulate the national economy. This 
asymmetry is interesting given that prior to 2010 the discourse on free-riding focused 
predominantly on growth free-riding. What is more, the 2011 created 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), which aims to prevent and correct 
imbalances throughout the EU, is clearly biased towards debtor countries (cast as 
likely stability free-riders) although it recently started to recognise the consequences 
of imbalances found in surplus/creditor countries (likely growth free-riders).
Chapter seven investigates both stability and free-riding behaviour. Accusations of 
stimulus or growth free-riding are not borne out by factual evidence. First, the 
findings of this chapter suggest that countries with a stronger export position, a larger 
population, and a larger economy implemented larger, not smaller, stimulus 
programmes. Secondly, countries with limited fiscal space, as set out in the EERP, 
did by and large abstain from large stimulus programmes. This study will conclude 
by considering future developments in fiscal policy coordination. I argue that as 
‘stressful heterogeneities’ between EU Member States are increasing, the importance 
of Olsonian incentives to induce group-oriented fiscal policy outcomes will increase. 
Despite apparent shortcomings in the wave of economic governance reforms 
post-2011, some elements of the new economic governance architecture, particularly 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), may pave the way towards a 
comprehensive system of macroeconomic policy coordination that covers both forms 
of free-riding. Furthermore I discuss market discipline and stability free-riding 
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post-2011 and chart some of the future challenges and tensions in financial-market-
sovereign state relations. I conclude by challenging the claim of the powerless EU 
Member State.
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CHAPTER 2: FISCAL POLICY COORDINATION
Introduction
Hardin (2009: 96) describes coordination as the ‘the central mode of social order in a 
complex modern society’. Accordingly, a central quest in political science is the 
identification of not only arguments in favour of coordination, but also of modes to 
ensure and eventually optimise coordination.  Hobbes’ (1983, 1642) answer to the 
latter question lead him to the all-powerful sovereign ensuring institutionally 
enforced coordination, Hume (2000, 1739) pointed to convention as a form of 
spontaneously imposed coordination, Schumpeter‘s (1934: 80) evolutionary account 
saw coordination achieved through ‘decades and, in fundamentals, through hundreds 
and thousands of years’, Schelling (1960) put coordination at the centre of game 
theory and Pareto (1971) revolutionised the field of study with his value theory,  to 
name but a few. Hardin’s account of coordination also applies to the EU where fiscal 
policy coordination was thought to ensure ‘the central mode of [fiscal] order’ in a 
complex system of interdependences. 
This chapter is organised as follows: it begins by unpacking the concept of 
coordination and examining the rationales for and against fiscal policy coordination 
in EMU. It starts by considering what exactly coordination means, how it differs 
from related policy actions and outcomes such as co-operation, convergence, 
harmonisation and cohesion, before presenting arguments for and against fiscal 
policy coordination. The arguments highlighting the benefits of fiscal policy 
coordination in the EU revolve around the concern of free-riding, whilst the 
arguments against coordination focus on concerns of efficiency and legitimacy. 
Although some of the considerations, specifically when discussing monetary policy, 
apply to eurozone Member States only, the overall theme of this chapter, collective 
action as a means to manage interdependence, holds true for the EU27 as a whole 
and more broadly. 
39
Coordination – an appraisal
In their analysis on international economic policy coordination, Horne and Masson 
(1987) stress the importance of being clear and precise with terminology. In 
analysing fiscal, as well as other forms of, policy coordination several closely related 
concepts emerge, namely co-operation, convergence, cohesion, and harmonisation. 
All four terms are currently used to describe different processes found in the 
framework for EU macroeconomic policy-making. Convergence is associated with 
the Convergence Criteria presented in Article 121(1) of the EC Treaty, which 
establishes the degree of economic convergence that Member States must attain in 
order to qualify for Eurozone membership. Economic convergence is evaluated in 
the annual Convergence Programmes for applicant Member States and Stability 
Programmes for Eurozone Member States according to a set of macroeconomic 
indicators found in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, namely inflation rates, interest rates, 
sound public finances, sustainable public finances, and nominal exchange rates. The 
overall aim of these programmes is to ‘ensure more rigorous budgetary discipline 
through surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies within the euro area and 
EU’ (Ecofin 2009). In the eyes of the Directorate General of Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG Ecofin), convergence is hence achieved through coordination. 
Related to the policy programme of convergence is the concept of cohesion. In 
particle physics, cohesion is the force with which the particles of a body cleave 
together. The role of the EU’s cohesion policy is, by reducing disparities in economic 
performance among European regions, to create the same kind of force that should 
help the Union to hold together. The principle of cohesion, ever since the reform of 
the Structural Funds in 1989, is one of the EU’s key policies regarding 
macroeconomic reform of the Member States’ economies.24 Especially in the light of 
the Eastern enlargements, the Cohesion Fund has more than doubled in real terms 
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24 In theory, EU Member States can make the disbursement of Cohesion funds conditional on SGP 
compliance (see the example of Hungary discussed in the concluding Chapter 8).
since the late 1980s. !347bn have been allocated for cohesion funds for the period 
2007-2013, more than 80 per cent of which is targeted at promoting 
‘convergence’ (Farole et al. 2009). Cohesion policy as a tool for macroeconomic 
policy coordination focuses on two principles of decision-making, concentration – 
decisions on where the money is spent – and programming – decisions on how it is 
spent (Bachtler and Mendez 2007). 
The harmonisation of economic policies has, generally speaking been used in a 
rather restrictive sense to refer exclusively to microeconomic policies. It describes 
the application of national regulations in order to achieve greater uniformity in 
economic structures across countries, e.g. competition policy and internal market 
rules. The instrument of harmonisation is perhaps the most dominant one in the 
history of European integration through harmonisation by law. As the reach of EU 
law expanded, this method met with increased resistance. Indeed, in areas where 
harmonisation is impracticable (such as harmonisation of fiscal policy in the EU) or 
counterproductive (again, this argument can be made with respect to harmonisation 
of fiscal policy where ‘one size does not fit all’) and the resulting regulatory 
competition may be too sensitive, the method of policy coordination by which 
national standards and practices are made compatible instead of harmonised is 
considered superior (Hartwig and Mayer 2002).
The phrase ‘policy co-operation’ encompasses broader forms of interaction between 
actors. While coordination always needs co-operation in order to be efficient, co-
operation can take the form of uncoordinated action. Hence co-operation ‘falls well 
short of coordination a concept which implies a significant modification of national 
policies in recognition of international economic interdependence’ (Kenen et al. 
2004: 78). Co-operation consists generally of consultations, information interchange 
and international surveillance. Based on this definition it would be sensible to 
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rename the OMC the Open Method of Co-operation.25 A systematic review of the 
relevant legal and political texts on EMU reveals that the term co-operation is 
predominately used to denote action between institutional actors such as the 
Commission, the Council and the ECB, and between the bodies of the Member 
States. The term ‘coordination’ is used for fiscal and macroeconomic policies. 
Overall the distinction, although not always clear cut, seems to be one of policies 
versus actors.26 
Following Currie et al. (1989: 14), in this thesis ‘the establishment of agreed rules of 
the game in the macroeconomic sphere that constrain, or determine, at least some 
instruments of macroeconomic policy is to be regarded as a form of policy 
coordination’. Coordination implies mutually agreed modification in the 
participating state’s national policies. Such modification calls for more or less 
explicit, operational commitments about the conduct of the specific policy area and 
necessitates clear commitments to targets. Targets in themselves do not constitute 
coordination, merely a measurement for its effectiveness.
Interdependence and coordination
One term stands out in all explanations as to why sovereign states would agree to 
coordinate (fiscal) national policies: interdependence. The earliest entry that the 
Oxford English Dictionary offers in order to illustrate its meaning stems from a letter 
by Samuel Coleridge (1822), in which the poet alludes to his ‘unfitness for a state of 
moral and personal union and life-long interdependence’. EMU membership has 
frequently been compared to a marriage. Even before the negotiations on the road to 
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25 See Armstrong (2010: ch. 2) for a discussion on labels and naming in the OMC.
26 A competing distinction can be found in Biagi (1998), who distinguishes between policy 
coordination as ‘co-operation’ and coordination as ‘convergence’. While ‘co-operation’ works with 
the autonomy of states to define their policies but promotes elective and selective learning across 
states, ‘convergence’ implies that the process is not agnostic about what states can and ought to learn 
with a potential consequential reduction in policy diversity. This distinction is however less helpful in 
the context of fiscal policy coordination, as it clearly has elements of both co-operation and 
convergence.
Maastricht, this metaphor has invited political scientists and economists to muse 
about the nature of monetary union. Hughes Hallet and Petit (1990) compared the 
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies in eurozone to a ‘forced marriage’; 
Thygesen (1993) discusses a ‘honeymoon affect’ for public finances in the run up to 
EMU; Dornbusch (1996: 110) considers the Maastricht Treaty a ‘prenuptial 
agreement’; Winkler (1999: 52) argues that ‘candidate countries for EMU play the 
role of the groom who has to woo a sceptical bride [...] before the EMU marriage’; 
Dyson (2000: ch.2), asked whether the eurozone was the child of the Franco-German 
‘couple’ and Feldstein (2000: 12) stresses that ‘EMU is meant to be a marriage made 
in heaven with no room for divorce’. While these characterisations do not draw the 
same conclusions, they all begin with the same implicit premise; the eurozone, like a 
marriage, is a union characterised by interdependence.
European integration has both strengthened existing and created new 
interdependence in numerous areas, such as cultural and political matters.27 This 
interdependence is first and foremost an economic one; it is sometimes used 
synonymously with ‘openness’, which merely refers to a state’s exposure to the rest 
of the world. Whilst there is a close correspondence between the two concepts, it is 
worth highlighting distinctions between the two. A state can be open but not exert 
any interdependence because it is too small to influence conditions in the rest of the 
world, however at the same time a state can be highly interdependent in relation to 
another, but by no means be regarded an open economy. Elaborating on their 
conceptualisation of interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1987) present the concept 
of asymmetrical interdependence, according to which interstate power originates not 
from the possession of coercive power resources, but from asymmetries in issue-
specific interdependence. Such asymmetric interdependence is part and parcel of the 
EU’s Member States’ intergovernmental relations.
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27 The relationship between integration and interdependence is not a EU phenomenon; for a broader 
discussion of the link between globalization and interdependence, see Kayser (2007).
Discussions on the causal relationship between interdependence and coordination 
have a standing tradition in both political science and economics. Wallich’s textbook 
definition (1984: 85) makes the link explicitly, defining coordination as ‘a significant 
modification of national policies in recognition of international economic 
interdependence’. The literature on economic interdependence and conflict supports 
the claim of a ‘liberal peace’ (e.g. Mansfield 1994; Gartzke and Li 2003; Oneal et al. 
2003; Press-Barnathan 2006). While these accounts are not uncontested, particularly 
with respect to post-colonial trade linkages, the idea of a pax mercatoria is hardly as 
accepted elsewhere as in the literature on European integration. The creation of the 
EU is largely understood to be the most successful peace building and sustaining 
operation of the 20th century (e.g. Garton Ash 2005; Habermas 2008), with which 
the growing interdependence between EU Member States, political integration and 
building of institutions has gone hand in hand. Fittingly, the title of Monnet’s 
biography (Duchene 1994) refers to the former President of the European 
Commission as the ‘first statesman of interdependence’. As the intensification of 
intra-EU trade relations, interwoven financial sectors and heightened powers of 
community institutions show, this interdependence has been on a steep upward slope 
since the days of Monnet. The past crises have painfully shown the negative 
ramifications and increased challenges of interdependence.
Interdependence and public goods
Interdependence creates the need for collective action. The starting point of the logic 
of collective action in international relations is the so-called moral hazard problem. 
The classic economic definition of moral hazard refers to the ‘observation that a 
contract which promises people payment on the occurrence of certain events will 
cause a change in behaviour to make these events more likely’ (Black et al. 2009: 
139). Moral hazard refers to a situation when one group member does not bear the 
full consequences of its action and consequently has an incentive to act less 
cautiously or even in a hazardous way because other members bear (part of) the 
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costs. A member (partly) insulated from risk may behave differently than if fully 
exposed to risk. This situation is referred to as a social dilemma, the analysis of 
which dates back to Olson’s seminal work (1965) on the logic of collective action. 
Olson’s work rests on a single premise: that individual rationality is not sufficient for 
collective rationality. He notably described how, due to the strong incentives to free 
ride for each individual, a situation in which the benefits of a public good cannot be 
successfully limited to those who positively contribute to its generation causes this 
good to be provided at sub-optimal levels, if at all. In the EU, the need for fiscal 
collective action is specifically due to the high sensitivity of interdependencies. In 
understanding why EU Member States would desire fiscal policy coordination, it is 
useful to consider fiscal policy as producing public goods.
Since Adam Smith’s enumeration of public goods, the list of public goods has 
expanded over time.28 Classic/pure public goods are defined by two characteristics: 
non-rivalry and non-excludability. First, the consumption of this good by one party 
does not reduce others’ ability to consume it. The second condition refers to the good 
being in joint supply; one party cannot be supplied without simultaneously supplying 
also others. The definition of fiscal policy public goods is less straightforward than 
for instance other pure public goods, such as lighthouses or national defence. Within 
an economy, fiscal policy involves the setting of both the provision of the public 
goods decided upon and their financing through taxes and/or debt. Many public 
goods provided through fiscal policy are exclusive to a certain group fulfilling 
specific group criteria. This type of public good can be called a discriminatory public 
good (e.g. unemployment benefits, schools). Conversely, the consumption of non-
discriminatory public goods (e.g. national defence, roads) is not restricted to group 
eligibility. A further distinction can be made between goods that are non-excludable 
but whose consumption is rivalrous: so-called common-pool resources. Economists 
describe the common-pool problem as the phenomenon of unrestricted access to a 
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28 Smith's understanding of public goods was limited to law and order and public service that are not 
profitable for individuals to do themselves.
resource resulting in overuse, until its marginal value drops to zero. Public finances, 
with its constrained pool of money to be allocated, represent a classical common-
pool resource. The deficit bias of governments is often accounted for by referring to 
politicians who represent different electoral groups and have no incentive to limit 
their spending demands given that the costs are shared by the population as whole 
(Hallerberg and von Hagen 1997). These asymmetries in the allocation of costs and 
benefits of spending programmes can then produce spending and deficit biases (see 
also inter alia Buchanan et al 1987; von Hagen and Harden 1994; Velasco 2000; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000).  
The interdependencies of the EU and to a larger extent the eurozone, economies 
make fiscal policy outcomes an international public good.29 Such public goods cover 
more than one group of countries. EU Member States' economic and, by implication, 
fiscal policies are regarded as a ‘matter of common concern’ (Article 121 TFEU). To 
this end, the need for improved coordination between the economic policies of the 
Member States has been recognised both in the TFEU and in the overall economic 
governance framework. The international public good in question, fiscal policy in the 
EU, is not concerned with single spending measures but with the aggregation of all 
fiscal expenditure and revenue, i.e. a country’s fiscal stance. The common concern, 
as will be addressed in more detail below, relates predominantly to overall 
macroeconomic stability, which was thought to be secured by sound monetary policy 
(read an inflation rate of close to, but below 2 per cent) and fiscal policies (read 
deficits below 3 per cent of GDP). 
The initial economic and financial crisis erupting in 2008 and to a greater extent the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, haven given testimony to the interdependence of national 
economies. By eliminating currency risk and reducing transaction costs within the 
eurozone, the introduction of the new European currency has strengthened cross-
46
29 Analagous names are ‘transnational public good’ (Sandler and Arche 2002), ‘European public 
good’ (Zuleeg 2009) or ‘global public good’ (Kaul et al. 1999).
border financial market integration in the wake of the economic and financial crisis 
(Howarth and Quaglia 2013). However as a result, this made the sovereign debt 
market more vulnerable to contagion effects. In April 2010 for example, Portuguese 
two-year bond yields rose more than three-quarters of a point to 3.99 per cent, 
Ireland’s jumped by a similar amount to 2.99 per cent and Spain’s increased a quarter 
of a point to 1.87 per cent (Financial Times 27.04.2010). In the case of the 
homemade debt crisis, the interdependence is endogenous, stemming from the 
internal system of interdependence. The financial sector fallout in the autumn of 
2008 however illustrates the possibility of exogenous structural interdependence. In 
this case, the original disturbance was exogenous, originating from the credit market 
in the United States and was triggered by the default of the US investment bank 
Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008.
In this thesis, ‘fiscal free-riding’ refers to both growth and stability free-riding. The 
treatment of fiscal policy as producing sub-types of public goods is therefore broader 
than usually found in the literature. For instance Schelkle (2005: 374) defines the key 
public good as ‘monetary stability or low equilibrium interest rates’. This bifurcation 
(stability and growth) should be considered not in absolute terms but as a conceptual 
device. What is more, both types of public goods are discriminatory as they are 
related to the variable interdependence threshold of each Member State. Not all 
Member States are, for instance, negatively affected by the sharp increase in interest 
rates on sovereign borrowing. Indeed quite the opposite is true; Germany, as flight to 
quality ensued, benefited from investors pulling out of troubled EMU states (Beber 
et al. 2009; In’t Veld 2013). In a similar vein, closed economies are less affected by 
other Member States’ decisions to stimulate national economic demand. This does 
not pose a conceptual problem for this research: the literature on public goods is 
quite accommodating to such nuances and heterogeneous exposures. 
The macroeconomic policy interdependence in EMU concerns both monetary and 
fiscal policies. Monetary policy refers to actions taken (generally) by central banks in 
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order to affect monetary and financial conditions in an economy. Fiscal policy 
encompasses the use of the government budget with the view to affecting the volume 
of national spending, or more generally to provide public goods and services as well 
as to redistribute income. Examining the enmeshed network of monetary and fiscal 
policy, one can distinguish between various reasons in favour and against fiscal 
policy coordination. Notably, these reasons are neither uncontested nor static and 
increase or decrease in argumentative power in times of crisis.   
Fiscal policy coordination according to the ECB
To better understand the reasons for fiscal policy coordination, it is useful to consider 
the arguments put forward by one of the staunchest supporters of the SGP and its 3 
per cent deficit criterion; the ECB. For the ECB, the need for fiscal policy 
coordination stems from an asymmetry between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Monetary policy is taken out of the hands of national policy makers and now rests 
entirely with the ECB, Europe’s ‘new Leviathan’ (Howarth and Loedel 2005). On the 
other hand however, fiscal policy, within the confines of the SGP, remains the 
prerogative of Member State governments. Fundamentally, and according to the 
theory, monetary policy is only able to control the price level if government solvency 
is guaranteed (Buti et al. 2001). Hence monetary policy seeking to achieve low 
inflation has to go hand-in-hand with a fiscal policy respecting a solvency constraint. 
Beyond the issue of solvency, the conduct of fiscal policy impacts on monetary 
policy generally speaking on two main levels (Doughty 1991). First, fiscal policy 
interacts with certain elements of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(domestic demand, interest rates, and direct inflation effects). Secondly, fiscal policy 
interacts with the long term perceived economic sustainability of monetary policy. 
Given that fiscal policy directly affects the economic environment in which central 
banks operate, they pay close attention to fiscal developments. As Mervyn King 
(1995) the ex-governor of the Bank of England, disclosed, ‘central banks are often 
accused of being obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are obsessed with 
48
anything, it is with fiscal policy.’ His characterisation seems to apply to the ECB, as 
evidenced by the fact that over the past ten years, the ECB has communicated 
intensively on fiscal policies in both positive as well as normative terms, especially 
in comparison to other central banks (Allard et al. 2012). 
Given the policy interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy, the underlying 
call for fiscal policy coordination was considered to be indispensable if the ECB was 
to fulfil its mandate. Fiscal policy coordination is therefore guided by the doctrine of 
fiscal discipline for the sake of price stability. As Wyplosz (2006: 225) points out, the 
economic logic of the SGP ‘is rooted in the strong evidence that large inflations are 
always the consequence of runaway deficits that lead to a public debt that cannot be 
financed anymore through normal market borrowing’. Unsustainable levels of debt 
would lead to demands of higher wage settlements and higher interest rates by 
purchasers of government debt to be compensated for expected inflation. As a result 
governments would try to force monetary financing upon their central banks. Hence 
the creation of the SGP is a means to prevent central bankers being drawn into an 
inflationary process. This sentiment is echoed by Beetsma (2001: 29), who sees the 
Pact as a ‘deterrent to over-expansionary fiscal policies that spill over into higher 
interest rates and inflation rates for all EMU members’. In sum, fiscal policy 
coordination from the ECB’s point of view is motivated by concerns over stability 
free-riding.
By imposing clear limits on public finances, the SGP confines fiscal policy 
coordination to the EU level and purposely excludes the ECB from the coordination 
process. While the coordination of fiscal policies guided by the paradigm of fiscal 
prudence is thought to enhance the credibility of monetary policy in EMU, the 
coordination between one central monetary policy and national fiscal policies is 
thought to be detrimental to the ECB’s independence (e.g. Issing 1992; Alesina et al. 
2001). The ECB therefore explicitly advocates horizontal (coordination of national 
fiscal policies) over vertical (coordination between fiscal and monetary policy) 
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coordination, and stresses that the current framework provides for sufficiently 
efficient assignment of objectives with clear allocation of responsibilities to 
individual policy-makers and relevant institutions. This assignment, so the argument 
goes, makes ‘policy coordination of monetary and fiscal policy redundant’ (Masuch 
and Brand 2002: 16). In comparing policy coordination between fiscal and monetary 
authorities both under and prior to EMU, Bini Smaghi and Casini (2000) find that 
coordination efforts have declined considerably. Arguably this weakening is a 
deliberate move from the ECB to isolate itself from the politicisation of monetary 
policy, which it fears to be entrenched in the coordination between monetary and 
fiscal policy. Attempts to coordinate monetary and fiscal policy ex ante are, 
according to Issing (2002:356), ‘very tricky and, in the end, may destroy the 
balanced institutional framework in EMU with its sound and clear assignment of 
objectives to the individual policy maker’. This evaluation echoes the warning of 
Rogoff (1985) that international macroeconomic policy (vertical) coordination 
threatens the credibility of stability-oriented monetary policy.30 The reluctance of the 
ECB to actively interact with domestic fiscal policy becomes further evident with 
respect to its role as both a ‘policeman and judge’. Howarth and Loedel (2004) 
distinguish between these two roles concerning the strategic interaction between the 
ECB and the Eurogroup with regard to the SGP. The authors argue that although the 
ECB has been known for making public recommendations to EU governments on 
how best to achieve the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines31 (BEPGs) (and in doing 
so fulfilling its role as a policeman by verbally ‘ticketing’ wayward states), it has 
been somewhat less active in the use of its role as a judge.. That is to say, the ECB 
has not made use of the interest rate weapon to ‘judge’ the recalcitrant Member State 
governments despite numerous threats to do so.
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30 Again, monetary and fiscal policy are interdependent, and interact with one another. Yet this 
interaction is implicit and not based on overt coordination. Using pooled data for 19 OECD countries 
including 14 EU Member States for 1960-1995, Melitz (1997) finds strong evidence for ‘strategic 
substitution’ – that is, monetary and fiscal policy moving in opposite directions (see also Wyplosz 
1999 for similar results). 
31 The, now defunct, BEPGs were adopted by the Council in the form of a non-legally binding 
recommendation and were part of broader macroeconomic policy coordination prior to the post-crisis 
economic governance reforms (see Deroose et al. 2008).
The ECB in times of crisis
It is worth repeating that at the heart of the construction of the pan-European 
Stability Culture was the claim that high deficits would cause inflation (e.g. EMI 
1996), an assertion that was reiterated in the reformed SGP (e.g. Gonzalez-Paramo 
2005). Yet there is strong evidence that the link between deficits and inflation, as 
expressed by Sargent and Wallace's ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ – stating that 
an increase in public debt is typically inflationary – is tentative at best and does not 
apply to low-inflation advanced economies (e.g. Catao and Terrones 2005). Indeed, 
substantial increases in public debt and deficit levels have not led to an ‘outbreak of 
inflation’ in the eurozone overall, although inflation rates for Greece in 2010 climbed 
to 4.7 per cent (ECB 2011). 
Since 2008, the ECB has found itself at the centre of crisis policies with clear 
implications for its cherished independence, particularly in light of the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis that brought about subsequent interventions in the secondary bond 
market and participation in the troika rescue team for countries in financial distress32. 
This begs the question of whether independence for a monetary authority is 
desirable. While a final verdict on the desirability of central bank independence is 
inherently political by nature, economists have sought to answer this question by 
looking at the welfare/efficiency implications of coordinated monetary and fiscal 
policies, that is to say, the interdependent interaction between both policy areas (e.g. 
Wyplosz 2002). Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2001: 135) argue that ‘ignoring the 
interdependencies between monetary and fiscal policies in the short run might lead to 
an unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance of the monetary union’. In analysing 
policies in the short run, the authors find a potential conflict between monetary and 
fiscal policies, which together shape aggregate demand in a monetary union. In a 
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32 The troika consists of representatives of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. Together 
they are responsible for deciding on a country's financial requirements if it has asked for financial 
assistance as well as for the supervision of the borrowing conditions. With regards to the latter, the 
troika assesses the implementation of structural reforms agreed upon in the Memorandum of 
understanding, signed by the parties receiving assistance. 
scenario where the central bank strictly pursues its goal of price stability at the 
eurozone level, fiscal policy at the national level would lead to a purely distributional 
conflict. Any increase in the deficit levels in one country would crowd out demand in 
another. If these two governments were to then ignore this apparent conflict, both 
will increase government spending in an attempt to achieve a given output goal. 
However since aggregate output is controlled by the central bank, this fiscal 
expansion will merely result in higher interest rates in addition to larger debt levels 
with neither government achieving their output goal. Without explicit policy 
coordination between the ECB and Member States, governments and the central 
bank would compete in setting aggregate output in a monetary union. Hence policy 
coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities would be able to reach a better 
policy mix with lower interest rates and deficit levels. The authors then extend this 
argument to the case of an exogenous shock to aggregate demand in the monetary 
union, much like the Great Recession. Under exceptional circumstances of large 
shocks, so the argument runs, ‘adjustments in fiscal and monetary policies would be 
the result of co-operative agreements on policies, aiming at acceptable output-
inflation combinations at the aggregate level’ (ibid.). This case for coordination in 
the face of policy interdependence makes for a strong defence for the central bank 
tolerating deviations from the mantra of price stability in times of crisis as it has 
during the past years by keeping interest rates low and further stimulating demand 
and stabilising public finances by ‘unconventional’ methods33.
Post-Sovereign Debt Crisis, the danger of stability free-riding was again formulated 
in terms of the presumed inflation-deficit linkage, yet the crisis-driven deterioration 
in public finances has not lead to inflationary pressures. More importantly, the ECB 
interventions were, with the notable exception of Greece, not necessitated by 
‘excessive’ spending of national policy-makers and a failure to coordinate public 
finances, but by fundamental weaknesses in the banking sector: ‘The financial-fiscal 
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33 For a review and evaluation of the ECB’s crisis policies see Bini Smaghi (2009); Lenza et al. (2010) 
and Drudi et al. (2012).
feedback loop, not a weak and broken Stability Pact, has proven to be the Achilles 
heel for independent monetary policy’ (Schelkle 2012a: 29).
Free-riding: growth and stability
The free-riding problem applies, albeit to differing degrees, to all 27 EU Member 
States. The starting point is the existence of cross-border leakages. Member States 
with less expansive crisis responses can easily benefit from the externally generated 
expansion of demand without having to infer the high costs of budget deficits. Prior 
to the Great Recession, policy interdependence had already been seen to lead 
national policy makers to consider one another’s fiscal policies when setting their 
own domestic plans. Analysing the time span of 1965 to 2003, Beetsma et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that a German fiscal expansion has quite strong effects on its smaller 
neighbours; an increase in public spending by 1 per cent of GDP in Germany leads to 
a more than 0.4 per cent normalised increase in GDP of Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands after two years, – while the corresponding number for Greece is only a 
0.06 per cent increase in GDP. Moreover, the authors show that the planned average 
fiscal stance of EU partner countries influences an individual country’s fiscal stance. 
In a related study, Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) investigate the interdependence 
between deficits in the EU using an empirical analysis based on real-time fiscal data; 
a relaxation (tightening) of the planned fiscal stance elsewhere in the union leads an 
individual EU member to relax (tighten) its own planned fiscal stance. The authors 
explain this finding by pointing to direct externalities resulting from cross-border 
public investments, tax competition and peer pressure among governments. 
Although empirical studies provide ample evidence for the existence of fiscal 
competition in the EU (e.g. Mintz and Tulkens 1986; Oates 2001; Baicker 2005; 
Kammas 2001), fiscal policy coordination is predominately concerned with securing 
sound government finances. This limits its interpretation of what constitutes ‘good’ 
fiscal policy to low deficit and debt levels, despite various policy dialogues that 
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specifically address wages and taxation. The SGP’s preoccupation with deficits and 
debts has taken for granted that fiscal discipline is a legitimate collective concern. 
Prior to the Great Recession, free-riding was considered predominantly a matter of 
overly expansive fiscal policies. The phenomenon of fiscal free-riding (excessive 
deficits) in the eurozone had been warned of even before the introduction of the euro 
(Inman and Rubinfeld 1991; Portes 1993), analysed after stage III of EMU (Chari 
and Kehone 2007; Bonati and Crisitini 2008) and revisited during the current 
economic and financial crisis (De Grauwe and Moesen 2009). Although allegations 
of ‘beggar they neighbour policies’, i.e. too restrictive fiscal stances, are not an 
entirely new feature of post-crisis debates (Dullien and Fritsche 2006; Gros and 
Belke 2007), the Great Recession has put macroeconomic imbalances on the political 
agenda. This is not only a EU but also a global trend in international macroeconomic 
policy coordination. As Jones (2009: 61) argues:
‘The argument is that […] surplus countries have fostered the crisis through their single-
minded determination to pursue export-led growth. […] The time has come to reconsider the 
wisdom of export-led growth strategies both in the developing world and elsewhere. If 
accepted, these arguments will have important implications for how the world economy is 
reformed.’
Within EU fiscal policy coordination, free-riding during the Great Recession 
explicitly encompassed two kinds of behaviour. The first considers to the problem of 
excessive deficits and the danger of threatening the stability of EMU whilst the latter 
refers to a Member State implementing no or limited stimulus policies and due to 
trade linkages, being able to free-ride on the expansive fiscal policies of other 
Member States.34 The basic rational for fiscal policy coordination is therefore that it 
provides a mechanism to internalise externalities arising from the spillover effects 
that still hold in time of crisis. However in times of crisis these externalities are 
potentially bigger due to the increased scope for government action. Indeed, 
regarding the economic context under which fiscal coordination would be mutually 
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34 By differentiating between growth (‘too little’) and stability (‘too much’) free-riding of stimulus 
policies, I do not wish to suggest that austerity politics could not have a negative impact on the 
stability of EMU. 
beneficial, Buti and Sapir (1998: 150) argue that only ‘in cases of severe common 
shocks or imbalances there may be a role for jointly agreed and announced budgetary 
policy actions.’ With monetary policy no longer a part of the official toolbox for 
national policy-makers, fiscal policy has gained importance as an instrument for 
macroeconomic management. The main cost of monetary union has generally been 
viewed as the loss of a key instrument of national demand management, domestic 
monetary policy, and of the associated ability to adjust exchange rates. Furthermore, 
as has been empirically confirmed, discretionary fiscal policy displays an asymmetry 
(Ardy et al. 2006: 38f.). In other words deficits expand further in downturns than 
they become surpluses in upturns. This deficit bias is likely to increase during the 
Great Recession when discretionary fiscal policy was used on an unprecedented 
scale.
Again, the first type of free-riding consists of ‘too little’ fiscal expansion in response 
to the Great Recession. Policy responses can gain efficiency if coordinated. Simply 
put, the stimulus programme in one country is likely to also stimulate other 
economies. In order for this effect to be optimal, a Member State should coordinate 
its fiscal stimulus with others. The apparent danger lies in the fact that other EU 
countries can easily benefit from the externally generated expansion of demand, 
without having to infer the high costs of budget deficits. In the presence of positive 
spillovers arising from stimulus programmes, the absence of coordination will lead 
Member States to refrain from undertaking fiscal efforts to stimulate their economies 
as they all have an incentive to free-ride, as was the case in the 1970s (de Grauwe 
2009). A similar logic applies to the cost-benefit analysis when facing fiscal exit 
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strategies.35 In the context of macroeconomic policy, ‘exit strategy’ refers to the 
withdrawal of economic stimulus programmes and a return to sound public finances 
through comprehensive consolidation strategies, with a strong focus on expenditure 
reforms (ECB 2009). Once one Member State starts the process of fiscal contraction, 
this will not only curb economic activity on a domestic level but also create negative 
spillovers in other states (see In’t Veld 2013). Whereas the initial benefit of a return 
to sound fiscal principles is enjoyed only by the first Member State, the costs of 
consolidation are accrued by other states as well. The likely reaction of other states is 
to follow the fiscal exit strategy, which will further reduce economic activity. This 
reduction could offset the positive effects on budget deficits. Non-coordinated exit 
strategies could therefore potentially hamper the recovery across national borders. 
The second, and pre-2008 dominating, type of free-riding, stability free-riding, 
considers the hazard of too much fiscal expansion. EMU Member States have a 
vested interest in coordinated fiscal policy in order to secure fiscal stability. 
Analogous to growth free-riding, one can easily imagine a scenario where one 
Member State engages in more discretionary spending than would be advisable with 
respect to its fiscal space, knowing that other Member States will exercise sufficient 
fiscal constraint for inflation and interest rates, as well as corresponding ECB 
policies, to not react. In other words, Member States feel sheltered from punishment 
normally resulting from imprudent fiscal behaviour. Likewise a Member State might 
prefer to push its fiscal consolidation back to a politically/economically more 
auspicious date, hoping that other Member States provide sufficiently stabilising 
policies for the Eurozone as a whole. The problem presented by over-stimulating in 
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35 The term ‘exit strategy’ entered the political discourse in the 1980s and was predominately used to 
describe tactics to withdraw troops from war-zones (Safire 1995). Prior to the Great Recession, the 
term was used in various EU communications referring to disaster relief and emergency assistance, as 
well as humanitarian crises in Kosovo and Somalia. The macroeconomic application of exit strategy 
entered the EU public policy jargon in the spring of 2009, both with respect to monetary and fiscal 
policy. Officially, Ministers agreed on the need for a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach on 
exit strategies at the Informal Ecofin in Gothenburg on the 20th October 2009 (European Commission 
2010).
the context of fiscal policy has been analysed more generally by Hardin (1968: 1244) 
who describes how shepherds sharing common pasture overgrazed since they were 
‘locked into a system that compels (each one) to increase his herd without limit’.
Stability free-riding (stimulating ‘too much’) is related to the problem of moral 
hazard. For EMU Member States, moral hazard is often evoked with respect to the 
No-Bail-Out Clause found in Art. 125 of the TEU, which seeks to strengthen the case 
in favour of fiscal policy coordination and prevent Member States from free-riding 
and thus to avoid moral hazard. It essentially states that neither the Community nor 
any Member State can be liable for the commitments of other Member States. This 
provision does not only prohibit the assumption of a Member State’s debt, but it also 
prohibits EU liability for such commitments: ‘The Union shall not be liable for or 
assume the commitments of central governments.’ This clause is only one of a 
number of institutional arrangements for sound fiscal policies at the EU level. It 
should be seen as complementary to the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 
123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the prohibition of 
privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124 of the Treaty), the SGP and the 
fiscal provision to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 126 of the Treaty) 
and the no-inflationary bail-out obligation of the ECB (that is the Central Bank 
accepting a higher level of inflation than warranted). In times of crisis the No-Bail-
Out clause is thought to caution governments not to spend beyond their means. It is 
hence an additional commitment device (in the shape of a non-commitment) to avoid 
moral hazard problems. 
Yet, with the heightened economic and political turmoil of the Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
European policy-makers were caught between the Scylla of moral hazard and the 
Charybdis of contagion. The former arises because bailing out a fiscally wayward 
state might send a signal that irresponsible macroeconomic management will not be 
punished, whilst the second stems from the risk of contagion both for the weaker 
Member States at the periphery as well as within the European banking system. 
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Subnational government defaults regularly involve large externalities on the rest of 
the federation or a specific group of the other Member States of a monetary union, 
which render it undesirable for the other states or the central government to deny a 
bailout (e.g. von Hagen et al. 2000). The introduction of a single currency, the 
abolition of capital controls and the Single Market programme for financial services, 
has led European investor portfolios to become increasingly diversified. 
Warnings that a bailout of one Member State would become increasingly likely have 
been heard since the early 1990’s (Bovenberg et al. 1991). The apparent policy 
dilemma posed by the high costs of actually sticking to Art. 125 gives further rise to 
the call for fiscal policy coordination as a means to avoid any excessive debt 
situation in which a bailout might become inevitable.
Although the concern of fiscal unsustainability is more pronounced within a 
monetary union, countries outside the Eurozone also have reason to participate in 
fiscal policy coordination. First, the impact of economic crisis is felt by other 
integrated economies. The EU Treaty considers economic policies a ‘common 
concern’ for all, not just eurozone, EU countries. Accordingly, the externalities of 
economic fallout are felt throughout the EU. Secondly, the financial assistance to 
Member States, that is the feared bailout, can be provided to and by EU members 
outside the eurozone as well. Ultimately, fiscal policy coordination is thus thought of 
as a means to prevent the need for financial assistance. 
The case against fiscal policy coordination
The marked push for greater fiscal policy coordination and the perceived need to 
reform EU economic governance in the wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis tend to 
conceal the fact that there are reasons against fiscal policy coordination both on 
political as well as economic grounds. The two most common objections to fiscal 
policy coordination are based on considerations of efficiency and legitimacy.
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Efficiency
The criticisms against fiscal policy coordination find negative responses to the 
question of whether there are benefits arising from collective action, i.e. benefits for 
the union as a whole and also for individual Member States. One argument against 
fiscal policy coordination is that it would not be worth the trouble, as the spill-over 
affecting the central monetary policy and the fiscal policies of other EMU Member 
States is at least in ‘normal’ times too small (e.g. Eichengreen 1997; Buti and Sapir 
1998). More recent studies have further highlighted that the cross-border effects of 
tax and government spending shocks are weak and/or insignificant in EMU. As such 
the size of national fiscal multipliers36, and as a consequence the quantitative 
influence of a spill-over effect, will be limited (Gros and Hobza 2001; Benassy-
Quere and Cimadomo 2006; Marcellino 2006). Dixit and Lambertini (2003) for 
example, show that the targeted output and inflation goals can be met with or without 
fiscal coordination, and what is more, that the SGP is not a necessary instrument to 
achieve those objectives. It is argued that it would therefore make little economic 
sense for national policy-makers to jointly decide on their fiscal policies. 
The question remains whether the coordination of fiscal stimulus measures would 
reduce cross-border leakage and therefore contribute to the efficiency of a national 
fiscal stimulus programme in the light of a common negative shock of the magnitude 
of the Great Recession. Beetsma et al. (2001) provide evidence that fiscal 
coordination is most likely to be desirable when the European economy is hit by 
asymmetric (demand or supply) disturbances, when the correlation of the shocks 
hitting the various economies is low. In that case the scope for fiscal coordination is 
larger, because the ECB remains passive as average inflation in the union is 
unaffected. It is however difficult to establish whether the Great Recession should be 
considered a symmetric or asymmetric shock. The European Commission (2009) has 
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36 The fiscal multiplier refers to the ratio of a change in output to a change in the fiscal deficit with 
respect to their respective baselines (Eyraud and Weber 2013).
dodged such a definition by calling it a ‘symmetric shock with asymmetric 
implications’. Following Beetsma et al. (2001), one of the main criteria for the 
evaluation of fiscal coordination efficiency is the reaction of the ECB. Since the ECB 
has pursued a course of – in its short history unprecedented – loose, growth-friendly 
monetary policy, one could argue that it is irrelevant whether the crisis was 
asymmetric or not in the absence of ‘harmful’ ECB interventionism. It seems that the 
ECB has suspended its policy of ‘strategic substitution’ (Melitz 1997) according to 
which monetary and fiscal policies move in opposite directions, in times of crisis. 
Whilst this strand of criticism has addressed the benefits/externalities for the EU as a 
whole, the vast majority of literature criticising the existing fiscal policy framework 
has focused on the impact of such coordination on individual Member States’ 
economies. Firstly, the fiscal strictures under the SGP are often presented as 
detrimental to structural reforms. Fiscal rules imposing annual ceilings on the 
government deficit and/or debt ratio, it is argued, may give disproportionate priority 
to short-run fiscal discipline at the cost of long-run economic growth and even long-
run fiscal sustainability. This is because reforms are discouraged, as their associated 
budgetary costs would risk breaching the SGP (e.g. Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998; 
Razin and Sadka 2002; Beetsam and Debrun 2005). Secondly, the fiscal policy 
coordination mechanism in place is said to pose an obstacle to the stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy. Since monetary union has removed the ability to set country 
specific interest rates, the government’s capacity in fiscal stabilisation should not be 
restricted (Schelkle 2005: 372). In a similar vein, Calmfors (2003) stresses that the 
SGP may increase output volatility because it hampers stabilisation efforts in 
downswings. This argument is contested, however. Lifting (2000) argues that the 
deficit ceiling of the SGP increases the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilisation 
tool, because EU states with lower debt levels have a better record in stabilising their 
economies. In addition and contrary to Schelkle (2005), Buti(2000) for example, 
argues that by creating deficit restrictions the Pact would create fiscal room for 
manoeuvre for Member States to smooth out economic shocks. Similarly, it has been 
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argued that the SGP would not guarantee a sufficiently balanced policy mix and 
would leave inadequate room for fiscal policy to support economic growth (e.g. 
Fitoussi 2002; Bofinger 2003). In the context of the economic and financial crisis, 
both the stabilisation and growth-supporting roles of fiscal policy are considered 
necessary. Whilst these accounts attack fiscal policy coordination from different 
angles, all are highly critical of the underlying economic rationale for such collective 
action.
Legitimacy
In a key work on the political consequences of increasing economic interdependence, 
Cooper (1968) identifies various obstacles to successful economic policy 
coordination. Firstly, even if like-minded countries agree on broad principles (i.e. in 
the case of EMU the paradigm of low inflation and sound public finances), that is to 
say they operate within the same broad conceptual framework, the challenge remains 
to strike the right balance of macroeconomic management. Countries are likely to 
have different policy preferences and in order for a policy to be legitimate, policy-
makers have to take the tastes of their constituency into account. Given this 
difference in national policy preferences, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998: 3) consider 
that it was ‘unclear why [...] European countries should agree on economic and non-
economic policy issues, even though they do not share a common language, common 
interests, and common histories’. Secondly, variation in policy taste is likely to 
increase further in times of crisis, when old systems of economic beliefs are called 
into question and the forecast of future events, ‘either with respect to the course of 
events without changes in policy or with respect to the influence of policy action on 
the targeted variables’ (Cooper 1986: 1228), is marked by uncertainty. That is to say, 
policy makers are more likely to disagree on the structure of the economy and 
consequently on the association of means and ends. Collignon (2003) doubts whether 
the existing rules for fiscal policy-making in the EU reflect the ‘policy tastes’ of 
Member States. He does not see the degree of binding obligation as the main 
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problem of the SGP but rather its lack of democratic legitimacy. ‘Hard budget 
constraints for fiscal authorities are a necessary condition for macroeconomic 
stability, but such institutional rules are only sustainable if they are backed by 
collective acceptance, expressed in the democratic choices of European 
citizens’ (ibid. 244).
Further legitimacy arguments are associated with proponents of fiscal federalism.37 
Regional diversity of choices concerning the conduct of fiscal policy suggests that a 
local, rather than a central, jurisdiction should be entrusted with the production of 
fiscal policy (Olson 1969). The same reasoning can be applied to the national versus 
supranational level, which mirrors the democratic deficit claim about EMU more 
broadly (Verdun 2000a; McNamara and Meunier 2002; Jones 2009; Verdun and 
Enderlein 2009; Majone 2010) and the ECB specifically (Buiter 1999; Taylor 2000; 
Howarth and Loedel 2005: ch.4). Fiscal federalists overwhelmingly argue that there 
are no compelling arguments for a common monetary union to also require fiscal 
union and an accompanying shift in decision-making power from national/regional to 
Community authorities (von Hagen 2006). This argument follows the logic of 
subsidiarity, i.e. the respect for local/national control wherever feasible which is 
considered to weigh heavier than any advantages gained from having a centralised 
fiscal policy (Ardy et al. 2006: 95). Cooper (1968) names the strong public sentiment 
in favour of the preservation of national freedom of action, despite the forces of 
policy interdependence being one of the main barriers for the coordination of 
economic policy: ‘The illusion of national autonomy is still widespread and is widely 
confused with national sovereignty’ (ibid. 1229). With the reform of fiscal policy 
coordination in the aftermath of the Sovereign Debt Crisis and the strict constraints 
on fiscal policy making for those countries that requested financial assistance, debate 
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37 Hallerberg (2011) presents fiscal federalism modeled after the Brazilian system, as one of two 
feasible solutions to reform the EU’s framework. More integration under fiscal federalism, so the 
argument goes, would be able to prevent a situation where a bailout would become an option.
on the legitimacy of fiscal policy coordination has once more taken centre stage (e.g. 
Hallerberg et al. 2012; Crum 2013; Torres 2013).
Conclusion
The theme running through this chapter is that the interdependence of EU economies 
requires co-operative solutions to common problems. Unilateral action is likely to 
result in negative spill-over effects for other Member States and, in a worst case 
scenario, might be detrimental to fiscal stability. Fiscal policy is treated as a matter of 
common concern and its coordination thus emerges as a means to achieve outcomes 
in a more efficient and more optimal manner. This is particularly true for EMU 
Member States that share a common monetary policy. As the two objections against 
fiscal policy coordination outlined above have highlighted, the appeal of and 
necessity for the centralised coordination of national public finances is far from 
uncontested. Fiscal policy coordination should be considered neither a panacea to the 
EU’s current woes, nor as equally desirable to all EU Member States. In fact, one of 
the many obstacles to successful collective action is that Member States have 
different preferences about the design and form of fiscal policy and its coordination 
in light of asymmetrical policy interdependence.
Prior to the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis and post Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, the dominating reason for fiscal policy coordination was identified in stability 
free-riding, culminating in ECB and/or Member State bailout. This changed during 
the Great Recession when the economic downturn brought about the coordination of 
stimulus packages and consequently concerns over growth free-riding, to the top of 
the EU’s fiscal policy agenda. The past crises have revealed fundamental flaws with 
the conceptionalisation of fiscal policy coordination and the single-minded focus of 
respecting the SGP criteria (stability free-riding). The focus on fiscal profligacy as 
the main source of fiscal risk is misleading; with the exception of Greece, Member 
States who were in need of financial assistance had not run large deficits and debt 
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levels were considered sustainable prior to 2008. By focusing on the prevention of 
moral hazard (in the form of No-Bail-Out Rules and the SGP), the existing 
framework was neglectful of the systemic risk stemming from the financial sector. 
The sharp deterioration in public finances was then not a result of policy-makers 
prone to run deficits to curry electoral favours, but a result of ‘sizeable fiscal costs 
through a combination of financial sector rescues, forfeited revenues owing to 
depressed activity and, more secondarily, discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal 
impulse to lessen the downturn’ (Buti and Carnot 2012: 903). What is more, the 
preoccupation with the prevention of free-riding lead to a coordination system that 
lacked provisions to allow for bailouts. The costs of sovereign default within the 
eurozone were considered to exceed the political (in terms of moral hazard) and 
economic costs of financial assistance in the face of substantial interdependence of 
the national financial system of all EU Member States. This omission ultimately 
threatened the stability of the eurozone much more then past breaches of the SGP. 
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CHAPTER 3: ON THEORIES, METHODS AND HYPOTHESES
Introduction
Over the course of the past decade, the study of European integration has seen an 
increase in literature championing a so-called eclectic approach (e.g. Stone Sweet et 
al. 2001; Rumford 2002; Ringe 2009), set out to defeat the credo of ‘parsimonious 
theorising’ (Hirschman 1986).38 Research on EMU has been particularly affected by 
this development, as the very nature of the subject touches upon a myriad of 
economic, political and social aspects.39 While for the most part these studies offer 
the expected advantage of providing comprehensive and inclusive explanations of 
the phenomena under investigation, they tend to fall flat with respect to hypotheses 
testing and often lack theoretical focus. Pounding the streets of the main theories of 
European integration (the ‘usual suspects’ being (liberal) intergovernmentalism, neo-
functionalism, new institutionalism, and social constructivism), such studies may 
easily turn into textbook exercises of theory-catechism, whose conclusions read like 
the Dodo bird’s Caucus race where ‘everybody has won, and all must have 
prizes’ (Carroll 1992, 1865: 63). The arguments of this thesis are not limited to one 
theory and to borrow Hirschman’s (1981) description, ‘trespass’ on the grounds of 
various bodies of literature that unite under the umbrella of the political economy of 
policy coordination. In so doing, this thesis acknowledges the main pitfalls of 
aggregating theoretical approaches with conflicting epistemological premises. Given 
the slippery nature of defining coordination that Metcalfe (1988: 2) considered a 
‘standing temptation to academic eclecticism’, such caution is particularly apposite.
The focus of this chapter is to discuss the conceptual framework, research 
hypotheses and methods used for examining fiscal policy coordination during the 
Great Recession. It starts by introducing the theoretical starting point of this research, 
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38 For a rejoinder to Hirschman see Gerring (1999).
39 Here,  particularly Dyson ed. (2002) comes to mind, which examines the impact of EMU on member 
states by applying a Europeanisation approach.
collective action theory. I then propose three main hypotheses considering the EU’s 
latency, incentives for group-oriented behaviour and fiscal free-riding. These 
hypotheses will be tested in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 using a mixed-methods approach of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Collective action theory
Since the 1980s, International Relations (IR) scholars have reinvigorated debates 
about the concept of international cooperation, discussing the constraints and 
opportunities for macroeconomic policy cooperation and coordination in the face of 
interdependence (e.g. Oye 1986; Bryant and Portes 1987; Dobson 1991; Kenen 
1995). At the same time the discussion has been further stimulated by new 
institutional economics (Brousseau and Glachant 2008) and public choice theory 
(Mueller 2000). The focus of this thesis is policy coordination. As this is in many 
instances congruent with collective action, it should come as no surprise that the 
literature on the logic of collective action, particularly Olson’s seminal work (1965), 
serves as this study’s theoretical foundation.40 The starting point of the logic of 
collective action in IR is the so-called moral hazard problem; policy-makers are 
prone to disregard the externalities of their policies for other states, and thus create 
non-optimal equilibria. Olson’s work rests on the premise that individual rationality 
is not sufficient for collective rationality. He notably described how, due to the strong 
incentives to free-ride for each individual, a situation in which the benefits of a 
public good cannot be successfully limited to those that positively contribute to its 
generation causes this good to be provided at sub-optimal levels, if at all. 
One of the key dependent variables in analysing collective action for Olson and other 
scholars of social dilemmas is the question of group size. Olson (1965: 48-49) argues 
that for a number of reasons, group size is negatively related to the likelihood of 
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40 Various scholars have analysed free-riding behaviour and selective incentive prior to Olson. But, as 
Dougherty (2001: 250) argues ‘these ideas were not prominent. Most of these theories were hidden in 
a mass of written works that were totally disregarded until Olson gave them relevance again’.
providing collective goods. Firstly, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of 
the total benefit any member acting in the group interest receives and thus the less 
adequate the reward for group-oriented action. Secondly, the larger the group, the 
smaller the likelihood of oligopolistic behaviour41 that might help to provide the 
good. Finally, larger groups involve higher organisation costs and as such higher 
transaction costs are involved in agreeing on and maintaining a coordination strategy. 
For the purposes of this study it is more useful to think of group composition instead 
of group size.42 Key here are the characteristics of EU Member States and their 
impact on fiscal policy outcomes, not the number of group members per se. Group 
composition thus determines the size of the benefits that any individual member 
receives from the provision of the public good in relation to the costs of his 
contribution towards its provision. The analysis of costs and benefits is expressed by 
the public good’s specific provision (costs) and allocation (benefits) function. 
Depending on group composition, Olson (1965: 50) distinguishes between three 
kinds of groups; privileged, intermediate, and latent groups. In a privileged group, 
‘each of its members, or at least some of them, has an incentive to see that the 
collective good is provided, even if it has to bear the full burden of providing it 
himself’ (ibid.). Accordingly, a collective good may be provided even without any 
group organisation, coordination or additional incentives. In an intermediary group, 
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41 Oligopolistic action is group-oriented, coordinated action by a subgroup of members of a group 
towards the provision of a public good. Crucially the provision functions of stability and growth are 
variable. For example, prior to the economic and financial crisis, the overall stability (as indicated by 
sovereign bond spreads) was essentially a ‘best shot’ scenario with Member States (including now 
famously Greece) paying almost the same interest rates on government borrowing as Germany. De 
Grauwe and Ji 92013) argue that this convergence was driven by an implicit understanding that the 
bail-out agreement in EMU would not be enforced. This claim is echoed by Sara Bertin, then Greece 
analyst at Moody’s, who argues that there was a widespread ‘belief that Greece was now part of the 
Eurozone and that nobody was ever going to default (New York Times, 29.11.2011). Yet at no point in 
time was pure oligopolistic provision of both public goods – stability and growth – possible. Even 
Germany, EMU’s ‘weak hegemon’ (Eichengreen 1987), is not in a position to singlehandedly provide 
stability by ‘maintaining liquidity, solvency and the political conditions for adjustment’ but depends 
on the cooperation of other group members (Schelkle and Mabbett 2013: 2). Likewise Germany does 
not have the economic resources (even if the political conditions for such policies was somehow 
magically secured) to provide for growth throughout the EU.
42 The notion that group size and collective action are negatively correlated has, since Olson’s seminal 
account, been refuted by numerous studies (e.g. Hardin 1982: 41; Agrawal 2000, see also Poteete and 
Ostrom 2004).
‘no single member gets a share of the benefit sufficient to give him an incentive to 
provide the good himself, but the group does not have so many members that no one 
member will notice whether any other member is not helping to provide the 
collective good’ (ibid.). In an intermediate group, a collective good cannot be 
obtained without some level of group coordination. The third, the latent group ‘has 
no incentive to act to obtain a collective good because, however valuable the 
collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any 
incentive to bear [...] any of the costs of the necessary collective action (ibid. 51). 
The greater the latency of a group, the lower the probabilities of a public good being 
provided and the greater the chances of collective action failure. The way out of the 
social dilemma for latent groups is the provision of separate and selective incentives 
that will ‘stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group oriented 
way’ (ibid.). The three main hypotheses of this thesis are developed systematically 
from Olson’s theory of collective action and consider group latency, separate and 
selective incentives and finally free-riding/collective action failure.
Bounded rationality
This thesis works with a weak rationality assumption (e.g. Elster 1986, 2000).43 In 
economics more generally, bounded rationality is linked to the assumption of finite 
limits to the amount of information the human brain can hold and process. Instead of 
optimising, that is to say considering all possible alternatives and choosing the best, 
individuals and organisations are said to consider only a limited set of alternatives 
and make a choice once they reach a tolerable course of action, known as satisficing. 
The understanding of bounded rationality used in this thesis goes further than the 
distinction between optimising and satisficing, which hinges on endogenous factors 
(cognitive constraints), instead considering the influence of exogenous factors as 
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43 Olson’s work (1965) introduces a variant of this theme distinguishing between individual and 
collective rationality. Accordingly individual rationality is said to be an insufficient condition for 
collective rationality.
well. In so doing, it follows Simon (1969), who argues that rationality resembled a 
pair of scissors where one blade is the ‘cognitive limitation’ of actual humans and the 
other the ‘structure of the environment’. State preferences for policies and 
institutions are considered to be not merely the pure product of rational reasoning, 
but contingent on political culture, ideology, rules and conventions. Fiscal-policy 
making is not merely a product of reconciling economic possibilities (i.e. the 
country’s fiscal space) with political strategies, but is further influenced by the 
societal consensus on the role of the state. For example, the initial German reluctance 
to stimulate the domestic economy in the autumn of 2008 seems irrational in light of 
its structural strength and fiscal space. A look at Germany’s peculiar relationship 
with fiscal policy explains the initial hesitance and subsequent poor communication 
strategy in which the government has effectively undermined its own stimulus efforts 
in front of European partners. Conversely, the Spanish governments’ overly generous 
stimulus programme cannot be explained by examining the economic situation of the 
country but was rather the result of deliberate choices of policy-makers in times of 
crisis who, unaware of the fragility of the banking sector, pursued a policy of active 
demand management in an election period.
Note that bounded rationality should not be confused with irrationality. As Drazen 
(2001: 410) concludes:
‘a goal of political economy is to show how policies which seem suboptimal (hence, irrational 
in terms of basic welfare economics) can in fact be shown to be the result of the political 
mechanisms under which the decisions of rational, self-interested agents are agreed’. 
The rationality of collective action depends on the specific parameters of a situation 
with the specific function describing the costs of the public good, its value to 
individual group members and the probability that the good will be provided without 
his or her individual contribution. Explaining collective action (failure) is hence also 
an attempt to explain the seemingly irrational state of policy (non-) coordination and 
to present it as the ‘rational’ outcome of individual optimisation/satisfying, 
contingent on intervening factors.
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Research Hypotheses
In this section I formulate the independent variables that are used to explore the three 
main hypotheses of this study. Three main elements of Olson’s theory guide this 
study and inform the three-step testing design; this is outlined in Figure 3.1. In a first 
step, I examine whether EU Member States can be characterised as a latent group in 
terms of fiscal policy choices. Specifically, by identifying the determinants of fiscal 
policy choices I am able to draw inference on group latency. If group latency is 
found to be a problem, Olson suggests the need for incentives to motivate group 
members to contribute to the production of the collective good in question. Hence in 
a second step, I examine the working of different separate and selective incentives 
and whether or not they matter for public finances in times of crises. Weak 
incentives, in turn, would imply a high likelihood of free-riding behaviour/collective 
action failure. The third hypothesis therefore considers evidence in favour of or 
against stability and growth free-riding during the Great Recession.
Insert Figure 3.1. here
Latency Hypothesis
There is no latency litmus test yielding yes or no answers. The use of latency is a 
conceptual device. To test for group latency in EU fiscal policy coordination, I will 
first examine the determinants of fiscal policy outcomes, which in turn either 
contribute or fail to contribute to the public goods defined in Chapter 2 (i.e. stability 
and growth). The first hypotheses tested in this thesis are that
H1a: Fiscal policy coordination in the EU takes place in a latent group between 
2008-2010.
H1b: Fiscal policy coordination in the EU does not take place in a latent group 
between 2008-2010.
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Latency is not equivalent to heterogeneity per se. On the one hand a group may be 
highly heterogeneous, that is diverse in character or content, but still classify as a 
salient group, for instance via the oligopolistic provision of the public good. On the 
other hand a highly homogeneous group might still be a latent group, for instance if 
all group members care little about the provision of a public good and are also united 
by a belief that their non-contribution to its production will remain unnoticed. The 
term latency originates in physics where it describes the delay between the receipt of 
a stimulus by a sensory nerve and the response to it. Following this image, latent EU 
Member States, depending on their propensity to contribute to fiscal policy 
coordination, delay, maladapt or ignore their policy responses to the Great Recession. 
It is possible to model latency as a function of the economic and political 
environment of fiscal policy-making. Following the distinction between 
heterogeneity and latency, the fact that Member States experienced the crisis very 
differently, or the fact that national policy-makers operate in dissimilar political 
systems do not suffice to establish group latency. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
first test whether these heterogeneous variables have an impact on fiscal policy 
outcomes during the Great Recession. Building on the theoretical considerations and 
empirical findings of the existing literature, one can identify the political factors that 
are likely to impact on a state’s fiscal response to the financial and economic crisis 
and by proxy to influence its contribution to fiscal policy coordination. Likely 
determinants of public spending are presented as sub-hypotheses of the latency 
hypothesis below. Given the heterogeneous political landscape of EU Member States 
that have differing electoral calendars, partisan outlooks, executive and legislative 
makeups, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to be heterogeneous across Member 
States. In order to ascertain whether this group heterogeneity influenced the group 
latency, I will first establish whether these factors indeed influenced fiscal crisis 
responses.
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Determinants of fiscal policy
To explore the latency of the eurozone Member States, I focus on four groups of 
political variables inspired by the literature on the deficit and debt bias of public 
finances. In doing so I include not only the literature on fiscal expansion, but 
consider also the literature on fiscal consolidation. The inclusion of these studies is 
relevant for two reasons; consolidation is simply the flipside of stimulus policies and 
efforts (in most cases alongside stimulus policies) had already started in 2009 and 
2010, Estonia, Greece and Ireland in particular, to implement substantial 
consolidation measures (Public Finances in EMU 2010: 20). I first examine the 
impact of the political business cycle (PBC). Secondly, I analyse the strength of the 
executive branch. Third, I analyse the strength of the opposition before finally 
turning attention to the political colour of government.
Political business cycle
One of the central hypotheses of the political economy of public deficits revolves 
around the PBC, based on the premise that policy-makers are opportunistic and 
voters myopic. Consequently, the central aim of public policy is to secure re-election. 
Assuming that the expected support for a party will rise with the short-term welfare it 
delivers, deficits are higher in election years when incumbent governments try to buy  
electoral support (Nordhaus 1975). A myriad of studies have been developed since 
the 1970s (for an overview see Drazen et al. 2001), forming a body of literature that 
although theoretically rich and empirically sophisticated, is far from uniform in 
presenting evidence concerning the impact of elections on public finances.44 
Studying the impact of elections on public finances in EMU, Buti and van den Noord 
(2003), von Hagen (2003), Hallerberg et al. (2009: ch.4) and Mink and de Haan 
(2006) present evidence of expansionary fiscal policies in EU member countries 
before elections, despite the introduction of the SGP. Other studies have however 
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44 See for instance Schuknecht 1996; Block 2002; Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2006.
cast doubt on the presence and/or strength of a PBC in EMU (e.g. LeMay-Boucher 
and Rommerskirchen 2014). A subgroup of the PBC literature has explored the 
relationship between fiscal consolidation and elections; Whilst Lavigne (2010) shows 
that elections do not matter for fiscal adjustments in advanced economies a number 
of studies have argued otherwise. Gupta et al. (2005), for example, find that fiscal 
consolidation is less likely to occur during election years than during non-election 
years; Mierau et al. (2007) analyse 20 OECD countries for the period 1970-2003 and 
similarly argue that the likelihood that a rapid consolidation takes place is negatively 
influenced by upcoming elections. Based on these studies, it is fair to say that fiscal 
policy may indeed be more expansionary in election years.
Political fragmentation
Political scientists and economists have argued that budget deficits are more likely in 
countries with fragmented executive or legislative polities. The former, in particular, 
has received much attention in the literature. Fiscal policy under coalition or 
fragmented governments45 is said to suffer from a so-called ‘common pool 
problem’ (see Weingast et al. 1981, Velasco 1999). This problem arises because for a 
typical spending programme, the costs are spread over a larger group with benefits 
being concentrated in a smaller group. The resulting ‘overgrazing’ of the common 
pasture (Hardin 1982) then leads to a deficit and debt bias.46 Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1999) empirically show that the members of a given government coalition 
prefer to keep taxes low on their own constituencies, thus contributing to the deficit 
bias. In a similar vein, Persson et al. (2003) argue that each member of the coalition 
will support initiatives to increase spending on items favouring their own 
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45 Government fragmentation usually distinguishes between the minority/majority governments and 
the number of parties in the coalition.
46 More specifically Hardin (1968) described ‘the law of 1/n’, according to which the larger the 
number of graziers (the n) on the budgetary commons, the smaller is the fraction of costs that each 
grazier internalises. The severity of the common-pool problem increases the smaller the fraction of the 
total cost that each grazier has to take on, the smaller become the perceived costs compared with the 
actual costs.
constituencies. Excessive spending is then positively related to the different groups/
constituencies represented by the government47. A different perspective on 
government/coalition fragmentation frequently cited in the literature explores the 
impact of spending ministers. Wehner (2011) argues that because the most important 
representatives of individual spending preferences in European governments are the 
individual spending ministers, public spending is positively related to the number of 
spending departments and ministers in a country’s government. This proposition is 
empirically confirmed for OECD countries by inter alia Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001).48
Turning to the question of fiscal consolidation, Alesina and Drazen (1991) show that 
the persistence of large deficits may be due to inefficient political equilibria, in 
which coalition members are unable to agree on a consolidation package. The 
implication of this ‘war of attrition’ model is that the higher the degree of 
heterogeneity of government coalitions, the higher the likelihood that consolidations 
are delayed. Studying 15 EU Member States between 1960-2000, Maroto and Mulas-
Granados (2002) find that the higher the number of spending ministers in the cabinet, 
the higher the number of accumulated failures to consolidate, and during election 
years, the higher the probability that the fiscal consolidation ends and a fiscal 
expansion begins. Support for the hypothesis linking the failure of fiscal adjustment 
to government fragmentation is mixed.49 
Fragmentation in the legislature is likewise thought to increase deficits. In 
fragmented legislative systems, so the argument goes, each party has an incentive to 
secure as much spending as possible to its political constituents (Mukherjee 2003). 
Crepaz and Moser (2004: 271) advocate the inclusion of the ‘effective number’ of 
parties in the parliament rather than the number of parties in the governing coalition, 
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47 See also Tsebelis 1999; Hallerberg and Basinger 1998; Tsebelis and Chang 200; Lane 2003.
48 For further empirical tests of this hypothesis see Balassone and Giordano 2001; Harrinvirta and 
Mattila 2001; Mulas-Granados 2003.
49 See inter alia Edin and Ohlsson 1991; Alesina and Perotti 1995; De Haan et al. 1999.
to fully consider the effects of the number of veto players in the budgetary process. 
Other studies have focused on the fragmentation of the legislative opposition in 
relation to the fragmentation of government (e.g. Ricciuti 2004). To summarise, I 
expect both government and opposition fragmentation to have a positive impact on 
the size of the fiscal stimulus.
Partisan politics
A fourth determinant of fiscal outcomes frequently tested in the literature is ideology. 
The analysis of the impact of political parties and their ideological inclinations has 
been the target of considerable scrutiny since the early 1970s. Proponents of the left-
right hypothesis regarding public deficits argue for a causal relation between political 
variables and policy outputs (e.g. Hibbs 1977: 485). A myriad of studies since then 
have examined the impact of (different) ideological stances within the executive (e.g. 
Mink and de Haan 2006) and legislative branches (e.g. Heller 1997). Various studies 
have found evidence for increased budget deficits under left-wing parties (De Haan 
and Sturm 1997; Imbeau et al. 2001), whilst others find no relationship between the 
party/parties in power and government spending (e.g. Pampel and Williamson 1988). 
Similarly, it is argued that the ideological positioning of government matters for the 
implementation of fiscal consolidation (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1995; Mulas-
Granados 2003). Reviewing the literature, Clark (2003: 49) concludes that the 
evidence for the ‘Hibbsian relationship between fiscal policy and the ideological 
orientation of the government is mixed at best’. Following the conventional 
assumption that a left-wing deficit bias is in part due to a propensity to implement 
Keynesian demand policy, it can be argued that this bias, if it exists at all in the 
contemporary EU, should be amplified in times of economic crisis when the 
perceived need (and therefore justification) for fiscal intervention is stronger. This 
would suggest a positive relationship between the size of stimulus policies and left-
wing governments, whereas the association between left-leaning parties and fiscal 
consolidation is likely to be negative.
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Incentives hypothesis
Group latency creates necessary but not sufficient conditions for the failure of 
collective action. In other words, free-riding behaviour is not an inevitable policy 
outcome for latent groups. To overcome free-riding and non-group oriented 
behaviour in latent groups, Olson (1965: 51) argues for the utilisation of separate and 
selective incentives to stimulate cooperation. Notably, incentives should not work 
indiscriminately like the promise of a collective good, but rather be targeted 
selectively towards the individual in the group.50 Negative incentives are defined as 
punishments that leave an individual on a lower indifference curve than she would 
have been had she contributed her share of the cost towards the provision of the 
collective good. Positive incentives, on the other hand, are defined to be any reward 
that leaves an individual on a higher indifference curve and thus makes group-
oriented behaviour more appealing51 (e.g. Kuhn 1963: 365-370). These incentives 
can then mobilise latent groups into collective action by altering the cost-benefit 
calculus of individual members. Following Olson’s (1965) argument, the rival 
hypotheses tested in chapter six are:
H2a: Free-riding was kept at bay due to select and separate incentives between 
2008-2010.
H2b: Free-riding was not reined in by select and separate incentives between 
2008-2010.
Separate and selective incentives in fiscal policy coordination
76
50 In their extreme form these incentives can take the form of coercion. In Chapter Three of The Logic 
of Collective Action, Olson (1965) argues that coercion is necessary for union survival. The legal 
obligation of (some) workers to join unions as well as the negative consequences of not joining 
exceed by far the possible ramification surrounding the compliance with EU’s fiscal rules which 
hardly qualify as ‘coercion’, regardless of the definition used. 
51 In microeconomic theory, an indifference curve is a graph showing different bundles of goods, or in 
the case of fiscal policy actions, between which an actor is indifferent. At each point on the curve, she 
has no preference for one bundle over another.
In order to explore their role in the success or failure of fiscal policy coordination I 
focus on two kinds of incentives. I first examine the impact of fiscal rules on 
stimulus policies, distinguishing between domestic and EU rules. Secondly, I analyse 
the role of financial market participants, specifically the impact of bond yields, in 
driving fiscal expansion.
Fiscal rules
A fiscal rule can be defined as ‘[a] permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically 
defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance’ (Kopits and Symansky 
1998: 2). The literature on fiscal rules highlights the importance of institutions 
which, according to Hall’s influential characterisation (1986: 19), are defined as ‘the 
formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure 
the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’. 
Different institutions (fiscal rules) therefore provide the framework within which 
individuals and groups define their preferences and thereby shape the strategic 
choices of policy actors (e.g. Shepsle 1989; March and Olsen 1996; North 1990). 
The theory of collective action is closely linked to the study of institutions, as these 
are considered to be the preferred loci of overcoming social dilemma. Ostrom 
(quoted in Peters 2005: 52) stresses that cooperation is most efficient if 
institutionalised, because institutions are a means to ‘prescribe, proscribe, and 
permit’ behaviour.52
In analysing the impact of EU fiscal rules, the evidence for a disciplinary effect is 
mixed. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) show that for the 1990-2005 period, both the 
rules laid out in the Maastricht Treaty and in the SGP have a statistically significant 
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52 In a similar vein, Shepsle (1989) argued that institutions are an attempt to solve the ‘Arrow 
Problem’ of how groups can make decisions that satisfy the conditions of a social welfare function 
without having the decision enforced through hierarchical coercion.
positive effect on the improvement of the fiscal position and suggest that this is due 
to an increased effort pursued by the EU countries to comply with the existing EU 
fiscal framework; similar evidence is presented by Busemeyer (2004). However a 
more nuanced picture is painted by Von Hagen (2006) and Buti and Giudice (2002). 
These authors present evidence that the Maastricht treaty and the related convergence 
period reduced deficit levels, but that this disciplinary effect disappeared with the 
introduction of the euro. This difference can be explained by the fact that the 
rewarding aspect of these rules (accession to the eurozone) during the convergence 
period has spurred fiscal consolidation, whereas the Pact lost much of its disciplining 
power once Member States adopted the euro, thereby irrevocably eating the carrot 
that once guided public finances. Conversely a number of studies find no significant 
effect of (post) EMU fiscal rules (Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Gali and Perotti 2003; 
LeMay-Boucher and Rommerskirchen 2014). Although the effectiveness of the SGP 
is almost exclusively studied in the context of EMU it is worth stressing that it 
applies to all EU Member States, albeit without the possibility of sanctions for those 
outside the eurozone. During the Great Recession the EERP created a new, albeit 
loosely defined, agreement on fiscal policy coordination for all 27 Member States. 
The literature on domestic fiscal rules, such as the Golden Rule53 or debt ceilings, 
largely suggests that they reduce budget deficits.54 Several studies find that the 
presence and/or strength of fiscal rules in the USA are associated with faster policy 
initiatives to reduce deficits (e.g. Alt and Lowry 1994) or lower budget deficits 
overall (e.g. Alesina and Bayoumi 1996). Similar evidence for Canadian provinces 
shows that provincial deficit rules lead to stronger budget balances (Tellier and 
Imbeau 2004). The evidence for EU Member States predominantly points to the 
beneficial effect of national fiscal rules on the soundness of public finances. 
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53 The golden rule stipulates that over the economic cycle, the government should borrow only to 
invest, – not to fund current expenditure.
54 A related body of literature focuses not only budgetary rules but takes the whole budgetary 
procedure into account.  Various studies have confirmed the effectiveness of specific budgetary 
procedures in improving fiscal performance (e.g. Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Hallerberg et al. 
2009). 
Examining the overall size of public spending in the EU between 1990 and 2005, 
Debrun et al. (2008) show that countries with strong expenditure rules have lower 
primary expenditure-to-GDP ratios.55 
Turrini (2008) shows that the pro-cyclical spending bias was less pronounced in EU 
countries with strong expenditure rules. Yet in times of crisis, the question becomes 
how expenditure rules impact anti-cyclical spending. If strong fiscal rules reduce the 
deficit bias of policy makers, is it sensible to assume that the same rules exert this 
moderating influence even in times of crisis, when a) most rules do not apply due to 
built-in exceptionality clauses56 and b) the overarching European crisis framework 
under the EERP explicitly calls for expansionary fiscal policies? Arguably the 
answer is yes. On the one hand, it can be assumed that countries with strong fiscal 
rules were in a better budgetary position to flout their fiscal thresholds57 to begin 
with and therefore had more room for manoeuvre to follow the EU-wide call for 
fiscal expansion.58 This would therefore make them less likely to engage in stimulus 
free riding. On the other hand, Member States with stronger fiscal rules might have 
been more attuned to the necessity for fiscal consolidation once the recession stopped 
and therefore implemented more moderate stimulus programmes, which are more 
easily reversed. To summarise, strong fiscal rules are expected to curb fiscal free-
riding, although given the weak record of EU-level fiscal institutions, the impact of 
domestic rules is likely to be more important. 
Market discipline
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55 For more evidence on EU/OECD countries see Turrini 2008; Wierts 2008; Basinger 2009; Holm-
Hadulla 2012.
56 However Schuknecht (2004) argues that it is not important whether fiscal rules bind in a strict sense 
because they serve as benchmarks against which imperfectly informed electorates evaluate 
governments’ fiscal performance. Put differently, they represent the ‘fiscal norm’, which policy-
makers should aim for.
57 Especially given that rules regularly have built in escape clauses (i.e. the rule does not or only 
partially apply in times of exigency)
58 This logic is summarised in the Commission’s endorsement of domestic fiscal rules: ‘Enforced 
national expenditure rules [. . .] help to counteract forces leading to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good 
times and thus prevent the need to retrench in bad times’ (European Commission 2004: 37).
The literature on market discipline examines if and how financial market participants 
constrain sovereign borrowers.59 This alleged ability is described by the market 
discipline hypothesis (MDH, see Bishop 1992, Lane 1993). Ever since the post-
Bretton Woods era, market discipline has been seen as a force for fiscal prudence, 
with proponents ‘[applauding] the way international financial markets would 
discipline government policy and force states to adopt more conservative, “sound” 
fiscal […] programmes’ (Helleiner 1996: 324). Market discipline is said to be able to 
‘deter a borrower from maintaining an unsustainable path of borrowing’ (Lane 1993: 
83). To this end, the MDH hinges on the responsiveness of both financial markets 
and national policy-makers. On the one hand, financial markets must react to fiscal 
policy changes. On the other hand however, borrowers must respond to market 
signals.
Market discipline was, and still is, considered to be a key ingredient for the 
functioning of EMU due to an apparent asymmetry. Eurozone Member States, albeit 
able to issue debt in their own right, are limited in their policy options in the face of 
financial difficulties because they are no longer in charge of monetary policy. This 
gave rise to one of the ‘founding fears’ of EMU, namely that governments would 
seek either monetary bail-out from the European Central Bank (ECB) or a fiscal bail-
out from other member-states. It was thought that ‘to the extent that market-imposed 
discipline leads to more prudent fiscal policies and helps prevent fiscal crises in 
federal states and monetary unions, it protects the citizens against having to pay for 
the profligacies of the governments of other states’ (Schuknecht et al. 2009: 371).
To analyse the responsiveness of financial markets, fiscal policy outcomes are 
modelled as determinants of government’s borrowing costs, measured as bond 
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59 For a comprehensive review on the financial market side of the capital market-national government 
nexus see Mosley (2003: ch 2).
spreads, credit default swap (CDS) spreads,60 interest expenditure (debt servicing 
costs) or changes in interest rates. The majority of empirical studies point to a 
significant effect of market punishment for ‘excessive’ fiscal policy (e.g. Dewachter 
and Toffano 2012). Lonning (2000) finds a positive and mostly significant impact of 
government debt and deficits on government bond yields, comparing the yields of a 
small sample of bonds issued in Deutsche Mark of 11 EU governments with 
equivalent German government bonds. The findings of Bernoth et al. (2004) confirm 
this relationship although argue for a stronger effect. Addressing the question of how 
bond yield spreads react to fiscal consolidations, Ardagna (2009) finds that interest 
rates of 10-year government bonds decrease, on average, by 124 basis points around 
episodes of fiscal consolidation. 
Whilst empirical studies of the first side of the MDH (market’s responsiveness) are 
abundant 61, the second side of the MDH (borrowers’ responsiveness) has been 
comparatively neglected in the literature.  For the purposes of this study I am 
interested in the second side of market discipline. Does market punishment offer a 
strong incentive for ‘sound’ fiscal policies? Do sovereign borrowers react to interest 
rate penalties demanded by financial markets? The existing literature suggests that 
credit market punishment restrains sovereign borrowers. Analysing the determinants 
of changes in the primary debt levels of 10 OECD countries for the 1980-1996 
period, de Haan and Sturm (2000) find that financial markets (measured by the debt 
servicing costs as a percentage of total debt) have a disciplining effect on 
government’s fiscal position. Heinemann and Winschel (2001) analyse the fiscal 
performance of 19 OECD countries between 1970 and 1998 and show that 
borrowing costs, measured as the interest-growth-differential62, have a significant 
impact on the primary surplus. However this impact is asymmetric: reactions in 
times of increasing borrowing costs are more pronounced than in times of decreasing 
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60 The CDS is a credit derivative which allows the buyer to purchase insurance against the risk of 
default.
61 Inter Alia Afonso and Strauch 2004; Codogno et al. 2003; Faini 2005; Malritz 2012.
62 The differential between the interest rate paid to service government debt and the GDP growth rate 
is a key measurement to assess fiscal sustainability. 
interest rates. Molnar (2012) analyses the effect of high interest rates on budget 
consolidations, finding that high interest rate differentials have a positive impact on 
the start of very large consolidations. Nickel et al. (2010) assess which factors 
determine the probability of major debt reduction (defined as a decline of the debt-
to-GDP ratio of at least 10 percentage points in 5 consecutive years) in the EU-15 
during the 1985-2009 period. The authors show that high debt servicing costs played 
a ‘disciplinary role’ and forced governments to reduce public debt. Bulut’s (2012) 
comprehensive analysis of 40 developing countries stands out because the author 
explicitly considers both aspects of market discipline; in various model specifications 
he finds little evidence for borrowers’ responsiveness, whereas the primary structural 
budget balances is shown to impact negatively on a country’s risk premium. 
Wagschal and Wenzelburger (2012) model market discipline as part of a so-called 
‘misery index’ which measures the economic pressure for reforms.63 It is this 
pressure that then provides the Olsonian incentive. Interest rates still qualify as 
‘separate and selective’ despite well-documented contagion effects; at the origin they 
are country-specific. Financial market discipline is likely to provide a particularly 
strong incentive due to the fact that it takes the form of both punishment (high 
interest rates) and reward (low interest rates). It offers both carrot and stick. Based on 
these studies, I expect to find a positive relationship between deteriorating sovereign 
borrowing conditions and fiscal indicators. 
Free-riding hypothesis
If group latency and weak incentives are identified, free riding becomes a concern. 
According to the free-rider problem, individuals only partially bear the adverse 
consequences of reducing their effort concerning fiscal stimulus or consolidation 
policies. Consequently, collective effort typically falls below the optimal level. Fiscal 
free-riding can take the forms of both stimulus and growth free-riding. The empirical 
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63 Although oddly and to Wagschal and Wenzelburger’s puzzlement (2012: 68), when regressed 
separately, their findings indicate that a high short-term interest rate reduces the probability of 
consolidation.
study of fiscal policy coordination in times of crisis is challenging; in the absence of 
clear numerical rules for fiscal stimulus policies, measuring the success of fiscal 
policy coordination is problematic This challenge is echoed in the scepticism of an 
interviewee from a Member States’ Permanent Representation in Brussels, who when 
told about the subject of this thesis quipped, ‘so how are you going to write about 
something that does not exist?’ (author interview, May 2011). There is little reason to 
organize a project on the chimerical promise of measuring the immeasurable. First, 
as a crude proxy for group oriented behaviour I will consider national stimulus 
programmes vis-à-vis the self-imposed EERP value of 1.2 per cent of GDP. 
Secondly, I will consider fiscal packages in relation to a country’s fiscal space. To do 
so, I will construct a measure of fiscal space based on the indicators used in the 
newly created Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) to obtain a suitable 
yardstick for crisis responses. Fiscal policy coordination is again that Member States 
shoulder fiscal expansion in accordance of their fiscal room for manoeuvre. Fiscal 
response strategies that fall short or (largely) exceed a country’s fiscal space are an 
indicator of growth or stability free-riding respectively. The analysis seeks to 
distinguish between group-desirable and group-undesirable free-riding. Finally, I 
identify two main factors that are likely to contribute positively to the incentive and 
opportunities for free-riding (see below). This allows me to test empirically for the 
lure of free-riding. 
A word of caution is, however, in order. By starting from a negative assumption 
about the malfunctioning of collective action, results might be prejudiced towards 
unearthing just that. Two factors mitigate this bias. First, the majority of fiscal 
outcome variables as well as all ‘free riding variables’ are ‘value-free’ variables in 
the sense that they reflect real world policies/characteristics. It is therefore unlikely 
that the empirical analyses suffer from a negative bias. Secondly, the interview 
material complementing the empirical findings has been gathered with this problem 
in mind. Therefore, when wording the questions, interviewees were not initially 
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asked about ‘free-riding’ problems, but the subject was first introduced by asking 
how Member States contributed to fiscal policy coordination. Only then as a follow 
up to a negative assessment of fiscal policy coordination were interviewees asked 
about free-riding behaviour. Introducing, a ‘positive bias’, so to speak, seemed 
further appropriate as these interviews were conducted in the spring of 2010 when 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis was in full swing and the general perception of fiscal 
policy coordination was one of glaring failure. The main hypotheses guiding chapter 
seven are:
H3a: Fiscal policy coordination was marred by free-ridding between 2008-2010.
H3b: Fiscal policy coordination was free from free-ridding between 2008-2010.
Determinants of free-riding
In order to ascertain and explain the phenomenon of fiscal free-riding during the 
Great Recession, two main ‘free-riding variables’ are explored. These relate to the 
size of a Member State and its trade openness, aspects that are able to elucidate both 
a country’s political ability and its structural capacity to free-ride. Both relate to the 
notion of asymmetric interdependence discussed in the previous chapter. 
Size
Various authors comparing the compliance rates with the SGP of small and large 
Member States have suggested that size matters when it comes to respecting E(M)
U’s fiscal rules. Von Hagen et al. (2000) argue that the superior track record of small 
Member States may be due to their being accustomed to external influence over 
domestic policy and therefore their readiness to accept a supranational framework for 
the conduct of fiscal policy. This ‘accustomisation’ is, according to de Haan et al. 
(2004), ascribed to the fact that small Member States tend to have less bargaining 
power. This makes them feel the loss of reputation from violating the SGP more 
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acutely (ibid. see also Meyer 2004, as well as Schure and Verdun 2008 on the 
different preferences about the SGP’s application for large and small Member 
States).64 
A similar distinction between small and large countries applies to fiscal 
consolidation. Buti and Pench (2004) show that the price of fiscal consolidation 
tends to be higher in large countries because fiscal multipliers are greater.65 What is 
more, fiscal consolidation is helped by strong growth. This is achieved by reducing 
the budget deficit directly via the reduced effect of automatic stabilisers, the 
increasing denominator (GDP), but also by easing ‘structural consolidation to the 
extent that carrying out restrictive fiscal policies may be easier when the overall cake 
is growing and it is therefore easier to compensate the losers’ (ibid. 1028). Fatas and 
Mihov (2003) argue that since the start of EMU large countries have grown 
considerably more slowly than smaller countries, which hampered their retrenchment 
efforts. Looking at compliance with the SGP, von Hagen (2007: 33) notes that it is 
the small states that respect the Pact, which ‘matters the least, since a fiscal crisis in a 
small EMU Member State would hardly threaten the stability of the common 
currency’. With the benefit of the hindsight this statement surely requires further 
qualification. 
An alternative argument to the big-versus-small Member States divide highlights the 
impact of state power at the decision-making stage. The political weight of a 
Member State is closely related to its assertiveness, that is, its ability to shape 
agreements according to its preferences (Thomson et al. 2007). If large Member 
States are able to influence the outcome of negotiations, this will positively impact 
their ability and willingness to comply with a given agreement. Large Member 
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64 The fiscal governance argument (e.g. Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999), not tested in this study, 
explains the disparities by pointing to the quality of domestic budgetary institutions, which differ 
between large countries (which are usually delegation states) and smaller Member States (which are 
predominantly commitment states).
65 Put simply, the higher the multiplier, the more painful deficit reduction.
States, notably France and Germany, were very active in the design of the EERP. 
One might argue that non-compliance on their part is therefore unlikely given the 
high degree of preference attainment.66 But given the rapidly altered economic and 
political realities of policy-makers I doubt whether this is a sufficient condition. The 
preferences held at the negotiation stage in late 2008 are not necessarily the same as 
throughout the Great Recession, when the fiscal response strategy was re-adjusted. In 
sum, I expect large Member States to be more likely to implement fiscal free-riding 
policies.
Openness
Openness is the second factor said to influence a country’s propensity to free-ride. 
There is a well-established link in the literature, as small countries tend to be more 
open.67 In fact large parts of the discussion on the fiscal policy choices of open 
economies discuss small and open countries. Ever since Cameron’s influential study 
(1978), numerous scholars have found a positive correlation between a country’s 
openness (trade exposure) and government expenditure. Cameron (ibid.) puts 
forward a ‘compensation hypothesis’ and explains this by suggesting that small 
economies are more likely to shelter their economies from the competitive risks of 
the international economy. Building on this work, Ruggie's embedded liberalism 
argument (1982) depicts a political compromise in which policy makers open their 
countries to freer trade while managing the dislocations that follow via increased 
expenditure.68 
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66 Looking back in history the alleged degree of preference attainment did not prevent both countries 
to breach the SGP’s three per cent threshold. However, crucially this thesis considers a comparatively 
short timeframe, where agreeing and enacting coalitions are largely identical in Germany and France.
67 Small countries with small domestic markets have limited opportunities to exploit economies of 
scale, which leads them to expand their market size through international trade (Alesina and Wacziarg 
1998). 
68 See also Rodrik (1998) and Kurtz and Brooks (2008).
A second strand of the literature examining the fiscal policy choices of open 
economies however questions the effectiveness of public spending. The Meade 
(1951) model suggests that at times of collapsing aggregate demand, economies that 
are more closed (or less open) should opt for larger fiscal stimuli. Trade openness 
implies lower fiscal multipliers, as a share of the stimuli would ‘leak’. Cameron 
(2012) argues that during the Great Recession concerns over such ‘leakages’ were 
strong amongst EU Member States. In light of this literature, open/small economies 
are expected to be less likely to engage in stimulus free-riding.
Research Methods
In the tradition of International Political Economy (IPE) and specifically European 
Political Economy (EPE), this thesis will comprise of empirical social science 
research. This thesis rejects the notion that all research methods inextricably  carry 
epistemological obligations (the embedded methods argument). Furthermore, it begs 
to differ that quantitative and qualitative research are separate paradigms, which are 
incompatible and incommensurable (the paradigm argument). It is worth noting that 
the sharp  distinction between qualitative and quantitative methodologies has been 
questioned in the literature by numerous accounts and it seems that the existing 
divide is one of methodological training and knowledge rather than one of 
epistemological paradigms. A mixed-methods strategy offers several methodological 
advantages. First, the goal of pursuing different research strategies is to expand the 
understanding gained from one method by incorporating the insights of another. This 
strategy is then able to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings within a 
single study, in order to obtain a more comprehensive account of the object  of 
enquiry. As Yin (2003) notes, the development of converging lines of evidence is a 
sound method of enhancing research validity. Triangulation of methods and measures 
has established itself as a clear hallmark of applied research. Ultimately the mixed-
methods approach is meant to counterbalance the weaknesses and shortcomings 
inherent within one method with the strength and advantages of another. 
87
Furthermore, with respect to the large body of EPE literature on European integration 
and more specifically  fiscal policy coordination, the methodological plurality of this 
study aims at bridging the divide between American and European scholarship 
(Verdun 2005). The end product thus aspires to plant a study that goes beyond the 
dominating ‘monocultural accounts’ (McNamara 2009) and appeals to a broad 
audience on both sides of the Atlantic.
Case Study Research
According to Odell (2001: 56) ‘case study methods have dominated the study of IPE 
over the last three decades’. This thesis uses case study methods to cast  light on the 
dynamics of fiscal policy  and its coordination in the EU. Often the selection of 
suitable cases presents itself as the primordial task of the case study  researcher 
searching for ‘explanatory’ or ‘pathway’ cases (Yin 2003; Gerring 2007). Yet the 
genesis of this research project began not with the undertaking to pair a theory  – to 
be proven or refuted – with appropriate cases. Instead the spark of origin can be 
traced back to the beginnings of the economic and financial crisis in late 2008, which 
precipitated an interest in the question of what would happen to fiscal policy and its 
coordination in the EU. The task at hand was thus not to find single or multiple 
cases, but instead to construct a robust  research design that would facilitate fruitful 
and coherent analysis. At first glance this thesis can be classified as a single-outcome 
study, defined by Gerring (2007: 710) as investigating ‘a bounded unit in an attempt 
to elucidate a single outcome occurring within that  unit’. Yet, on a second level this 
thesis is both idiographic, insofar as it purports to shed light on a set  of 27 Member 
States within the EU, as well as nomothetic insofar as it  reflects on broader questions 
of European integration. 
The case study design of this thesis matches Odell’s (2001) ‘disciplined-interpretive 
case study’. In this approach the analyst applies an existing body of theories to 
scrutinise a particular new event. A case is understood to constitute ‘a single instance 
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of an event or phenomenon’ (ibid.162). In this case study, the EU Member States 
(N=27) compose the group  that forms the case unit. Within this study multiple 
observations of theoretically  relevant variables will be tested. The central and sole 
criterion for selecting these countries was their membership in the EU.69 This thesis 
focuses not only on those countries that are Member States of the eurozone, despite 
the greater need for fiscal policy coordination resulting from to the single currency. 
Such a focus is justified by the fact  that the larger rationale for fiscal policy 
coordination applies to all EU Member States, as has been argued in the previous 
chapter. This is made explicit in the EERP, which calls on all EU countries to 
stimulate their economies. Including all Member States in the study can increase 
robustness of results, or in social science terminology ensure higher typicality and 
maximise inferential leverage. To create a comprehensive understanding of the scope 
and limits of fiscal policy coordination in the EU, it is essential to include all of its 
Member States. Not doing so would increase the propensity to omit evidence. This 
‘umbrella approach’ fits closely aggregated analyses in EPE studies (e.g. Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999; Ardy et al. 2006). It brings a decreasing level of detail in each 
Member State, which will be justified by the explanatory leverage gained into the 
research question of interest.
Having argued for the inclusion of all 27 EU Member States, the case for the 
exclusion of non-EU states must also be made. After all, fiscal policy coordination 
was not confined to the EU. While national governments worked on their response to 
the economic crisis, three supranational organisations, the G20, the IMF, and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) attempted to 
coordinate these national fiscal policies (Armingeon 2012). Particularly the attempts, 
and self-proclaimed success, of macroeconomic coordination within the G20 come to 
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69 As of 2012 these are (year of entry): Austria (1995), Belgium (1952), Bulgaria (2007), Cyprus 
(2004), Czech Republic (2004), Denmark (1973), Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), France (1952), 
Germany (1952), Greece (1981), Hungary (2004), Ireland (1973), Italy (1952), Latvia (2004), 
Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg (1952), Malta (2004), Netherlands (1952), Poland (2004), Portugal 
(1986), Romania (2007), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain (1986), Sweden (1995), United 
Kingdom (1973).
mind (Rommerskirchen 2013a). The G20, a comparatively young multilateral forum, 
is an interesting, yet compared to the EU experience, less rich case. Fiscal policy 
amongst G20 Member States is a very underdeveloped area of coordination 
compared to that  in the EU. First, this distinction must be seen against the backdrop 
that fiscal independence among EU Member States is much higher than among the 
dispersed G20. Collective action problems are therefore less pronounced with respect 
to stability or growth free-riding. Consequently, incentives to motivate group-
oriented behaviour are scarce. The existing architecture in the EU dwarfs 
international agreements on public finances. Even the EERP, however evasive it  may 
be, is still the most substantial inter-governmental agreement on the coordination of 
fiscal policy responses during the Great Recession. This is not to suggest that  fiscal 
policy coordination among states outside the EU is not worth studying; Empathically 
it is, yet the unique experience of the EU is not readily transposed to other countries 
as well, which is why it  would stretch this study to include other countries, however 
strong their economic links with the EU.
Qualitative Analysis
In order to investigate fiscal policy and its coordination in times of economic crisis, 
this research project relies on two qualitative methods: documentary  analysis and 
elite interviewing. Employing sources for qualitative data calls for processing, 
analysing and interpreting the data to transform it  into a meaningful source of 
inference (McNabb 2004: 434).
Documentary Analysis
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Documentary analysis can make a vital contribution to the understanding of 
contemporary  events: the use of documents can corroborate information and augment 
evidence from other sources (Yin 2003: 81). For this research project, primary, 
secondary  and tertiary documents were used. Each was assessed on the basis of its 
quality according to criteria such as authenticity, credibility and representativeness 
(Scott 1990: 30-31). What is more, the analysis of the documents took questions of 
origin, purpose and original audience into account. Ideally, most of the data analysed 
in this project originates from primary sources. Primary sources consist of evidence 
that was produced at the time of the event. For the purpose of this research project, 
documents and statements produced by EU institutions such as the Council, the 
Commission and the ECB, as well as Member State governments related to fiscal 
policy and its coordination in times of economic crisis were collected. Documents 
produced by the OECD, the IMF, and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
were also examined. 
Elite Interviewing
This thesis relies further on 42 confidential interviews with key bureaucrats and 
policy-makers working on EMU. Interviews were conducted at the European 
Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament (EP), Permanent 
Representations of the Member States to the EU and the IMF. The decision to 
interview broadly across different institutions is based on the ‘fragmentation of 
responsibilities’ (Hodson and Maher 2001: 645) of fiscal policy coordination. All 
institutions of the EU contribute to fiscal policy coordination in the eurozone to 
various degrees. Although not all are equally powerful, it is nevertheless not possible 
to single out one institution as the main locus for fiscal policy  coordination. The 
European Council is responsible for setting the main policy  orientations and manages 
a plethora of committees and policy coordination processes under its ambit. Here I 
interviewed members of the DG Economic and Regional Affairs. The EU’s 
Committee of Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, is responsible for preparing 
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upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council and has long been a major player in 
the EU system (see Lewis 2005). Interviews here offer a bridge to national 
perspectives on fiscal policy  coordination. Interviews were conducted with staff of 
representations’ economic and financial affairs division or their functional 
equivalent, and in one case with the Permanent Representative to the EU. 
Within the Commission, the Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs 
(Ecfin) is responsible for fiscal policy coordination. It monitors performance and 
compliance, acting as the representative of the EU interest and as such is present at 
most Council and Committee meetings. The Commission’s power in fiscal matters is 
perhaps greatest with respect to the SGP, notably due to its reports that form the basis 
of the Ecofin’s assessment of national stability  programmes and the fact that  the 
EDP is triggered by  a recommendation from the Commission. Eurostat has the role 
of regulator of Member States’ fiscal accounting, watching over the accounting of 
budget deficits or public debt. Interview material from the Commission’s statistical 
agency was especially helpful for chapter four which identifies appropriate 
measurements of fiscal policy choices. During the Great Recession the Commission 
President Barroso played an active role in the orchestration of stimulus policies, as 
chapter six describes. One member of his cabinet was therefore interviewed as well. 
What is more, I interviewed members of the DG Competition’s newly created Task 
Force Financial Crisis, as well as its general State Aid division. This decision was 
motivated by the fact that fiscal policy choices during the Great Recession were 
potentially at odds with EU state aid rules. What is more, said Task Force is active in 
the country programmes of EU Member States receiving financial assistance and its 
members are very well informed about various reform proposals relevant to this 
study. 
The EP is excluded from most coordination procedures and has no say in the 
implementation of the SGP and fiscal policy  coordination more broadly. Members do 
however have access to information via shared documents and hearings. Specifically, 
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I interviewed members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, who 
work on matters of fiscal policy coordination. Finally, I also conducted interviews at 
the IMF. During the Sovereign Debt Crisis the IMF has gained importance for fiscal 
policy coordination in the EU, notably through its role in the Troika, surveilling, and 
some would say directing, fiscal and macroeconomic polices in Greece. This 
development caused Hodson (2013a: 1) to proclaim that  ‘the IMF emerged as a de 
facto decision-making body of the EU’. But even before 2010, the IMF was an active 
commentator on national and EU-level fiscal policy. These interviews incorporate an 
outsider’s perspective.
The interview experience
I contacted 105 individuals for the initial interviews, completed 42 interviews, 
received 26 refusals and 37 non-replies, leaving a 40 per cent response rate. The 
general reasons given for refusal were scheduling problems and a lack of time. 
Interviews took place almost exclusively at the interviewee’s place of work. Most of 
the information gathered during the interviews was explicitly ‘not for 
attribution’ (e.g. Goldstein 2002), that is to say the information could be used and 
quoted provided that the individual would be granted anonymity. Five interviews 
were conducted over a series of email exchanges, the remainder face to face. 
Interview length varies considerably, ranging from 30 to 150 minutes. To encourage 
interviewees to speak freely, the discussion was not recorded. Instead I took partial 
notes during the interview while maintaining eye contact to further the 
conversational tone and completed the notes immediately  following the interview 
with memory still being fresh. In deciding how many  interviews to conduct, this 
research was guided primarily by  ‘thematic saturation’, continuing to interview so 
long as the evaluation of fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession 
continued to be markedly modified or added to substantially by the interviews. The 
interviews were relatively unstructured in form to capture more qualitative aspects of 
the challenges and dynamics of fiscal policy  coordination. As such, the semi-
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structured interviews were based around a range of questions depending on the 
interviewee’s job description, responsibilities and (in some cases) previous expertise, 
covering subjects as appropriate. These open-ended questions allowed respondents to 
organise their answers within their own framework (Aberbach and Rockman 2002).70 
Using semi-structured in contrast  to fully structured interviews is considered to 
further complement the quantitative evidence of this thesis and to offer a deliberate 
counter-weight to the, particularly in the context of binary variables, unsubtle 
generalisation inherent to quantitative analysis. Semi-structured interviews further 
allow the researcher to attain ‘a delicate balance between covering the topics that are 
considered significant by the interviewer and allowing the respondent to open new 
routes on topics without taking unrelated tangents’ (Goldstein 2002).
Using interview material
This analysis usually draws on individual interviews when exemplifying general 
tendencies or corroborating previous findings from other sources. In addition to 
exercising critical judgement of the information provided by  interviewees (of which 
aspects might be coloured by judgements and prejudices), I confronted them with 
different positions or apparent incongruities. What is more, interview material has 
not only been checked for consistencies and conflicting evidence, but also cross-
referred to written documents where possible. For the purpose of minimising 
potential methodological problems of elite interviewing, interviewees have been 
selected to control for known political, national, and institutional divides in EU 
politics and an effort was made in the selection of interviewees to cover each country 
and to ensure a fair distribution in terms of age, background, and nationality. Despite 
my best efforts to ensure a representation of different nationalities, Germans are 
over-represented in my interviews (10 out of 42). This bias stems largely from the 
strong presence of Germans in the European Commissions, particularly in DG 
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70 ‘Elites especially – but other highly educated people as well – do not like being put in the 
straightjacket of close-ended questions’ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).
Ecfin.71 It  is also possible that  my own nationality, and more specifically a mention 
of my research’s sponsor, the German National Merit Foundation, of which at least 
two of my  interviewees were alumni, led to a higher response rate from fellow 
citizens. In the light of Germany’s prominent role in matters of fiscal policy 
coordination, this bias is however not unwelcome, provided interview material is 
critically compared and cross-referenced. 
Quantitative Analysis
The advances in the statistical methodologies used for evaluating hypotheses on the 
interrelations between economic development and political reactions over the past 
two decades have been impressive. While political science research has yet to catch 
up with this cornucopia of econometric innovation, the various pitfalls arising in the 
application of quantitative methods in comparative political economy are by no 
means restricted to disciplinary  boundaries (e.g. Kittel and Winner 2005). Regression 
analysis will be employed to form a basis for some of the hypotheses, notably  to 
assess determinants of fiscal policy-making during the crisis. The empirical material 
will be appreciated in relation to the qualitative material. Awareness that regression 
analysis produces a different way of knowing different realities is crucial. A 
regression analysis does not focus upon countries; rather they constitute an 
aggregation of numbers of observations. Uncontrolled state-specific characteristics 
of the variability  are lost. It is therefore all the more important  to balance this 
apparent weakness with informed qualitative analysis on the eurozone Member 
States. The case study  elements are hence crucial to check whether their evidence 
supports the claims made by quantitative analysis. By checking for rival 
interpretations (those that were for instance not attributed with statistical significance 
in the model) as well as omitted considerations (factors that are not readily 
quantifiable), the case study  approach compensates for the limitations of quantitative 
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71 According to the European Commission’s statistical bulletin (2013) more than 10 per cent of 
employees of the DG Ecfin held German nationality (67 out of 626). 
analysis. In addition to traditional regression analysis, chapter seven also engages in 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, which aims to combine some of the strengths of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods.
Conclusion
This chapter has developed the three main hypotheses of this study. They are again: 
H1a: Fiscal policy coordination in the EU takes place in a latent group between 
2008-2010.
H1b: Fiscal policy coordination in the EU does not take place in a latent group 
between 2008-2010.
H2a: Free-riding was kept at bay due to select and separate incentives between 
2008-2010.
H2b: Free-riding was not reined in by select and separate incentives between 
2008-2010.
H3a: Fiscal policy coordination was marred by free-ridding between 2008-2010.
H3b: Fiscal policy coordination was free from free-ridding between 2008-2010.
Before testing these hypotheses the following chapter will turn to the question of 
how to measure fiscal policy and its coordination. 
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 CHAPTER 4: MEASURING FISCAL POLICY OUTCOMES
Introduction
The context of the Great Recession poses several challenges to the analysis of fiscal 
policy coordination. Some of these are relevant irrespective of the quality of 
economic climate: How to measure discretionary spending? How reliable are indices 
of automatic stabilisers? How should one (if at all) distinguish between voluntary 
and involuntary compliance with EU’s fiscal rules? Some concerns however, have 
emerged as a direct result of the economic and financial crises. First, the Great 
Recession saw unprecedented government intervention in the financial sector with 
substantial consequences for deficit and debt levels. How should these rescue 
operations be reflected in the measurement of the fiscal policy variables? Secondly, 
for the first time EU rules explicitly call for excessive deficit spending. Prior to 2008 
the common characterisation of free-riding behaviour was that of countries breaching 
the SGP. With the Great Recession the predominant concern temporarily turned to 
stimulus free-riding. How should we define a compliance variable with the 
comparatively vague mandate for stimulus spending? Given that these 
considerations, due to the timeliness of this thesis, have been addressed by 
comparatively few studies, this chapter will discuss appropriate measurements for 
fiscal policy outcomes in times of crises that are used as dependent variables in the 
subsequent chapters.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the measurements of fiscal policy 
choices used in this study, before discussing concerns of automaticity and 
intentionality. Subsequently, the impact of the interventions to support financial 
institutions and financial markets on public finances is discussed. In the fourth 
section, I lay out the strategy for measuring fiscal policy coordination.
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Fiscal policy and its components
Fiscal policy is inherently concerned with resource allocation and distribution and is 
thus at the core of state activity. Fiscal policy creates conflicts of interest both with 
respect to its macroeconomic function (i.e. to ensure fiscal sustainability and a 
degree of stabilisation of the economy) as well as its microeconomic function (i.e. to 
ensure efficient and effective allocation of public resources). The government 
provides budgetary support to the economy, which can be broadly captured by the 
year-on-year change in the general government budget balance as a share of GDP. 
Given that countries have country-specific levels of deficit and debt levels, it makes 
sense to take the previous level into account – hence the interest in changes. 
Government revenues and expenditure make up the overall fiscal balance. Looking at 
the overall budget balance (BB), one can distinguish between the primary balance 
(PB), the structural balance (SB) and the primary structural balance (PSB). For the 
primary balance, given that this measurement is generally considered outside the 
control of the government, expenditure on interest is filtered out. While interest 
payments are to a large extent dependent on a country’s economic outlook and debt 
sustainability, they can be subject to fluctuations outside the control of national 
policy-makers. According to Fedelinio et al. (2009: 1), ‘interest payments are often 
kept separate because their movements, while “automatic” in the sense of not 
generally reflecting discretionary fiscal policy actions, may not be necessarily 
correlated with cyclical output changes’. The PSB excludes not only interest 
expenditures but also spending linked to the operation of automatic stabilisers. 
Automatic stabilisers are features of the tax and spending system that react 
automatically to the economic cycle in order to reduce the severity of its fluctuations. 
The structural deficit requires two inputs: first, the cyclical position of the economy 
as measured by the output gap (the distance between actual and potential output) and 
second, the responsiveness of the budget balance to the economic cycle, as expressed 
by budget semi-elasticities. The semi-elasticities measure the reaction of the balance-
to-GDP ratio to cyclical conditions and are derived from national tax codes as well as 
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from regression analysis.72 This measurement is generally used for the purpose of 
budgetary surveillance by both national governments and international institutions, 
including the European Commission, the OECD, the IMF and the ECB. Changes in 
the PSB are considered to be indicative of discretionary policy decisions and not 
merely a product of output fluctuations. Put differently, the structural balance 
excludes that part of the change in the budget balance that follows automatically 
from the cyclical conditions of the economy due to the reaction of public revenue 
and expenditure to changes in the output gap. The basic idea in using changes in the 
PSB is that, once the budget is purged of its cyclical component plus interest 
expenditure, any remaining difference across time should indicate deliberate policy 
interventions.
Discretionary fiscal policy: the state of the literature
There is no consensus in the literature on the appropriate methodology for the 
construction of a cyclically adjusted measure of fiscal policy (see Alesina and Perotti, 
1995; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996, Alesina et al. 2002). Following the Commission’s 
definition (European Commission 2009), a country’s discretionary crisis policies are 
defined as the change in the PSB relative to the preceding period. When the change 
is positive (negative) the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). The 
usage of cyclically-adjusted budget balances as an indicator for discretionary fiscal 
policies has been favoured by numerous studies (e.g. Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay 2002; Wyplosz 2006; Turrini 2008; Afonso 2009; Fatas and Mihov 2009). 
Galì and Perotti (2003) for example estimate that fiscal policy in a panel of eurozone 
countries has become pro-cyclical for the period that followed the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992-2002). Analysing the breakdown between cyclically-
adjusted spending and revenue, they show that both of these components seem to 
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72 See Larch and Salto (2005) for a detailed description.
have become a-cyclical over the period considered.73 Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) 
consider the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit in their analysis on the disciplining 
effect of the SGP. In light of the consolidation efforts in the run-up to EMU, the 
authors suspect that there may be persistence in the PSB, which would result in a 
positive bias of the PSB and therefore an overestimation of the ‘SGP effect’. To 
control for this potential bias they construct an ‘exogenous PSB’, which is estimated 
as the residuals of regressions of the PSB on its first two lags.
The Commission’s method is not however the only approach to decomposing fiscal 
policy into discretionary and cyclical components. Fatas and Mihov (2003), for 
instance, partial out business cycle effects by regressing the fiscal policy measure on 
variables related to the state of the economy.74 The obtained residuals are considered 
to represent discretionary fiscal policy, as they account for the part of the fiscal 
policy measure unexplained by economic fluctuations. Here the authors follow Gali 
and Perotti’s distinction (2003) not only between the structural and cyclical 
component of fiscal policy, but also between an endogenous and exogenous 
structural component. In so doing, Fatas and Mihov (2003) are interested in 
explaining discretionary policy.
Larch and Salto (2005) criticise the PSB approach for ignoring the effects of over- or 
underestimating growth in the planning phase of the budget, coupled with inertia in 
the implementation phase.75 The PSB deteriorates (improves) when potential growth 
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73 Larch and Salto (2005) contest this finding, arguing that it can be explained by the increase in 
prediction errors post 1999, i.e. the reluctance of fiscal policy makers to accept a lower growth 
potential. In my view there is no reason to assume that this reluctance would be any greater after 
1999, especially in the context of qualifying for eurozone membership during the previous period 
which could just as well lead to a greater incentive to exaggerate growth projections (this would be in 
line with the aforementioned literature on account gimmickry which touches on deficit and debt 
accounting and not on the calculation of GDP growth). Strauch et al. (2004) provide evidence for a 
systematic tendency in some Member States to overestimate potential growth (see also Cottarelli 
2012).
74 Lane (2003) and Sorensen et al. (2001) also adopted the regression-based measures to study the 
cyclical behaviours of fiscal policy.
75 See inter alia Canova (1998) and Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) for a critique related to the 
estimation of the output gap and Darby and Melitz (2008) as well as in't Veld et al (2012) for a 
critique on the computation of spending elasticities. 
is over-(under-)estimated. In the context of the 2008 to 2010 period it is well 
documented that growth assumptions were too positive (European Commission 
2008), which means that the size of discretionary fiscal policy would be 
overestimated. Put differently, a change in the PSB does not necessarily point to 
active fiscal stimulus policies such as tax cuts or expenditure increases. Instead the 
change can simply stem from passive behaviour in the event of lower than projected 
underlying growth. The authors argue that this problem is aggravated by the inertia 
of fiscal policy in the implementation phase, which makes it ‘safe to assume that 
contemporaneous corrections for growth “surprises” will be limited’ (Larch and Salto 
2005: 9). Does this assumption still apply in times of crisis? The fact that the 
majority of countries reacted swiftly with emergency budgets and revised stimulus 
plans, fine-tuning their budgets as late as 2010, suggests that the answer is no. 
Consequently, possible ‘inertia bias’ inherent in the PSB should be less acute during 
the Great Recession. I accept Larch and Salto’s main reasoning that the PSB is likely 
to give an exaggerated measure of discretionary policy. At the same time, Larch and 
Turrini (2009) admit that ‘despite its many downsides […] the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance (CAB)76 remains to date one of the key indicators for the analysis and 
conduct of fiscal policy making, in particular in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework’.
Fiscal policy measures used
Given the criticism facing the PSB measure it seems unwise to base the entire 
empirical analysis on one indicator. Scrutinising fiscal policy and its coordination, 
this thesis will consider four common indicators of fiscal policy (see also Table 5.1):
1) he change in the budget balance (" BB)
2) the change in the primary budget balance (" PB)
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76 SB and CAB denote the same variable.
3) the change in the structural balance (" SB)
4) the change in the primary structural balance (" PSB)
Additionally, I will consult the available figures on stimulus packages. These 
crucially rely on subjective policy evaluation to determine which fiscal measures 
qualify as crisis measures and which not. Adopting a centripetal measurement 
approach has three advantages. First, it is a welcome robustness check for empirical 
analyses. To address the quality issues generally signalled in connection with the 
measurement of fiscal policy outcomes – available data are not based on an 
unanimously agreed methodology – I used different measures to assess the 
robustness of results. The four measurements then each account for a distinct, albeit 
overlapping and correlated, aspect of fiscal policy. What is more, when scrutinising 
fiscal choices during 'hard times', to paraphrase Gourevitch (1986), it seems 
undesirable to completely purge these ‘hard times’ from the fiscal outcome variables. 
I am specifically interested in the role of automatic stabilisers (see below) and the 
varieties of fiscal policy choices along a sliding scale of discretion. Are fiscal policy 
outcomes, which are thought to carry little discretion, driven by different 
determinants than those who are based on purely discretional policy choices? 
Second, this strategy enables comparison with other studies on fiscal outcomes 
which predominately use the change in budget balance for fiscal performance or the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit for the discretionary element of 
public finances. Third, data for stimulus packages is available for 2009/2010 only; 
relying exclusively on this measure would therefore reduce the temporal scope of the 
empirical investigation. What is more there is evidence that policy-makers responded 
to the economic downturn already in 2008. The average budget deficit in the EU 
worsened in 2008 to 2.3 per cent of GDP from 0.8 per cent in 2007 (Public Finances 
in EMU, 2009) and we cannot simply assume that this was the result of non-
discretionary fiscal policy. Excluding the year 2008 risks presenting an unduly 
shortened analysis of fiscal response strategies. 
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Intentionality and fiscal policy 
One of the main problems for the study of fiscal stimulus policies is that of 
intentionality. For theoretical purposes it is worthwhile to disentangle the 
discretionary and intentional elements of public spending. In a stylised presentation 
of the fiscal impulse and its components, the ECB (2010) attempts a methodical 
dissection of fiscal policy actions (Figure 4.1). The resulting schema differentiates 
between discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy actions, between policy 
measures and non-policy effects, as well as non-crises related measures and 
measures taken in response to the crisis. A glaring problem of this Figure is that it 
ignores the budgetary implications of the financial sector bailouts. While this albeit 
flawed desegregation is a useful conceptual exercise, this characterisation does not 
yield concrete measurements due to a lack of data availability (where it could be 
collected) and measurability (where it could not be collected). The former pertains to 
policy measures and non-policy measures, as well as to the definition of automatic 
stabilisers. Both touch upon the distinction between crisis and non-crisis policies. 
Notwithstanding empirical practicalities, the ECB schema displays some of the key 
challenges inherent in the discussion of fiscal policy: How ‘automatic’ are automatic 
stabilisers? Does public expenditure during the Great Recession amount to 
expenditure in response to the crisis? How should one account for public expenditure 
related to the financial sector? 
 Insert Figure 4.1 here
On automaticity and discretion
The notion that automatic stabilisers are driven by forces which are outside the 
control of fiscal authorities is not uncontested in the literature. Even prior to the 
Great Recession, it was argued that the line of demarcation between discretionary 
fiscal policies and automatic fiscal stabilisation was not as sharp as generally thought 
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(DerOose et al. 2008). First, at least in the context of the 27 EU countries analysed, 
any expenditure has to be approved by the executive and the legislature and should 
therefore be, at least in theory, mutable.77 The allegedly structural component may be 
systematically linked to the economic cycle. For example, the government may 
systematically raise tax rates whenever activity rises above potential and reduce them 
whenever it falls below potential. During the Great Recession a number of countries 
had actually increased the size of the automatic stabilisers. Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Italy, for instance boosted unemployment benefits during the crisis (Saha and 
Weizäcker 2009). Looking at the composition of fiscal packages over the 2008 to 
2010 period, an OECD (2009) study finds that various EU countries implemented tax 
measures to mitigate the economic fallout of the Great Recession. The reduction of 
social contributions in Germany and Finland, for example, amounted to 0.7 and 0.4 
per cent of 2008 GDP respectively. These and other changes in the tax and benefit 
structure relating to automatic stabilisers were counted in the aggregate of fiscal 
stimulus packages by both national and European authorities. This is not to suggest 
that all spending measures are alike and equally readily changeable. There is ample 
evidence in the literature that entitlement spending for instance faces higher 
institutional constraints than public investment (e.g. Breunig and Busemeyer 2011). 
Instead this section seeks to challenge the dichotomous notions of discretionary and 
automatic. The former ECB President Trichet (2008) stressed that ‘countries with 
budgetary room for manoeuvre can let automatic stabilisers operate freely’. Yet this 
concession implies that those countries without fiscal room for manoeuvre should 
curtail their automatic stabilisers and accordingly that automatic stabilisers are not an 
inevitable spending item in the annual budget. 
What is more, it seems reasonable that in the design of discretionary stimulus 
programmes, policy-makers would be aware of the costs and effects of automatic 
stabilisers, although not necessarily with the focus of whether the spending item 
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77 Irrespective of the difficulties associated with entrenched welfare states; see Clayton and Pontussen 
(1998).
should be grouped as ‘automatic’ or ‘discretionary’. De Castro et al. (2011) argue 
that countries with large automatic stabilisers provide a sizeable counter-cyclical 
economic impulse without the need for recourse to additional discretionary 
measures. Consequently, when comparing crisis responses based solely on the 
adoption of stimulus packages, the conclusion might be drawn that government is 
fiscally inactive, when, in fact, if the financial flows stemming from the working of 
automatic stabilisers were also accounted for, the conclusion could be quite the 
opposite. In this regard, answers to questions of free-riding and group orientated 
behaviour are likely to diverge depending on the fiscal measure used.
Yet how much did automatic stabilisers contribute to cushioning the blow of 
economic downturn? Girouard and André  (2005, updated in OECD, 2009) measure 
the overall cyclical sensitivity of the budget to the economic cycle as the difference 
between the cyclical sensitivity of four categories of taxes (personal, corporate, 
indirect, and social securities contribution) and on current primary expenditure, 
weighted by their respective shares of GDP. Crucially, budget elasticities are said to 
change little over time and one single weight indicator is used for the assessment of 
the 2008 to 2010 period. A budget elasticity of 0.51, as in the case of Germany, 
means that the budget balance declines about half a per cent in response to a negative 
output gap of one per cent. The contribution of automatic stabilisation is therefore 
dependent on the strength with which different budget items respond to cyclical 
changes and the size of output gaps. So is there strategic substitution between fiscal 
stimulus policies and automatic stabilisation? Did member states design less 
ambitious stimulus policies, knowing that they have large automatic stabilisers that 
will support aggregate demand? In light of the controversy surrounding the operation 
of automatic stabilisers, there is surprisingly little evidence that Member States with 
larger automatic stabilisers implemented smaller stimulus programmes. Fuest et al. 
(2010) show that automatic stabilisers are largely unrelated to the size of fiscal 
stimulus packages adopted. Figure 4.2 replicates their findings using the 
measurement of Girouard and André (2005, updated in OECD 2009). However when 
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running the same correlation with an indicator used by the European Commission,78 
results are different and in fact suggest a statistically significant negative relationship  
between the size of automatic stabilisers and fiscal stimulus programmes of 
individual EU countries. In the words of the Commission, Member States agree to 
coordinate a ‘budgetary stimulus package’ or a ‘budgetary impulse’. A budgetary 
stimulus is arguably a change in expenditure or revenue policies that boosts 
aggregate demand regardless of whether it is considered ‘discretionary’ or not. 
However in setting a tentative stimulus threshold the EERP explicitly states that that 
1.2 per cent of spending should be considered, in addition to the working of the 
automatic stabilisers. 
Insert Figure 4.2 here
One interviewee in the Commission pointed out that ‘discretionary spending is not a 
statistical term but for Ecfin to decide, what is what’ (author interview, May 2011). 
This means that different understandings are likely to prevail with regards what 
counts as discretionary and what does not. However since this thesis considers fiscal 
policy coordination within the EU, the year-to-year change in PSB and the PB are 
therefore useful measurements to investigate Member States fiscal policies in the 
light of the EERP and related communications. Doing so relies on the filtering out of 
non-discretionary spending items. This approach is less sophisticated than other 
statistical smoothing techniques used to extract the cyclical component of budgetary 
categories. At the same time, given the substantial role of automatic stabilisers, – the 
automatic stabilisation provided was greater, overall, than the discretionary measures 
(Public Finances in EMU 2010: 22) – it would be short-sighted to ignore their 
impact, especially when evaluating free-riding. It is therefore sensible to include a 
measurement of the cyclical balance that takes the working of automatic stabilisers 
into account. 
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78 The European Commission (2010) calculated the change in the output gap multiplied by the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio (used as a proxy of the semi-elasticities of the budget balance).
Crisis policies? 
The second question relates to the intentionality of policies during the Great 
Recession. A case in point can be found in Germany, where the change of the 
commuter tax allowance (Pendlerpauschale) and the change of tax deductibility of 
social security contributions reduced government revenue by about 0.8 per cent of 
GDP (Zohlnhöfer 2011). Both of these changes were not made deliberately by the 
German government, but due to rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court. The 
government chose to abstain from offsetting this fiscal effect and did not re-finance 
the thus-created expenditures. This lead to the decision by German and European 
authorities to count these expenditures under the discretionary fiscal stimulus 
package. 
Are fiscal policies during a crisis necessarily policies in response to the crisis? There 
are various examples of dubious ‘crisis labelling’ in the EU. Armingeon (2012: 9) 
points out that under this German accounting, ‘about two-thirds of the [German] 
“gross” stimulus was not due to a crisis-related political choice but resulted 
independently from [sic] economic circumstances’. He goes on to argue that some 
Austrian programmes had already been introduced in the Spring and September of 
2008 before the crisis hit the real economy, and were part of a policy bundle seeking 
to increase real household income prior to national elections. During the crisis these 
measures remained in force, yet their original design and implementation were not 
linked to the Great Recession. Another example can be found with respect to 
education spending in Malta. The increase in expenditure related to education 
(amounting to 0.34 of GDP; MinFin 2009) was presented as stimulus spending, 
whereas it arguably had little to do with the economic and financial crisis, but was 
‘already planned and sold as part of the electoral campaign in the previous 
year’ (author interview, April 2011). A substantial proportion of Luxembourg’s 
stimulus consisted of measures that ‘had already been agreed to before the crisis and 
consisted of purchasing power increases to compensate ex post for faster inflation in 
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2008 due to high energy prices’ (Watt 2009: 12). Similarly, Spain’s stimulus 
programme can in large part be traced back to the fulfilment of election promises in 
the spring of 2008 (Burnett 2008). Concerning the intentionality of crisis policies, a 
degree of uncertainty will remain unresolved. Indeed as depicted in Table 4.1, the 
data on these stimulus packages vary considerably depending on the source. Some of 
these variations can be explained by the fact that some governments labelled 
spending decisions taken before the crisis as elements of the crisis package, or by 
other governments labelling EU funds as part of the national fiscal package 
(Armingeon 2012).
Insert Table 4.1 here
Interventions to support financial institutions and financial markets
The third question concerning the impact of the financial sector bailout is a reminder 
that the Great Recession started as a financial crisis. Government interventions in the 
financial sector had a considerable impact on public finances. To clarify any issues 
about how to account for measures undertaken in the context of the financial crisis, 
Eurostat published a decision on 15 July 2009. One can distinguish between three 
kinds of measures for accounting purposes. First, measures which have to be 
recorded as expenditure and will contribute to the deficit (direct costs). Second, 
measures such as loans and securities other than shares that will only appear as an 
increase in government debt (liabilities) and third, measures that are outside the 
government books and as such do not impact on expenditure or government debt 
(contingent liabilities). Pontussen and Raess (2012: 24) brush away concerns over 
the bias introduced by the support given to financial institutions and financial 
markets: ‘Suffice it to note, at this point, that most of the support for the financial 
sector […] does not show up in national accounts as current spending and 
consequently is not part of the estimates of fiscal stimuli […]. In this sense, fiscal 
stimuli and financial bailouts can be treated as independent policy choices.’ (ibid. 
108
27). Table 4.2 presents the correlation between financial sector interventions and 
fiscal crisis responses. The financial sector interventions take on a negative value if 
costs occurred and a positive value if the revenue from the bailouts (for example via 
interest payments received and gains from share price increase) exceeds the costs. 
Contingent liabilities and liabilities, similar to the direct costs, are correlated with 
larger stimulus spending. The correlation results with the Commission’s stimulus 
figures (virtually identical for the ECB’s estimation) display no statistically 
significance. This is in contrast to the correlations with this thesis for main variables 
("BB, "PB, "SB, "PSB). Overall results suggest that the direct costs of the financial 
bailouts are negatively correlated with stimulus activities in response to the Great 
Recession. On the contrary, contingent liabilities and liabilities are positively 
correlated with fiscal crisis measures, perhaps indicating the severity of the financial 
and subsequently economic crisis and thus the perceived need to stimulus domestic 
demand. Results using the changes in the budget balance differ. This should not 
come as a surprise as this is the only measurement where financial sector costs are 
not filtered out. While I agree that the bulk of financial sector interventions do not 
show up in the deficit headline figures, the evidence presented here suggests that 
Pontussen and Raes’ (ibid.) claim of ‘independent policy choices’ should be taken 
with a grain of salt.
Insert Table 4.2 here
Hidden interventions
Financial sector interventions recorded as liabilities do not show up in this study’s 
primary expenditure based measurement, nor do financial sector interventions 
classified as contingent liabilities show up in any of the measurements used. The two 
components recorded as liabilities/debt are: 1) loans incurred (directly or indirectly) 
by government in order to finance various interventions, and 2) debt securities issued 
by government to finance the interventions. The latter forms the bulk of government 
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liabilities, as EU governments financed their rescue measures predominantly by new 
issuances of debt securities – more than 72 per cent of all debt issuances from 2008 
to 2010 (Eurostat 2012). The third part of the rescue package comprises government 
contingent liabilities.79 After the aforementioned decision, contingent liabilities 
pertaining to the financial crisis are not recorded in national accounts. In other 
words, they neither impact on expenditure levels nor on government debt. Given the 
increased debt burdens due to rescue operations in the financial sector, this study 
does not consider the change in general government debt in percentage of GDP to 
capture a country’s ‘fiscal performance’. According to Hallerberg et al. (2009: 77) 
this conventional measurement has the advantage that ‘everything the government 
does appears on these accounts, and that means that they are much less subject to 
direct accounting tricks’.80 In the context of crisis interventions, this strength is then 
also its weakness, in that this study is not primarily concerned with the 'fiscal bill' of 
the financial sector interventions. 
The main concern stemming from the financial sector interventions is that these 
policy measures might interact systematically with the variables determining the 
state of public finances as well as, consequently, fiscal policy coordination. Various 
factors should however limit such bias if it exists. First, relying on the primary 
balance on the expenditure side does filter out 80 per cent of the interventions related 
to the reported deficit (Eurostat 2012). The short-term net impact of the various 
measures in support of the financial sector has been relatively small, amounting to 
less than an increase in deficits of 0.1 per cent of GDP for the EU27 as a whole as of 
2011. Secondly, this study controls for the impact of financial sector interventions. 
Government interventions aimed at the financial sector and at the real economy are 
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79 Concerning government interventions in the financial crisis over 2007-2011, the lion’s share of 
contingent liabilities reflect the guarantees granted on the financial institutions’ assets and liabilities 
(nearly 79 per cent of the total value). The remaining contingent liabilities concern the value of 
securities issued under liquidity schemes, with around 15 per cent, and the operations of special 
purpose vehicles, with around 6 per cent (Eurostat 2012).
80 On accounting tricks after the introduction of the euro see von Hagen and Wolff (2006), Bernoth 
and Wolff (2008).
not independent policy choices, but almost certain to influence one another. To 
control for the impact of the financial crisis should reduce the exogenous noise of the 
bailout blowing up expenditure levels out of sync with the usual determinants of 
government spending suggested in the literature. Thirdly, by controlling for the 
general economic climate, the impact of the financial crisis is also accounted for. On 
a related note, the cyclically-adjusted measure takes into account the magnitude of 
the crisis and is closely linked to the financial fallout as it is well documented that 
financial crises lower potential output (Furceri and Mourougane 2013). 
Measuring compliance
Empirically, fiscal policy coordination will be analysed by proxy. There is no clear 
variable measuring compliance81 with the EERP. Instead, by identifying the 
determinants of fiscal policy outcomes during the Great Recession, this thesis sheds 
light on the conditions of fiscal policy coordination. Specifically I will test the free-
riding hypotheses as outlined in the previous chapter. Fiscal free-riding is defined 
here as the opposite of group-oriented behaviour. This approach carries the 
advantage that whereas compliance with any intergovernmental agreement on public 
finances is not a clear indicator that these rules shape fiscal policy choices, free-
riding policies are a sign that they do not. In line with the preceding discussion on 
intentionality it is easier to find negative evidence for the collective action outcome 
(free-riding).
A Member State could very well be in full compliance with the stipulations to 
achieve fiscal policy coordination, without these intergovernmental fiscal rules and 
agreements actually shaping its choice of actions. A scenario where a Member State 
sets fiscal policies that happen to be in accord with EU agreements is difficult to 
distinguish from a scenario in which a Member State decides on a set of fiscal 
111
81 Compliance generally denotes behaviour that conforms (or comes into relative conformity) with 
prescribed or proscribed behaviour (Young 1979). 
policies because of EU agreements.82 This leaves us with the problem of 
observational equivalence, a term usually associated with the Principal-Agent 
literature (Weingast and Moran 1983: 767, Epstein and O’Halloran 1999: 24).83 
Understanding whether EU agreements mattered for fiscal crisis responses is 
especially relevant in the context of intergovernmental, deliberately vague policy 
commitments which were tailored to the needs and demands of Member States. By 
including both EU and non-EU countries in this analysis, it will be possible to test 
whether EU Member States’ fiscal responses to the Great Recession differed, all 
other things being equal.
Even though I do not empirically test for the drivers of compliance due to a small 
sample size84, it is illustrative to determine which countries complied with the EERP 
and which did not. The yardstick for free-riding is taken from the EERP, with its 
overall stimulus threshold of 1.2 per cent of GDP.85 Any compliance measurement is 
problematic if not considered vis-à-vis a country’s fiscal space. Again, the EERP 
clearly states that ‘the budgetary stimulus should take account of the starting 
positions of each Member State. It is clear that not all Member States are in the same 
position.’ In chapter seven I will examine the link between fiscal responses to crisis 
and a country’s fiscal space in detail. Consequently, fiscal policy coordination in the 
EU is about the discord between the positive linkage of the severity of the crisis and 
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82 A related question asks whether non-compliance with the EERP is intentional or not. In his study of 
the domestic ratification of international agreements Putnam (1988: 438) distinguishes between 
volitional and non-volitional defection. Accordingly, involuntary defection refers to the behavior of an 
agent who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification. Haggard and Simmons 
(1987: 515) locate the reasons for such defection on the domestic level, ‘it is not the result of 
calculating unified actors, but the outcome of domestic political conflicts which no single actor can 
control’. Non-volitional defection has been the focus of the management approach of the compliance 
literature, assuming that states are prevented from complying with international agreements due to the 
lack of sufficient state capacities (various types of capital or infrastructure), ambiguous definitions of 
norms, and inadequate timetables (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Haas 1998).
83 Both cases of non-volitional cooperation and non-volitional non-cooperation are instances where 
observational equivalence poses a problem to the researcher. 
84 The EERP does not give annual targets, but merely an overall target that leaves us with 27 
observations. 
85 Binary compliance approaches to public finance outcomes can be found in inter alia Hughes Hallet 
and Lewis (2008) or LeMay-Boucher and Rommerskirchen (2014). A measurement of relative 
compliance is suggested by Hallerberg et al. (2007).
the size of the stimulus. Specifically because countries experiencing a more severe 
recession are also suffering from a curtailed fiscal space, their ability to engage in 
stimulus spending is reduced. Group-oriented behaviour would see those countries 
with more fiscal space also shouldering more of the stimulus effort. It is here that 
coordination would live up to the textbook definition of ‘negotiated mutual 
adjustment that causes states to pursue different policies than they would have 
chosen had policy-making been unilateral’ (Webb 1995: 11).
Compliance with the EERP
Table 4.3 summarises the non-compliant Member States according to the three main 
(and by far most complete in terms of coverage) sources for the estimation of the size 
of stimulus packages. The only common ‘laggard’ identified by all three sources is 
Greece, whose virtually non-existing stimulus packages should come as a no surprise 
in the light of the substantial economic hardship and consolidation pressures during 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Romania and Lithuania are not included in the ECB and 
OECD evaluation. However, there is little doubt that Romania did not implement a 
stimulus package amounting to 1.2 per cent of GDP. The original Commission 
estimation (European Commission 2011) puts the figure at 0.5 per cent, whereas the 
Council Opinion on the updated Convergence Programme of Romania (COU 2010) 
states that the stimulus measures amounted to 0.2 per cent of GDP in both 2009 and 
2010.86 Romania was hit hard by the financial crisis; as financial market participants 
grew more risk averse, Romania's large internal and external imbalances lead to a 
marked fall in capital inflows, causing the exchange rate of the new leu (RON) 
against the euro to depreciate by more than 30 per cent between August 2007 and 
January 2009. In the spring of 2009 this downturn caused the Romanian authorities 
to apply to the EU, the IMF and other international financial institutions for financial 
assistance. This assistance was conditional on fiscal consolidation and given the tight 
budgetary constraints, Romania’s comparatively small stimulus package was 
113
86 Council Opinion on the updated convergence programme of Romania, 2009-2012
welcomed by the European Commission (see Convergence Programmes 2009, 2010). 
Similarly, Lithuania faced budgetary difficulties that would have made the 
implementation of stimulus measures problematic. The Concluding Statement of the 
IMF Mission of December 2008 (IMF 2008) noted that global financial markets were 
effectively closed and domestic borrowing options severely limited by a lack of 
liquidity. This shock has been compounded by the decline in export demand from its 
recession-hit trading partners. In light of these events, the IMF recommended upfront 
fiscal adjustment to increase confidence in the currency board arrangement. It was 
judged that Lithuania did not to have the scope for fiscal stimulus available to some 
other countries in order to counter the downturn.
Insert Table 4.3 here
The OECD and IMF measures are in agreement as to the stimulus measures in 
France, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland being below the 1.2 per cent threshold (similar 
estimates are found in Watt (2009)). The OECD does not provide estimates for 
Slovenia and Cyprus. The 2010 Stability Programme put together by the Slovenian 
authorities argues that the discretionary policy response was small given the limited 
effectiveness of stimulus spending in a small and very open economy. Here the total 
discretionary policy measures influencing the real economy directly (employment 
and productive capacity) were said to amount to 254 million EUR, or around 0.7 per 
cent of GDP. However according to the programme, measures to support the 
economy laid down in the government’s stimulus packages, as well as expansionary 
measures taken before the onset of the crisis (mainly tax relief for companies), are 
said to add up to almost 2 per cent of GDP. Similarly, in its Article IV review of the 
Slovenian economy in 2009, the IMF estimated the size of the fiscal stimulus 
package at 2.1 per cent of GDP. The difference between these estimates and the ECB 
estimation is due to the inclusion of the tax stimulus previously adopted and being 
implemented in 2009. Again this touches upon the question of intentionality. There is 
an argument to be made that the EC’s stimulus measure should be accepted because 
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a) all official documents, be it from Slovenian or EU officials, are very transparent 
about the inclusion of the tax relief for companies; b) Slovenian authorities account 
for the relief as a deliberate policy choice despite being agreed in early 2008; and c) 
the Stability and Convergence Programme includes the relief under the ‘discretionary 
stimulus measures’. 
The high stimulus figure for Cyprus given by the EC (5.1 per cent of GDP) comes as 
somewhat of a surprise given that Cyprus experienced the mildest recession in the 
eurozone in 2009, with a fall in GDP of just 1.9 per cent. The IMF also provides a 
high estimate of the Cypriot stimulus at 4 per cent of GDP, composed of permanent 
increases in wages and salaries (1.6 per cent of GDP), social transfers (1.6 per cent of 
GDP), and public investment (1.4 per cent of GDP) (IMF Country Report No. 
11/331). However all communication under the Stability and Convergence 
Programme, including the reports by Cypriot authorities, give 1.5 per cent of GDP as 
the official figure. This figure, although much closer to the ECB’s estimation, is also 
above the EERP threshold. 
In contrast to the OECD and the EC estimates, the ECB reports both Ireland and 
Belgium’s stimulus packages as less than 1.2 per cent of GDP. Based on additional 
official reports (notably the Stability and Convergence Programmes) and Watt’s 
figures (2009), it appears that the Belgian stimulus programme fell below 1.2 per 
cent of GDP. In the Stability Programme, Belgian officials confirm this, justifying 
the comparatively small expansion (0.9 per cent of GDP) by stating that ‘in 
accordance with the European Commission’s recommendations, the stimulus plans 
put into effect have been more limited owing notably to the inherent characteristics 
of Belgium’s open-market economy’ (Belgium-SC 2010). Along similar lines, in its 
Assessment of the Stability Programme, the Commission points out ‘that as a result 
of the openness of the economy, foreign packages should also contribute 
considerably to the recovery of the Belgian economy’ (ECFIN/52791/09-EN). 
Belgium’s country specific circumstances hardly warranted a large fiscal expansion, 
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‘in particular [given] the very high and rising debt-to-GDP ratio, the above-average 
cost of ageing and considerable contingent liabilities following the operations to 
stabilise the financial system, the fiscal room for manoeuvre of Belgium can be 
characterised as limited’ (ibid.). However the Council Opinion on the updated 
Stability Programme of Belgium sanctions the fiscal stimulus package as an 
‘adequate response to the downturn’. In addition to these economic problems, the on-
going difficulties in forming a government during the turmoil of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis meant that Belgium was caught in political turmoil without federal 
government from June 2010. The lack of government did not however startle market 
participants. This may be due to the fact that, as Hooghe (2012) argues, regional 
governments, the European Union, public service managers and Members of 
Parliament expanded the scope of their authority and thus filled the policy vacuum. 
In addition, Bouckaert and Brans (2012: 174) show that from a fiscal standpoint the 
lack of executive did not lead to a budgetary deterioration. On the one hand, major 
structural policy reforms, such as pension systems and social security, energy supply, 
employment and labour market suffered from the ‘interregnum’ of the caretaker 
government. On the other hand, the budgetary control mechanism of ‘provisionary 
twelfth’ authorized only one-twelfth of the previous budget to be spent monthly in 
the absence of a newly approved budget. This meant that in the absence of 
government no additional expenses could be approved, which resulted in an 
improvement of the budget balance.
Conclusion
This chapter has located the four main measurements for fiscal policy and its 
coordination in times of economic and financial crisis. None of these measurements 
is without fault, as the discussions on policy intentionality and automaticity, as well 
as the accounting of financial sector rescue operations, have suggested. But taken 
together they are valid proxies for fiscal policy choices and the analysis of fiscal 
policy coordination. As such this study adopts a centripetal measurement approach.
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Different measurements can provide answers to different questions pertaining to 
fiscal policy during the crisis, which suggests caution in choosing the right variables 
(or ignoring additional variables which could be considered). At the same time, 
different measurements of fiscal policy may also yield different answers to the same 
question. The narrower a measurement the smaller the fiscal activism of government 
estimated. Public documents on fiscal policy coordination regularly pick and chose 
from the different measurements, depending on the nature of their evaluation. For 
example when presenting the crisis measures, a 2010 EU (European Commission 
2010) publication used the broad measure of budget balance (including interest rate 
payments), stating that ‘over 2009-2010, the additional support to economic activity 
as measured by the change in the budget balance is estimated to amount to 5.0 per 
cent of GDP.’ Indeed, since there is little consensus on the definition of crisis 
measures, or fiscal support, it seems sensible not to rely solely on a single indicator. 
Testing the three main hypotheses with different fiscal measurements of varying 
scope should render the results more robust and help to avoid any bias in the 
evidence presented. 
It is important to add that by analysing fiscal policy coordination during the Great 
Recession, this study does not venture into the thorny field of assessing the exact size 
of the impact that fiscal measures had on aggregate demand; I focus on the input side 
(the changes in government finances) and not on the output side (its effect on 
macroeconomic developments). The extent to which fiscal policy is effective in 
supporting growth recovery, both in the short term and in the long term, is subject to 
much debate (Jansen et al. 2008). Whilst arguably relevant for the production of the 
public goods in question, a study of the output side would be beyond the remit of this 
investigation. A focus on the input side is not only empirically more feasible, but also 
the relevant approach for the study of fiscal policy coordination. The EERP 
(similarly to the rules of the SGP) makes suggestions about the size of stimulus 
spending and not about the size of the impact of this expenditure. In so doing, the 
117
effect of stimulus policies will be considered at face value – that is to say, in terms of 
the impact they had on changes in public finances. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF 
FISCAL CRISIS RESPONSES
Introduction
This chapter seeks to answer the question of whether fiscal policy choices during the 
Great Recession were characterised by a so-called ‘deficit bias’. In so doing, it 
identifies the determinants of public finances in times of economic crisis. How do 
different determinants of fiscal policy affect group latency by either increasing or 
decreasing public spending? Specifically, I will test the sub-hypotheses related to the 
spending and borrowing bias of profligate governments emanating from the 
democratic political process as presented in chapter three. Informed by the political 
economy literature on public finances, this investigation is guided by the notion that 
fiscal outcomes do not emerge in a political vacuum. Instead, they are influenced by 
a complex battery of factors describing the political environment within which actors 
bargain for their favoured policy outcome – as Adler (1991: 53) points out, ‘the 
environment does not “instruct” policy-makers, it challenges them’. Accordingly this 
chapter seeks to elucidate the choices and constraints of the fiscal politics of ‘hard 
times’. 
The following discussion is based on 81 observations. This is justified by the fact 
that it represents a ‘complete population’ in the sense that all EU countries and the 
main years of the Great Recession during which the EERP applied (2008-2010) are 
included. Empirically I augmented the numbers of observations with numerous 
interactions of each variable of interest with a pre- and per- crisis dummy. Doing so 
for the 1994 to 2010 period, I reject the hypothesis of parameter poolability (i.e. the 
poolability of the data). Evidence for this claim can be provided in form of a Chow 
test for structural change across time, which indicates that the sets of coefficients for 
all the specifications are significantly different for the post and pre crisis years. 
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Similar studies on fiscal policy during the economic and financial crisis are likewise 
left with relatively few observations (e.g. Armingeon 2012; Cameron 2012).
This chapter is organised as follows: I start with a presentation of the data and 
methods of the empirical analysis, identifying the operationalisation of dependent 
and independent variables that were developed in chapters three and four. 
Subsequently the research design and empirical methods employed are discussed. 
The following section presents the empirical findings and discusses various 
robustness tests. In the discussion, three key findings are considered in greater detail. 
These are the timeliness of automatic stabilisers, the impact of political 
fragmentation and the role of fiscal conservatism, both for national and EU policy-
makers. Here the empirical results are compared to the existing literature and 
analysed vis-à-vis additional documents and interviews on the politics surrounding 
fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession.
Data and methods
This section discusses the empirical research design for this chapter, starting first 
with the dependent and independent variables and ending with the discussion of the 
appropriate estimation techniques. The model specification is as follows: 
"fiscal outcome =  #  + $1L.GDP i,t + $2L.debt i,t + $3L.AS i,t  + $4Bailouti,t + 
$5Election i,t + $6Herfgov i,t + $7Herfopp i,t + $8Left i,t +  % i,t
The following paragraph describes the variables used to test the assumptions 
concerning the determinants of fiscal policy choices. Summary statistics for these 
variables can be found in Table 5.1. A definition of these variables, including 
sources, together with other key variables used in this thesis is listed in the Appendix 
in A1. 
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Insert Table 5.1 here
Fiscal policy: As mentioned in the previous chapter, the strategy for capturing a 
country’s fiscal responses to the crisis will be to test four variables separately; the 
change in budget balance (BB), the change in the primary balance (PB), the change 
in the structural balance (SB), and the change in the structural primary balance 
(PSB). 
Economic conditions: Economic conditions are controlled for in the estimations. 
First, I include the lagged GDP growth rate (GDP). 87 Economic growth is likely to 
impact on fiscal choices. Low (or even negative) rates of economic growth tend to 
increase budget deficits by reducing revenue and increasing expenditure (notably in 
the context of unemployment benefits). What is more, the political pressure to bring 
about economic growth via fiscal stimulus programmes increases as economic 
conditions deteriorate. Second, the lagged debt to GDP ratio (debt) represents a 
country’s past fiscal legacy as well as its constraints for future spending in light of 
fiscal sustainability. Third, the lagged size of automatic stabilisers (AS) controls for 
both the budgetary impact of welfare state provisions and budget elasticities, and for 
the fact that discretionary fiscal policies are influenced by the size of existing crisis 
provisions in the form of automatic stabilisation. Its measurement follows the 
European Commission and takes the change in the output gap multiplied by the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio (used as a proxy of the semi-elasticities of the budget 
balance) (Data Source: Ameco and European Commission 2010).
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87 Lagged variables are used to circumvent the endogeneity problem of contemporaneous 
macroeconomic variables which raises doubt as to the validity of the estimates and may create biases. 
Initially I attempted to instrument GDP growth as well as the debt levels with their lagged variables as 
well as US GDP and debt levels. As Hallerberg et al. (2007: 341) note it is ‘notoriously difficult to 
instrument changes’. Relevant tests indicate the strength of the instruments is fairly weak. At the same 
time a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirmed the endogeneity of both variables (see Table A5.2 in the 
Appendix). Similar to Armingeon (2012) I therefore use the lagged variables. 
Financial crisis: The variable Bailout records the consequences of the bank and other 
market support operations by public authorities. Including this variable controls for 
the fact that stimulus measures and financial bailouts are likely to be interrelated 
policy choices. Specifically, it measures the direct costs of these interventions in per 
cent of GDP as recorded by Eurostat (2012). A negative value records costs, whereas 
a positive value indicates revenue stemming from the financial sector interventions.
Elections: The variable Election is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if there was a 
legislative election at the national level in a given year (Keefer 2010).
Government fragmentation: To measure the strength of the executive I include the 
variable ‘Herfgov’, which indicates the probability that two deputies picked at 
random from among the government parties will be of different parties. This variable 
has a potential range from 1 (government is composed of a single party) to close to 0. 
This variable is found in Keefer (2010).
Opposition fragmentation: Analogous to the variable above, I include a 
corresponding measure for the strength of the legislative opposition, ‘Herfopp’, 
which indicates the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties. This variable, which is also found in 
Keefer (2010), has a potential range from 1 (the opposition is composed of a single 
party) to close to 0 (every opposition seat in the legislature is held by a different 
party). 
Government ideology: To account for the executive party/parties orientation with 
respect to economic policy, I include a variable for ‘right’ and ‘left’ governments. 
‘Right’ takes the value one for parties that are defined as conservative Christian 
democratic, or right-wing; ‘Left’ takes the value one for parties that are defined as 
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communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Centre is omitted. Data comes 
from Keefer (2010) (based on EXECRLC).
Econometric issues
Due to the small sample of countries and the limited number of years included, the 
use of panel data estimation techniques with fixed or random effects, may be not 
appropriate. What is more the existence of several dummy variables that do not 
change over time, means that the use of fixed effects is not feasible. This is why I 
prefer to use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation technique.88 
A pooled cross section (where observations for all countries and for all periods are 
pooled in one cross section sample) is analysed much like a standard cross section, 
except that it accounts for variation across time. ‘Pooling’ offers at least two 
advantages compared to either a pure cross section or a pure time series analysis. 
First, as the number of observations increases so do the degrees of freedom. This 
makes it possible to estimate more fully specified models and to reduce the potential 
problem of omitted variable bias. Second, pooling makes it possible to control for 
exogenous shocks common to all countries (by controlling for time effects). The 
pooling procedure was made popular by Beck and Katz (Beck & Katz 1995), also 
called the ‘de facto Beck-Katz standard’ (Plümper et al. 2005: 327) due to its 
influence on subsequent research. It includes a lagged dependent variable, time and 
unit dummies. The analysis of pooled data is econometrically more problematic than 
a pure cross-section analysis due to that fact that observations from the same 
countries are not independent. I use panel corrected standard errors to address this 
potential violation of the standard OLS assumptions.
The OLS estimator proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) is known to be biased if 
errors are autocorrelated. To eliminate serial correlation of errors, the authors 
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88 Using the command xtpcse in stata.
recommend adding the lagged dependent variable to the right-hand side of the 
equation, which in almost all cases suffices to get rid of autocorrelation. In the public 
finance literature the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is a common feature, 
as authors often point to the path dependency of fiscal policy choices (e.g. Davis et 
al. 1966). In fiscal policy studies the lagged dependent variable is frequently found 
to be significant and included for theoretical as well as methodological reasons (e.g. 
Hallerberg et al. 2009). As Kittel and Obinger (2003: 24) point out, it seems 
appropriate to assume persistency, particularly in the context of the comparatively 
large European welfare states. Welfare budgets are made with reference to the budget 
of the previous year and the largest shares of social spending (health care and old age 
pensions) tend to increase incrementally. 
Analysing discretionary fiscal policies, there is reason to doubt the narrative of fiscal 
path dependency. Indeed over the years, Wildavsky’s notion of ‘budget 
incrementalism’ (1964) has come under attack in research exposing the limited 
evidence of this account (for a review see Berry 1990). This thesis is mainly 
interested in explaining the variations of discretionary fiscal responses, which should 
reflect the felt needs and political pressures of the current year, as opposed to the 
pervious year’s. ‘Sticky’ expenditure and revenue is filtered out in both the SB and 
the PSB measure. From a theoretical point of view the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable therefore only makes sense for the cyclical indicators.
Given that our sample only covers three years, it is technically difficult to detect any 
serial correlation with confidence. I nevertheless test for it (Wooldridge 2002; 
Drukker 2003) and results indicate that autocorrelation is only an issue in one of the 
models (BB). This makes sense, since this measurement carries less ‘discretion’ then 
the cyclically adjusted and primary balance indicators, thus making it more persistent  
over time. Including a lagged dependent variable as suggested by Beck and Katz 
(1995) does not alter the results, nor does the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable improve the model’s fit, as indicated by the R2 (see Table A5.1 in the 
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Appendix). This is an interesting finding in itself, suggesting that fiscal policy 
responses during the Great Recession were not driven by path dependency.
Pooled data from multiple countries observed over a number of years can cause 
problems when analysts attempt to apply the standard linear regression model. Panel 
heteroskedasticity (individual countries have their own error variances) and 
contemporaneous correlation of errors (cross-national phenomena such as stimulus 
policies that cause one country’s errors to be correlated with the errors of other 
countries) generate biased estimation of standard errors if left uncorrected. I thus use 
standard errors that are corrected for these problems. 
Having discussed broader methodological issues, the next two sections will consider 
measurement problems specific to this investigation; the first concerns the possible 
endogeneity of elections and the second addresses the appropriateness of the 
measurement of partisanship in the context of fiscal outcomes. 
The endogeneity of elections
Governments manipulating the timing of elections, calling elections early in the light 
of a climate favourable for the incumbent or delaying elections if approval ratings 
are low, may give rise to endogeneity89 (e.g. Rogoff 1990). A further source of 
endogeneity might stem from unobserved factors. For instance, as Brender (2003) 
argues, both the timing of elections (the breaking up of government) and fiscal 
policies could be influenced by a variety of (unobserved) variables, such as social 
unrest, which are not included in our regression. What is more, looking at the 
election landscape of the Great Recession, it seems that in a number of instances 
early elections and public finances were interlinked. For example in September 2009, 
the then Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis called for snap elections after 
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89 Endogeneity refers to the presence of an endogenous explanatory variable that is correlated with the 
error term either because of an omitted variable, measurement error, or simultaneity. 
discontent with his government’s handling of the unfolding economic crisis (New 
York Times 2.09.2009). In the same year the Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány surprisingly announced his resignation for similar reasons (LaTribune 
24.03.2009). After protests in Riga over the worsening economic situation 
degenerated into riots, the Latvian prime minister resigned, defending of his austerity  
plans which were deemed necessary in the light of a !7.5bn bailout (Financial Times 
20.02.2009).90
There is reason to assume that the endogeneity of elections should be a wider 
concern, and not only for the 2008-2010 period. Heckelman and Berument (1998) for 
example, find that election dates in Japan and the UK are endogenous. Analysing 
elections in both countries for the 1960-1990 period, the authors present strong 
evidence to support the notion that election timing is a function of the economy, 
rather than the macroeconomy, being driven by elections as often assumed by the 
political business-cycle literature. Whilst outside the period of empirical analysis 
here, this assessment seems to apply to the surprise election in 2011, when José 
Sócrates, the president of Portugal resigned because Portuguese opposition parties 
refused to approve a package of austerity measures (1.4.2011 Financial Times). One 
could just as easily argue that the timing of elections is determined by fiscal policy 
choices and not the other way round. This complex relationship makes it difficult to 
establish any direction of causality with certainty. 
To deal with this endogeneity problem, similar to Wehner (2011), I therefore enter a 
new dummy variable which captures the number of years left in the electoral term of 
the current governmentas an instrument for actual elections. This instrument suggests 
itself; in all countries the electoral term is constitutionally determined (in the sense 
that there are term limits) and therefore difficult to manipulate. Thus, the assumption 
that the number of years left in the current term is exogenous to fiscal policy choices 
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90 However, government instability/absence in the Netherlands and Belgium during the same period is 
more complex and cannot be readily attributed to the turmoil of the financial and economic crisis.
is reasonable. At the same time, this instrument is correlated with the actual 
incidence of elections. This instrument is individually significant in the first stage; 
however, this does not in itself guarantee a successful identification in the second 
stage estimation. Testing for weak instruments, I use the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-
statistic, a correspondingly robust version of the Cragg-Donald statistics. As Baum et 
al. (2007) note, the statistics obtained should be compared to 10, the conventional 
rule of thumb. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistics for overall identification allows 
us to strongly reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. 
Consequently, weak instruments may not be considered as a problem for all 
estimations. In short, the results suggest the model used is reliable. I then proceed to 
test for endogeneity in the variable estimated with instrumental variables; the results 
of this test show that the null cannot be rejected at a ten per cent level: endogeneity 
of the Election variable is not a problem in this analysis (see Table A5.2 in the 
Appendix). I therefore display results without instrumenting.
Conservatism as fiscal conservatism
The inclusion of partisan variables in empirical studies on the determinants of fiscal 
outcomes is by now standard practice. An objection might be that the meaning of 
‘left’ and ‘right’ varies markedly between Western and post-communist Eastern 
Europe. For historical reasons the left–right polarity certainly tends to be broader in 
the East, encompassing moral/cultural/historical as well as socio-economic cleavages 
(Sitter 2003). However East–West differences may be exaggerated; recent studies 
show ‘a remarkable (and increasing) similarity’ (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 70). 
Moreover, pan-European homogeneity within party families is very high: ‘The 
ideological identity of parties and voters is much stronger than the geographical 
identity. Genealogy trumps nationality’ (Camia and Caramani 2012: 75). In 
particular, the institution of direct elections to the EP and the cooperation and 
grouping amongst parties within the EP has increased the comparability of party 
families across the EU (Mair and Mugge 1998: 216). 
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A more relevant objection might then be that the right-left division is only able to 
give a crude notion of policy-makers’ fiscal policy partialities. The misalignment 
between binary partisan positioning and nuanced macroeconomic preferences has 
been addressed particularly by studies on voters’ preferences (e.g. Bohn and Inman 
1995). For example, when analysing Swiss voters, Dafflon and Pujol (1999: 56) 
argue that ‘the pertinent measure of conservatism for our issue ought to be directly 
related to the notion of fiscal conservatism which is different from the general notion 
of political conservatism’. 
I accept the criticism of the arguably simplistic right-left choice. Is a more relevant 
measure of fiscal preferences available? One candidate would be the government’s 
commitment to stimulus spending as recorded in the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(CMP) produced by Klingemann et al. (2006). This innovative database counts 
mentions in party manifestos that relate positively (or negatively) to particular 
policies. Specifically, I take the measurement for ‘Keynesian demand management’ 
as an indicator for the government’s ideational outlook. This variable represents the 
percentage of sentences (with respect to the overall number of sentences) in the 
parties’ election programmes which comprised of positive statements with respect to 
‘demand-oriented economic policy; economic policy devoted to the reduction of 
depression and/or to increase private demand through increasing public demand and/
or through increasing social expenditures’ (ibid. V409). If there is more than one 
party in a coalition government, the government’s index value is an average of the 
separate index values of all coalition partners, weighted by their seats in parliament. 
Problematically, data (particularly for Eastern Europe) is incomplete and the 
observations are reduced to 64 – a cut of 20 per cent. The ‘pro-stimulus’ 
measurement is positively correlated with the two dichotomous right-left variables 
(for left rho = 0.30, for right rho = -0.24). I will return to the impact of an expressed 
commitment to Keynesian demand management later in this chapter.
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The determinants of (discretionary) fiscal policy during the Great Recession
Table 5.2 presents the results of the main model. The findings suggest that the 
economic climate is a key determinant of fiscal policy outcomes. Indeed the 
macroeconomic variables together with the year and country dummies explain most 
of the variation (see Table 5.3). It is noteworthy that the jump in R2 is considerably 
larger for the SB and PSB models. Here, the addition of ‘political’ variables increases 
the R2 by .16 and .18 respectively. The interpretation is straightforward: the more 
discretion policy-makers have in their fiscal policy choices, the more important is the 
political landscape to these choices. The variable GDP captures the economic need 
for government intervention. All coefficients on this variable are negative, suggesting 
that policy-makers reacted to a severe economic downturn with less and not more 
stimulus spending, possibly due to a limited room for fiscal expansion (simple 
correlation estimates confirm this relationship both for the lagged and the 
contemporary GDP measurement). Its coefficient is largest for the measurements 
with the most discretion attributed (PSB and SB), which may be due to the fact that 
policy-makers here had larger freedom to actually curb spending. The variable Debt 
has the expected positive sign,91 a result that points to the disciplining effect of high 
public debt burdens – a finding to which we will return again in chapters 6 and 7. 
The coefficient for automatic stabilisers shows a positive impact of automatic 
stabilisation on fiscal stimulus policies.
Insert Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 here
The coefficients of Herfgov and Herfopp indicate that while opposition 
fragmentation increases stimulus policies, the fragmentation of the government 
improves the fiscal position. A left-leaning government is found to lead to an 
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91 I also added the squared term of the Debt variable to control for non-linear effects, but its 
coefficient was not significant in any of the specifications, nor did it change any of the other 
coefficients. A RESET test confirmed the exclusion of both the quadratic and cubic term.
improvement in the budgetary position. I also included a corresponding variable 
measuring right-leaning governments. Here the coefficient was negative and 
statistically significant in all models. Since the interpretation of the findings remains 
unchanged and the models’ fit did not improve, I parsimoniously excluded this 
variable in the light of the small number of observations. Furthermore, I find strong 
evidence for the existence of a political business cycle (Election).
The costs of the financial sector interventions (Bailout) lead to an increase in fiscal 
measures to mitigate the crisis. This finding suggests that the severity of the financial 
crisis, or at least the severity of its consequences for public finances, impacted 
positively on fiscal response strategies. Accordingly, it appears that fiscal stimuli and 
financial bailouts are not independent policy choices. According to one interviewee, 
‘for us [the national government] saving the banks was one thing, but then when it 
came to getting the stimulus plans right, we wanted to show the people on the streets 
that we cared about them too. If we have money for the banks, we have money for 
the people’ (author interview, May 2011).
Whereas this finding in itself is interesting, it may be considered unsatisfactory 
insofar as the direct costs stemming from the financial sector interventions can 
account for only a fraction of the bailout programmes as discussed in chapter four. 
How do the potentially much bigger liabilities factor into the discretionary fiscal 
crisis responses? Estimating the same model and including contingent liabilities and 
liabilities instead of the direct costs as independent variables yields different 
results.92 Three points stand out here. First, the impact of liabilities such as loans 
(which are recorded at the debt level), have virtually the same impact as the direct 
costs. This is intuitive; such liabilities represent ‘real costs’ for public finances 
because they are not outside the general government accounting. Secondly, 
contingent liabilities have a significant and positive impact on fiscal policy 
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92 As the other independent variables remain unaltered by the ‘swap’ of variables related to the 
financial sector interventions, full tables are therefore not presented but are available on request.
outcomes, suggesting that higher contingent liabilities lead to a reduction in stimulus 
spending. I suspect however that this finding is driven by the exceptional case of 
Ireland. The Irish government had taken on a staggering level of contingent liabilities 
(almost 200 per cent of GDP in 2009) and at the same time was faced with pressure 
to consolidate public finances; it implemented very few stimulus policies. Thirdly, 
excluding the Irish cases, and thereby reducing the sample size by three observations, 
leads to the same conclusions as the other two financial bailout variables. These 
points speak to the fact that a) the costs, hidden or visible, from the financial sector 
interventions, are linked to the severity of the economic and financial meltdown and 
as such b) are an indicator of the (perceived) need to stimulate aggregate demand as 
well as the fiscal costs of the downturn more broadly. 
The deficit and debt bias pre and per crisis
Before addressing the key findings in greater detail, I test whether the deficit and 
debt bias of public finances is larger in times of economic crisis. The structural 
breaks discussed above prevent me from comparison within a single model. Instead, 
I run the same specification (subject to the same robustness tests) for the 1999, the 
year of the introduction of the euro, to 2007 period. Results are presented in Table 
5.4. What jumps out immediately is that only the variable pertaining to the political 
business cycle hypothesis is significant across specifications. Neither the 
fragmentation of government and the opposition nor the partisanship of the executive 
is found to determine fiscal policy outcomes between 1999 and 2007.  
Insert Table 5.4 here
Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that pressures for increased spending may become 
stronger in economically good times; as resources are more abundant and the 
benefits from lobbying increase, fiscal policy is likely to become pro-cyclical in 
good times. Yet in the light of explicit EU-level and domestic calls for stimulus 
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policies, it seems that the bad economic climate increased the perceived need and 
justifiable scope for government intervention. The deficit and debt bias of 
contemporary public finances should be just as strong, if not stronger, in times of 
economic crisis. Looking at crisis budgeting across the OECD, Schick (2009: 11) 
concludes that in times of crisis ‘when stimulus is the order of the day, the main 
issues in dispute are how big the increases should be and who should get them’. With 
the general modus of public finances 'switched to stimulus spending’ the benefits for 
lobbying consequently increased instead of decreased, as Tornell and Lane (1999) 
assumed. For example the German government hosted an ‘economy summit’ at the 
end of 2008, with representatives from the executive, science, industry, trade unions, 
and interest groups to discuss possible options for coping with the economic crisis 
(FAZ 13.12.2008). 
The role of automatic stabilisers
Chapter 4 presented the positive correlation between the size of stimulus packages 
and the size of automatic stabilisers, a relationship that is now confirmed by means 
of regression analysis. Instead of implementing a substitution strategy, governments 
with larger automatic stabilisation were also engaging in more discretionary 
spending to combat the crisis.93 This positive relationship may point to the 
established role of government in countries with large and small systems of 
automatic stabilisation. Automatic stabilisers are an indicator for the generosity of 
the welfare state. As such they highlight both the ability of a government to shoulder 
stabilisation as well as expectations with regards efforts to mitigate the consequences 
of the economic fallout. This finding is contrary to the recommendation of the 
European Commission (2009), which argued that the size of the automatic stabilisers 
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93 Following the Commission (2010), I use an expenditure-based measurement of automatic 
stabilisation. Fuest et al. (2010) and Girouard and Andrew (2005) also include revenue-based 
indicators (such as corporate, personal income and indirect taxes). To check the robustness of my 
proxy I also ran the same specification with a revenue-based variable. Analogous to the original 
measure, it takes the change in the output gap multiplied by the revenue-to-GDP ratio (used as a proxy 
of the semi-elasticities of the budget balance). My inferences were not affected.
is a key factor in explaining differences in fiscal stimulus across countries: Countries 
with extensive automatic stabilisers, so the argument goes, should rely less on 
discretionary fiscal policy spending.94
Timely and temporary
In recognising the important role of fiscal policy in the absence of national monetary 
policy instruments, two problems emerge. Firstly, discretionary fiscal policy may 
work inefficiently by either targeting the wrong groups or by providing too much or 
too little stimulus. Secondly, the actual implementation of this stimulus, even if 
correctly identified, takes time. Such implementation lag emerges because different 
stimulus measures take different amounts of time to take effect in the real economy. 
This delay was recognised in a joint letter written by the German Chancellor and the 
French President, which urged Member States to implement their national stimulus 
packages ‘without protracted processes’ as ‘speed counts’ (Merkel and Sarkozy 
2008), and thus effectively advocated unilateral, instead of coordinated, crisis 
responses for the sake of timeliness. 
Through their very nature automatic stabilisers typically provide timely support, as 
tax receipts are directly linked to the performance of the economy; they do not 
require the identification of underlying trends to be analysed by policy makers before 
any action is taken. The size of the stabilisation provided is linked to the magnitude 
of the recession or overheating of the economy and, crucially in the context of fiscal 
sustainability, there is no need to take action to reverse the stabilisation provided 
once the economy returns to a more sustainable path. Schelkle (2011) thus 
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94 The size of automatic stabilisers also played a role for international attempts to coordinate fiscal 
stimulus plans at the G20 level (Rommerskirchen 2013a). Schelkle (2012a) shows that the fiscal 
contribution to aggregate demand for EU Member States is not markedly different from that of the 
US. In fact, the Spanish stimulus by far exceeds the US stimulus if automatic stabilisers are included 
(see also Fuest et al. 2011). Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) even argue that, properly adjusted for the 
declining fiscal expenditure of the fifty states, the aggregate stimulus in the US was close to zero in 
2009 and that the stimulus package has been exaggerated.
characterises automatic stabilisation as a ‘good governance institution’, which 
corrects the ‘shortcomings’ of representative democracy.
One solution to the expansion versus consolidation bias and the related concerns over 
the efficiency of fiscal stimulus policies is the usage of automatic reversals of public 
spending, also known as sunset clauses. EU Member States did apply sunset clauses 
in various cases, which provided for the automatic cessation of crisis measures upon 
the date of the agreed 2011 sunset as laid out in the EU’s exit strategy. The notion 
that a government anticipating a potential loss of power may seek to constrain its 
rival by committing future resources to current use is well established in the 
literature (Persson and Svensson 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990). Built-in 
reversals as a means of self-binding are especially helpful against the background of 
slow economic growth and what is likely to be a slow recovery, when the political 
economy challenges of reversing temporary measures are likely to be considerable 
(Roeger and In’t Veld 2009).
Very few policies introduced as a temporary response to the crisis had built-in sunset 
clauses (DG Ecfin 2009); indeed most Member States implemented stimulus 
measures that were permanent rather than temporary in nature (ibid.). Of all the EU 
countries, only Greece and Estonia did not enact any permanent spending measures. 
In Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Slovenia and Finland, permanent 
measures outnumbered temporary ones. In light of the predominant non-automaticity  
of fiscal crisis policies, the reversal of discretionary spending is therefore subject to 
the political process of budget consolidation.
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The role of political fragmentation
Government fragmentation
The results of the cross-sectional analysis suggest a diminishing effect of government 
fragmentation; the less fragmented the executive, that is to say the more homogenous 
it is, the more stimulus policies were implemented. It is worth noting that this effect 
is not conditional on the strength of government. Interacting the fragmentation index 
with a dummy indicating minority or majority governments, as well as the margin of 
majority, the corresponding coefficients remained insignificant in all of the 
specifications. Furthermore, the inclusion of quadratic and cubic transformations of 
this variable, as well as the corresponding measurement of opposition fragmentation, 
was rejected95.
There are several factors that might explain this outcome. Firstly, the literature on the 
deficit and debt bias of contemporaneous public finances emerges from the implicit 
assumption that this bias is ‘a bad thing’. Volkerink and de Haan (2001: 221) for 
example introduce their study with the observation that ‘most industrialized countries 
entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray. Yet is it possible that in times 
of crisis the old equation of political power dispersion and high deficits no longer 
holds? The findings of this chapter suggest that the answer is yes. One-party, 
majoritarian96 governments implemented larger stimulus programmes, all other 
things being equal, than coalition governments. The main reason for this lies in the 
fact that the mandate for pro-cyclical spending has reached unprecedented levels in 
recent history. Previous analyses predominantly studied counter- and pro-cyclical 
fiscal behaviour jointly.  This thesis examines the expansion of counter-cyclical fiscal 
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95 Squared and cubic coefficients were not significant in any of the model specifications. A RESET 
term further confirmed the linear modelling choice. 
96 In the sample at hand, all one-party governments also held the majority of seats.
policies, which although with the benefit of the hindsight may not always be 
beneficial, is at least easily justifiable.
The inability to consolidate public finances is attributed to inefficient political 
equilibria in which coalition members are unable to agree on a consolidation package 
(Alesina and Drazen 1991). The parallel between consolidation and stimulus 
packages lies not in their popularity,97 but in the sense that both represent a 
breakaway from the fiscal policy of normal times. A strong executive, defined as a 
single party government, is likely to be in a better position to react more swiftly and 
forcefully. This claim is echoed in veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002), which predicts 
fewer changes in the budget in countries where the government consists of several 
parties and the ideological distance between parties is large. What is more, harking 
back to the previously discussed heightened ‘visibility of crisis responses’, one-party, 
majoritarian governments have limited opportunities to engage in (predominantly 
domestic) ‘politics of blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1986); the burden of recovery hence 
sits with one party.
One caveat however applies: The measurement of fragmentation does not take into 
account the nuances of ideological fragmentation. Since it is based on the mere 
numbers of different parties in a given government (coalition), this says nothing 
about the ideological proximity of these partners. However there is evidence in the 
literature on fiscal policy outcomes that high party fragmentation can lead to an 
increase in government spending, regardless of the ideological positions of coalition 
partners. Using a formal model, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) derive the expectation 
that due to electoral accountability, a larger number of parties in a coalition results in 
higher deficits. Furthermore, it has been argued that this relationship holds even 
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97 The majority of EU citizens welcomed stimulus packages; even the German electorate received the 
fiscal package favourably. According to a 2009 survey, only 15 per cent of respondents thought that 
the second stimulus programme was ‘too high, whereas 38 per cent thought it was ‘just right’ and 34 
per cent thought it was too small (survey based on 1,202 respondents over the age of 18, ZDF 
Politbarometer 2009).
when a smaller number of larger parties represent the same interests, because the 
supporters for each party will receive more from the benefits than they pay in 
additional taxes (e.g. Hallerberg and Marier 2004: 573). That being said, it may be 
interesting for future studies to consider the impact of ideological fragmentation on 
stimulus policies. 
Opposition politics
The positive coefficients of the measurement for opposition fragmentation initially 
come as a surprise.98 The results confirm one half of the fragmentation hypothesis: 
an increase in homogeneity leads to an improvement of the budget balance. Yet 
overall the effect of opposition fragmentation is always positive. The same common 
pool argument should apply for the fragmentation of opposition parties in the 
legislative. They should have similar ‘grazing’ incentives to government actors. 
Arguably, this positive sign points to the main challenge of opposition parties, which 
is the need to mark their position as different from that of the government. As the 
majority of governments in the EU chose at least some form of fiscal stimulus 
policies, the prevailing opposition position was by default to oppose the stimulus 
package. This opposition is not necessarily a veto of stimulus spending as such. In 
late 2008 for example, the German stimulus package was rejected by the Green party, 
on the grounds that the measures would lead to ‘more cement and not more 
justice’ (Heine 2009) whereas the Liberal Party (FDP) argued that it would amount to 
a dubious ‘debt package instead of stimulus package’ (der Spiegel 17.1.2009). This 
example suggests that opposition to budgetary plans is more nuanced and could be 
the result of different, even opposite, (strategic adoptions of) ideological positions. 
The German example also illustrates how such opposition could, despite a 
government majority, lead to a modification in the stimulus package as the fiscal 
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98 Minority governments must bargain with the opposition to pass legislation (Powell 2000). To test 
whether therefore the role of the opposition is conditional on the minority/majority status of 
government, I interacted the fragmentation index with a minority dummy. Both variables were 
positive and insignificant in all specifications.
plans were contested and (re)negotiated in both the upper and lower house which 
must have approve the budget (ibid.).
The significance of opposition fragmentation comes as a surprise and runs counter to 
existing studies, interviews and other materials. Note however that the coefficient for 
government fragmentation is always larger than that for opposition fragmentation.99 
Consequently, fragmentation effects of the executive outweigh any fragmentation 
effects of the opposition. Existing studies suggest that in times of crisis, we may 
witness a pure executive mode of policy-making and a ‘rally round the flag’ effect 
which makes it difficult for the opposition to criticise or even oppose government 
policies, similar to what has been described during foreign policy crises (see Oneal 
and Bryan 1995). Describing the mechanisms of crisis budgeting, Schick (2009: 10) 
considers the tendencies of the budgeting process to become more ‘top-down and 
centralised’. This ‘expedites the process, invests political capital and urgency in 
mobilising support, and marginalises those who stand in the way’ (ibid.). 
Accordingly, decisions are largely taken in small groups involving the executive, 
which results in a loss of power of typical veto players located in the legislative. 
There is evidence that the Great Recession has seen an increase in executive policy-
making and a marginalisation of the legislative (see Lodge and Wegrich 2012). As 
one national parliamentarian put it in an interview, ‘there was a general feeling that 
we were treated as “rubber stamp parliament”’ (author interview, June 2011). In 
Spain, the government marginalised legislative decision-making, issuing crisis 
measures as executive orders, which prevent any amendments by parliamentarians 
(Fleischer and Parrado 2012). Parliament could then only approve or disapprove of 
these ‘royal decree laws’ without any real powers to shape and amend. Similar crisis 
decrees were passed in Romania and Hungary. In the case of the latter, the newly 
elected government in April 2010 proposed an extensive package of controversial 
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99 Both coefficients are statistically different from one another. Coefficient signs remain the same if 
one of the two variables is excluded.
measures submitting over 80 regulations to Parliament without following customary 
or mandatory consultation procedures (Parrado 2012). 
Parliamentarians whose parties were in government were also unlikely to influence 
fiscal policy outcomes. In most EU countries, notwithstanding the formal powers of 
the legislature to modify budget bills, the vote on the budget is considered a vote of 
confidence in the government according to the OECD Budgeting Database. In 
Finland, for example, the government declared the vote on the stimulus package an 
issue of confidence: i.e. the government would have resigned if it lost, which led to 
an ‘unusually high number of absentees’ (author interview, June 2012); out of 95 
votes, 38 parliamentarians abstained (Saramo 2012). Similarly in Belgium, out of 
129 votes, 49 parliamentarians abstained when the stimulus was approved (Loi de 
relance économique 2009). 
The Netherlands offers a counter-example to the trend of centralised crisis 
management. Kickert (2012: 440) considers the Dutch government’s response to the 
economic and financial crisis, finding that the rescue of the banking sector was 
undertaken by an elite group comprising the finance minister and the chairman of the 
Dutch National Bank, which took far-reaching decisions without much significant 
parliamentary input. Conversely the agreements on stimulus policies ‘were taken in 
an explicitly politicized decision process’ (ibid. 441) with political consultation 
involving the parliamentary parties and the coalition party leaders. 
The return of intergovernmentalism? 
The overall dominance of executive policy-making in times of crisis was not only a 
trend in domestic crisis reactions. Similarly at the European level, both interviewees 
from the European Commission and the European Parliament complained about the 
‘return of intergovernmentalism’ (author interview, April 2011) and ‘executive power 
grab’ (author interview, May 2011) and argued that ‘clearly already in 2008 the 
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intergovernmental side of EU became increasingly important’ (author interview, 
March 2011). In particular, members of the EP claimed to have felt ‘ignored’ (author 
interview, April and May 2011). The European Parliament had no formal say in the 
adoption of the EERP; MEPs only formally voted on the plan in March 2009, by 
which point domestic stimulus efforts were well under way. In its 11th March 
resolution, it states that it ‘expects from the Commission clear and strong guidance 
towards an improved coordinated approach amongst all Member States in managing 
this deep economic crisis’ and warns of ‘the risk that the solutions implemented 
become the sum of all the national policies, with potential conflicts and costs, 
undermining the single market, the economic and monetary union’ (EP 2009). Yet by 
spring 2009 the vast majority of stimulus decisions had already been approved by 
national parliaments. In some Member States (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
France, Spain and Germany) governments were in fact already preparing a second 
round of stimulus programmes to follow the adoption of initial packages. 
Fabbrini (2012) argues that French and German governments converged towards an 
intergovernmental interpretation of EU policy coordination. Sarkozy’s crisis 
management was reminiscent of Charles de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe of nation 
states, a process that perceives integration as driven and controlled by the Member 
States’ executives, with no room for the European Parliament (ibid.). In a speech in 
Toulon on 1st December 2011 Sarkozy argued that ‘the reform of Europe is not a 
march towards supra-nationality’ (cited in Mahony 2011). Instead ‘the integration of 
Europe will go the intergovernmental way because Europe needs to make strategic 
political choices’ (ibid.). Along similar lines, Schmidt (2012:4) states that EU policy-
makers ‘seem to have moved toward assuming that an intergovernmental Europe is 
the best way to govern’. She illustrates this claim by pointing to Merkel’s much 
noted speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, where she proposed a new ‘Union 
Method’ according to which a coordinated European position could be found not by 
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pursing the old route of the Community Method100, but by coordinating between 
executive leaders (Chang 2013). Intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making had 
arguably been on the rise even before the economic and financial crisis of 2008/2009 
(see also Bickerton et al. mimeo). Puetter (2006), for example, sees the Eurogroup as 
a conscious attempt by finance ministers to escape the bias towards formal 
bargaining under the Community Method in favour of informal, deliberative working 
method. The Economist’s Charlemagne (11.02.2012) locates the resurgence of 
intergovernmentalism in the wake of the initial failure to win electoral support for the 
EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, which resulted in 
‘intergovernmentalism [to emerge as] the new fashion’. Irrespective of the changing 
currents of intergovernmentalism over the past decade, there is evidence that crises in 
general favour intergovernmental policy-making at the international level and 
executive policy-making at the national level (Lodge and Wegrich 2012). I will 
return to the role of intergovernmental crisis management in the next chapter when 
considering the Commission’s position vis-à-vis the EERP and in the conclusion 
when discussing various reforms linked to fiscal policy coordination. 
The role of government ideology 
Results in Table 5.2 show that left-leaning governments implemented larger stimulus 
packages then their right-leaning and centrist counterparts.101 However, the results, 
presented in Table A5.3 of the Appendix, show that a specific commitment to 
Keynesian demand management in the election manifesto leads to a reduction in 
stimulus efforts. What is more, a related measurement of right-left,102 based on 
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100 Under the so-called Community Method, the Commission proposes policy and legislation and 
shares responsibility for policy execution with national authorities. The Council and Parliament have 
the role to adopt legislative and budgetary acts and the Court of Justice ensures respect for the rule of 
law. See also Dehousse (2011)
101 Including the variable ‘right’ in the model specification with only centrist governments in the base 
group yields a significant and negative coefficient. The R2 does however not improve and all other 
results are virtually identical. 
102 Right-left position of party as given in Laver and Budge (1992). This index adds up different 
scores in the Comparative Manifesto data.
Comparative Manifesto data, is not significant. These findings are in line with 
numerous empirical studies questioning the old association of government ideology 
and public deficits prior to the introduction of the euro. A wave of studies first 
challenged the partisan theory of public spending and presented evidence of 
substantial partisan dealignment in the 1980s (e.g. Dalton 1984). These views are 
supported by the evidence on the determinants of public spending during the 
1999-2007 period, (see Table 5.4) where the partisan variable is not significant. How 
then to explain the shift during the Great Recession? One possible explanation points 
to the changing fiscal predilection of the electorate and policy-makers. 
Lipsmeyer (2011) analyses how policy-makers react to economic crises, arguing that 
the Great Recession has seen a departure from ‘business as usual’ where 
governments pursue their policy goals in line with their stated ideological outlook. 
The severe economic downturn constrained politicians in their ability to enact their 
favoured welfare policies; even fiscally conservative governments may turn to 
extensive stimulus policies to ‘buffer people from hardship’ (ibid. 977). Along 
similar lines, Schick (2009: 10) argues that the emergency mood of public finances 
overrides particularistic, partisan interests. Castles (1998) examined changes in 
expenditure across OECD countries, concluding that in times of economic crisis the 
party affiliation of policy-makers does not matter for the state of public finances: ‘the 
impact of partisanship is contingent on high levels of economic growth’ (ibid. 32). 
Based on an analysis of data from 17 OECD nations between 1981 and 1998, he 
presents evidence of a diminishing partisan impact on social expenditure during 
downturns – ‘during economic busts all governments spend more on welfare 
regardless of ideology’ (ibid.). Analysing the Nordic EU countries Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway, Lindvall (2012) argues that the quick adoption of fiscal 
stimulus measures was made possible by a societal consensus on the role of fiscal 
policy, which meant that policy-makers were not concerned about indirect political 
effects for their re-election prospects (see also Vis et al. 2011). This mattered 
particularly for the willingness of the centre-right governments in power in most of 
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the Nordic countries to adopt expansionary fiscal stimulus policies. This description 
of ‘default stimulus’ in times of economic crisis fits the situation of fiscal policy 
making in most EU Member States.103 Turning to liberal Keynesianism as the ‘model 
response to economic crisis’ (Pontussen and Raess 2012, see also Grabel 2010) was a 
move that transcended party lines. 
Much has been written about EMU’s evolving logic of fiscal appropriateness104, 
which is enshrined in the SGP (e.g. McNamara 1998; Dyson 2000). Yet the Great 
Recession even triggered a change in the perceptions of what constitutes viable 
(appropriate) policy options to mitigate the crisis in Member States where policy-
makers seemingly embraced strict rules of fiscal restraint. The old alternatives 
consistent with decades of relative economic stability were no longer considered to 
be appropriate given the magnitude of economic downturn. This shift in policy 
options meant that even policy-makers on the right of the political spectrum were 
willing to abandon the previously defining policies of fiscal conservatism. However 
the stimulus consensus was not an instantaneous convergence of fiscal policy 
preferences throughout the EU. This is perhaps best illustrated with the example of 
Germany, although other countries, notably Finland and Austria, were initially 
cautious as well (author interviews, April 2011). Dating back to an arguably failed 
attempt at demand management in the 1970s, the German position on stimulus 
spending was initially negative. This stance is rooted in the conviction of ‘basically 
all leading German academic economists’ who stressed that ‘fiscal policy CANNOT 
work for principal theoretical considerations’ (Dullien 2008). German government 
officials echoed these views during the negotiations on the EERP. One participant 
described a heated discussion amongst EU and national officials: ‘we were 
witnessing the worst economic crisis in the history of the EU, and all we heard from 
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103 Not all Member States implemented stimulus policies, and fiscal responses to the crisis were 
nuanced depending on a country’s economic and political context. I will return to the question of the 
size of stimulus measures in chapter 7 when discussing the issue of fiscal space.
104 The term ‘logic of appropriateness’ dates back to Risse et al. (1999), who seek to explain 
persuasion as normative suasion, especially in shifting the internalisation of a norm from a ‘logic of 
consequences’ to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see also Olson and March 2004).
the German side was that stimulus doesn’t work because of non-Keynesian 
effects’105 (author interview, April 2011). On 22 December 2008, the then Finance 
Minister Peer Steinbrück stressed in an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal that 
‘large-scale stimulus programmes —and tax cuts as well — would not have any 
effects in real time’ (Steinbrück 2008b). Only a few weeks before he had denounced 
the UK’s cut in VAT as ‘crass Keynesian[ism]’ (Newsweek 11.12.2008). The timing 
of this is remarkable given that first, at the EU level Member States had already 
agreed to coordinate substantial stimulus programmes and second, the first recovery 
package had already been approved domestically. Once concrete stimulus measures 
were already well on their way the economy minister, for instance, called the 
German crisis response ‘a tailored economic growth package, not a classic stimulus 
program’ (New York Times 5.10.2008). On first consideration this linguistic hair-
splitting seems to be more a matter of political cosmetics then of economic 
substance. But in the light of coordination problems it is important to remember that 
it does not only matter politically whether fiscal crisis policies are in line with a 
policy agreement (such as the EERP), but also whether other EU Member States 
perceived them to be so. This especially matters in the context of overcoming a 
collective action problem, where the incentives for defection rise with the perceived 
likelihood of other countries complying. By arguing not only generally against 
stimulus measures, but also denying the nature of domestic crisis response, the 
German government was de facto undermining the coordination of national stimulus 
programmes.
Championing stimulus policies within the Commission
The embracement of Keynesian style demand policies was not only contested in 
some Member States, but also proved a divisive issue within the European 
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105 The economic assumption behind the opposition to fiscal stimulus is that forward-looking 
consumers save the proceeds from a debt financed fiscal stimulus in anticipation of the future tax 
increases. This behaviour then cancels out the impact of the stimulus and creates a non-Keynesian 
effect.
Commission. Members of DG Ecfin in particular ‘had huge reservations’ (author 
interview, April 2011, see also Hodson 2012) about the design of the EERP; ‘For 
years and years we [Ecfin staff] insist on consolidation and sound public finances 
and then we should come out and proclaim exactly the opposite?’ (author interview, 
April 2011). Another official pointed out that the EERP ‘contradicted the philosophy 
of the Commission diametrically’ (author interview, May 2011). Martin Larch, from 
the DG Ecfin, and his colleagues worry that the ‘forced combination of accepting 
violations of the Pact on the one hand and insisting on the formal, although more 
flexible implementation of the EDP, on the other has not strengthened the already 
battered credibility of the surveillance framework’ (Larch et al. 2010: 23). According 
to one Commission official, advocating fiscal stimulus policies was ‘not something 
we [the Commission] would do light-heartedly, but in the light of the magnitude of 
the economic and financial crisis it became increasingly clear that we needed 
decisive state intervention to break the spiral of economic slowdown and job 
losses’ (author interview, April 2011). The Commission’s policy turn can be seen as 
part of a broader picture of global crisis responses; in sharp contrast to the policies of 
the Great Depression where fiscal policy was not used extensively (Brown 1956), 
fiscal policy (in the form of discretionary spending in addition to automatic 
stabilisers) was the main policy instrument of the Great Recession.
In tracing the Commission’s fiscal crisis framework it is helpful to turn to the public 
statements made by two, in this context key, figures: the Commission President 
Barroso and the then Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Joaquín 
Almunia. José Manuel Barroso (2008b) was quick to suspend the SGP as early as 
September 20th, arguing that the Commission could not go on with ‘business as 
usual’ as ‘Europe's economy needs a boost to recover, to continue to grow and to 
provide employment’. Speaking at the European Parliament Plenary Debate only 
four days later, Almunia (2008a) still stressed the conservative prescription that ‘in 
budgetary policy, [the Member States] must preserve [their] commitment to fiscal 
discipline and the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact’. Finding an ally in the 
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ECB, this assessment was echoed by Trichet who stressed that ‘the Pact should be 
applied fully’ (Financial Times 6.11.2008). These evaluations are at odds with the 
outlook of President Barroso, who, on the occasion of the extraordinary Commission 
meeting of 29th October, again stated that in the application of  ‘the Stability and 
Growth Pact, of course, there must be scope for fiscal and budgetary policy to be 
anti-cyclical in a downturn, to maintain demand and protect jobs’ (Barroso 2008c).
With the announcement of the EERP, the views that applying the old rules ‘would 
lead to a vicious recessionary cycle [... as] it would lead to falling purchasing power 
and falling tax revenues, to rising unemployment and the accompanying human 
misery, to ever wider budget deficits, ultimately to a risk of social 
instability’ (Barroso 2008d) prevailed over more cautious voices. Throughout his 
remaining time at DG Ecfin until 2010, Almunia stressed the need to balance fiscal 
stimulus and fiscal sustainability on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, he publicly 
accepted that ‘monetary policy alone cannot provide the full stimulus needed by the 
European economy.[…] Realising this [...] we proposed an ambitious economic 
recovery plan that brings together a fiscal stimulus to boost demand in the short 
term’ (Almunia 2009).
Going to China
One would expect that given equal popular support, there would be no partisan effect 
on fiscal policy choices in times of crisis in line with previous studies (e.g. Castles 
1998; Lipsmeyer 2011). Right-leaning parties emerged as an ‘unlikely actor’ 
championing the motto of ‘excessive’ spending. Counter-intuitively, these parties are 
in a comparatively better place to advocate this expansionary crisis policy not despite 
but because of the fact that it contradicts its pre-crisis paradigms on fiscal policy 
making. The likely reason for this apparent incongruity is that the public does not 
suspect conservative parties of advocating stimulus spending solely because of the 
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attributed ‘ideological tendencies’; the policy is perceived as being an objectively 
motivated one. Buttressed by an image of fiscal conservatism, right-leaning 
governments may be subject to fewer pressures to justify an increase in spending. 
Whereas stimulus implemented by the left may be seen as exploiting a crisis for their 
own ideological agenda, the same programme may be considered an economically 
necessary move if undertaken by a government considered fiscally conservative. The 
stereotype of a ‘fiscal hawk’ may then help these parties to secure an agreement on 
exceptional fiscal policies. This phenomenon of unlikely champions of policies that 
appear to contradict its policy preferences has been called the ‘Nixon-in-China 
syndrome’ after Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), who argue that right-wing policies 
are more likely to be implemented by left-wing parties (and vice versa). This effect 
has been confirmed empirically by various studies on fiscal consolidation (e.g. 
Zohlnhöfer 2007). For example, Cyran (2011) stresses that the radical reform of the 
German welfare system (Hartz IV) could ‘only have been implemented by a Red-
Green coalition. In his view, ‘if the [centre-right] CDU or the [liberal centre-right] 
FDP had taken up such initiative, a revolution would have been set loose’ (ibid.). 
The embrace of stimulus policies by conservative governments is likely to have 
political repercussions for Europe’s partisan landscape beyond the Great Recession. 
Judt (2010) appeared puzzled by the fact that ‘in a series of European elections 
following the financial meltdown, social democratic parties consistently did badly; 
notwithstanding the collapse of the market, they proved conspicuously unable to rise 
to the occasion.’ Indeed, in Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, centre-left parties made considerable 
electoral losses (Lindvall 2011). What is more in Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia 
and the United Kingdom, centre-left parties either lost power or were forced to leave 
governing coalitions (ibid.). The fact that left-leaning governments were not more 
likely to engage in more stimulus spending then their right-leaning counterparts may 
help to explain why parties left of the political spectrum were not able to benefit (at 
least for the moment) from the Great Recession. Indeed, Bartles (2011) analyses 31 
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parliamentary elections in 26 OECD countries from 2007 through early 2011 and 
finds some evidence of a boost in incumbent governments’ electoral support 
associated with spending on economic stimulus programmes. 
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the determinants of fiscal response strategies to the 
economic and financial crisis, analysing time-series cross-sectional data from the 27 
EU Member States over a 3-year time period (2008-2010). Post-war economic 
history provides evidence that fiscal authorities in industrialised countries may be 
prone to a deficit-bias, which shows up in large and persistent deficits and growing 
public debts. The empirical analysis has shown that this bias is even stronger during 
the Great Recession. One result to highlight is that political-economy factors are 
found to have shaped public finances during the Great Recession. This finding 
confirms Gourevitch’s (1986) dictum that ‘policy needs politics’. Faced with a 
common shock, countries do not merely respond to the economic imperative of crisis 
management, but identify different solutions to similar problems. The domestic 
political processes then influenced the specific features of the policy response. A 
similar conclusion is reached by Cameron (2012) and Armingeon (2012), who both 
analyse the drivers of stimulus packages across the EU. Cameron (2012) shows that 
the greatest expansionary effect did not occur in the countries that experienced the 
greatest contraction of the economy and that there is at best only a very slight 
relationship between the extent of the economic contraction in 2008-9 and the extent 
to which the country’s budget introduced a fiscal stimulus in those years. Along 
similar lines, Armingeon (2012) argues that economic variables had limited 
explanatory power; they constrain governments, ‘but in the end fiscal policy is about 
politics’ (ibid. 19). 
The empirical results of this chapter suggest that the heterogeneous crisis responses 
should not only be seen as a result of different economic profiles (the severity of the 
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recession shock), but also as a consequence of different political landscapes, marked 
by diverging electoral calendars, government formation and ideological position. 
This heterogeneity has considerable implications for the latency of EU Member 
States and in turn the coordination of fiscal policy choices. Member States, without 
election years falling in the 2008-10 period, for example, were more likely to 
implement smaller stimulus programmes than Member States where policy-makers 
faced the electorate. Conversely, right-leaning governments were more likely to have 
designed larger stimulus plans than their left-leaning counterparts. The differences in 
the political and economic climate throughout the EU, which are shown to determine 
the fiscal responses to the Great Recession, means that the production function for 
fiscal policy coordination is heterogeneous across Member States. Collective action 
theory, as will be discussed in the following two chapters, would therefore see the 
likelihood of free-riding increasing in groups with ‘stressful 
heterogeneities’ (Varughese and Ostrom 2001: 762). 
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CHAPTER 6: SEPARATE AND SELECTIVE INCENTIVES
Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the key determinants of fiscal policy choices during 
the Great Recession and its findings suggest that the deficit and debt biases may be 
more pronounced in times of crisis. This has implications for group-oriented policy 
actions in the context of stimulus spending. With the diversity in terms of political 
landscape and economic profile the group latency of the EU as a whole increases. 
According to Olson (1965: 51), the solution to successful collective actions for latent 
groups lies in the provision of separate and selective incentives. As Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001: 762) put it, heterogeneities ‘do not have a determinant impact on the 
likelihood or success of collective action’ since groups can overcome ‘stressful 
heterogeneities by crafting innovative institutional arrangements well-matched to 
their local circumstances’.
This chapter will scrutinise two types of different incentives that are thought to affect 
fiscal policy choices; fiscal rules and market discipline. It examines the impact of 
fiscal rules on stimulus policies, distinguishing between domestic fiscal rules and 
fiscal policy agreements found in the EERP106 as well as the SGP at the European 
level. Most domestic fiscal rules are designed to restrict policy-makers over a long 
time horizon in order to achieve fiscal sustainability. Their main aim is therefore to 
mitigate the deficit and debt bias of contemporary public finances. For the 
coordination of fiscal stimulus policies, exigent domestic fiscal rules may on the one 
hand prevent stability free-riding, but on the other hand may increase growth free-
riding by limiting (or being perceived as doing so) the scope for fiscal expansion in 
times of economic crisis. Conversely, the EERP explicitly encourages stimulus 
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106 Strictly speaking the EERP does not qualify as fiscal rule. For the sake of simplicity the term is 
nevertheless used when grouping domestic fiscal rules, the EERP and the SGP together. 
spending and may even be seen as a counterweight to the existing budgetary 
framework under the SGP and at the domestic level. Domestic fiscal rules and the 
SGP both rely solely on the threat of punishment as incentive. This incentive usually 
takes the form of reputational costs (e.g. audience costs as described in Lohmann 
2003). Market discipline however also provides positive incentives in the form of 
lower borrowing costs. Furthermore, market discipline provides exogenous 
incentives, whereas the punishment associated with a breach of fiscal rules has to be 
agreed within the group. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: First the role of domestic budget rules in steering 
fiscal stimulus programmes is tested. Given numerous crisis-driven reforms, the 
endogeneity of fiscal rules and its implications for statistical estimations are 
considered in detail. The third section discusses the role of the EERP and the SGP. 
Both types of rules are found to have had no impact on fiscal policy outcomes. In the 
light of this finding, both the Commission’s and Member States’ motivations 
concerning the creation of the EERP and the survival of the SGP are explored. The 
fourth section analyses market discipline during the Great Recession, paying 
particular attention to the bi-directionality of market reactions and government 
responsiveness. The penultimate section considers the differences between fiscal 
rules and market discipline focusing on the second-order free-riding problem.
Domestic fiscal rules
A fiscal rule can be defined as ‘[a] permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically 
defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance’ (Kopits and Symansky 
1998: 2). As such it imposes ‘a constraint on fiscal policy with a time-bound 
character’ (Danninger 2002: 7) by setting numerical targets for budgetary aggregates. 
Poterba (1995) considers the study of fiscal policy choices in times of crisis to be 
particularly interesting. According to him, fiscal crises provide ‘a unique opportunity 
for studying how fiscal institutions and political factors affect fiscal decision-
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making’ (ibid. 1). He reasons that if fiscal rules such as balanced budget amendments 
constrain the flexibility of political actors, then states with and without these rules 
should respond differently to fiscal crises. 
Analysing the role of fiscal rules, I employ the fiscal rules index developed by the 
European Commission (for summary statistics see Table 6.1). Commission services 
have compiled a dataset on domestic fiscal rules in force, based on questionnaires 
sent to EU Member States. These surveys request information on the description and 
definition of the fiscal rule, its coverage, its statutory base, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, as well as experience applying the rule. Based on the 
Fiscal Rule Strength Index (FRSI)107 for each rule, the Commission constructed a 
time-varying fiscal rule index for each Member State by summing up all fiscal rule 
strength indices in force in the respective Member State weighted by the coverage of 
general government finances of the respective rule. The assigned weights are mainly 
determined by the fiscal strength of the rule and its coverage.108 
Insert Table 6.1 here
The endogeneity of fiscal rules
Empirically modelling the impact of fiscal rules on public finances throws up the 
challenge of endogeneity. The endogeneity of budget institutions is well-established 
in the literature. Fiscal outcomes and budget institutions may both respond to other 
unobserved variables such as a country’s Stability Culture109 or voters’ preferences in 
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107 The FRSI considers whether fiscal rules are equipped with appropriate characteristics within the 
institutional framework of budgetary policy. It is based on (i) the statutory base of the rule, (ii) room 
for setting or revising its objectives, (iii) the body in charge of monitoring respect and enforcement of 
the rule, (iv) the enforcement mechanisms relating to the rule, and (v) the media visibility of the rule.
108 Additionally, it will be interesting for future research to investigate the impact of different forms of 
fiscal governance (Hallerberg et al. 2009) on the spending decisions concerning stimulus policies.
109 See Howarth and Rommerskirchen (2013) for discussion on the meaning, origins and role of 
Stability Culture in EU fiscal policy coordination. 
addition to the political environment. As Poterba (1996) argues, if voters have a 
preference for conservative fiscal policy they would be in favour of both low deficit 
and debt levels as well as tight fiscal rules. The omitted variable of voters’ 
preferences may then play a role in explaining fiscal discipline, however it is 
exceedingly difficult to accurately measure voters’ tastes for fiscal outcomes. 
Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Poterba (1995) the use of government party 
affiliation may be considered a satisfactory, albeit crude proxy. Furthermore, various 
studies (e.g. von Hagen and Harden 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1997) have considered 
that budgetary institutions can be treated as exogenous variables uncorrelated with 
social preferences. 
A second potential source of endogeneity stems from the likelihood that fiscal policy 
outcomes impact on fiscal institutions and not the other way round, raising concerns 
about simultaneity. Political institutions are artefacts, not natural phenomena. 
Therefore, so goes the argument, they can be modified and reconstructed. Haan et al. 
(1999) present evidence suggesting that in several European countries, budget rules 
emerge as a result of previous fiscal outcomes. In his study of fiscal adjustment, 
Lavigne (2011) argues that although the causal link runs primarily from political 
economy factors to fiscal policy, it may be the case that fiscal policy choices also 
influence political and institutional variables. The same logic can be applied to the 
causality of discretionary fiscal policy and the change of fiscal rules. Debrun et al. 
(2008) on the other hand argue that there is no support for the hypothesis that fiscal 
rules are introduced at times of recession or fiscal stress. Hallerberg et al. (2009) 
emphasise that budgetary institutions are relatively costly to change and are stable 
over at least the short to medium term, as fiscal performance cannot quickly feed 
back into altering institutions. Nevertheless, in their analysis on fiscal governance in 
EU countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors (ibid. ch. 5) also show that countries 
with histories of fiscal crises have adopted more robust fiscal institutions. Hallerberg 
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et al. (ibid.) argue that through fiscal crises, the electorate learn the potentially 
disastrous consequences of having decentralized fiscal institutions in place.110
The notion of institutional inertia seems unconvincing, especially in light of 
numerous reforms of fiscal rules in the aftermath of the financial crisis. There is at 
least one example during the Great Recession where fiscal policy choices and 
institutional reform were interdependent – namely the introduction of a debt brake in 
Germany.111 To tame his rebellious SPD coalition partner, Volker Kauder, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, followed the tested logic of package deals 
and threatened to vote against the second stimulus package if the debt brake was not 
introduced (FAZ 1.02.2009). Conversely, members of parliament (particularly SPD 
parliamentarians) who were in favour of a second stimulus package made their 
approval of the debt brake conditional on the passage of new discretionary measures 
(author interview, March 2011). Not only did negotiations on debt brakes and similar 
measures feature heavily in the political discourse of European crisis leaders, but 
there is also evidence that the majority of Member States have, at least on paper, 
improved their budgetary institutions. According to information provided in the 
2009-2010 Stability and Convergence Programme, 21 EU Member States have 
implemented and/or plan to implement changes in their respective system of fiscal 
governance (Ayuso-i-Casals 2010). The European Commission’s FRSI (European 
Commission 2012) indicates a jump from an average of .30 in 2009 to .58 in 2010. 
The phenomenon of fiscal governance reform is not restricted to EU Member States. 
Schaechter et al. (2012) provide an extensive survey of the adoption of new fiscal 
rules in response to the economic and financial crisis. Whereas in 1990, only five 
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110 Fiscal crises are however not a sufficient condition for institutional reform. Hallerberg (2004), for 
example, suggests that fiscal problems in Italy in the late 1970s and 1980s did not lead to meaningful 
reform due to limited competition amongst parties. Molander (2000) stresses that the fiscal crisis in 
Sweden in the 1990s did not automatically cause the institutional reform, but instead contributed to a 
general climate for reform.
111 The resulting cyclically-adjusted debt brake envisages a 0.35 per cent of GDP limit for federal 
government borrowing in normal times from 2016 onwards with a transition period starting in 2011 
and the Länder budgets are to be structurally balanced as of 2020 (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 
2013).
countries (Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Luxembourg and the United States) had fiscal 
rules in place that covered at least the central government level, the number of 
countries with national and/or supranational fiscal rules surged to 76 by end-March 
2012 (see also Schick 2009: 12).
How then to address the issue of endogeneity? There are two dominant strategies to 
circumvent the problem: taking the lag and instrumenting. Lavigne (2010) 
transforms the endogenous independent variables (rule of law, democratic 
accountability and inequality) by taking the average value of the past three years. A 
second approach would be to instrument the variable, for example with previous 
levels of its score and the debt level (Hallerberg et al. 2004). I instrument fiscal rules 
with its lagged value and test for weak instruments; the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-
statistic indicated that weak instruments need not be considered a problem for all 
estimations. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistics for overall identification allows 
for strong rejection of the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. In 
brief, the results suggest the model used is reliable. I then proceed to test for 
endogeneity in the instrumented variable, with results suggesting that endogeneity is 
not a problem in this analysis (see Table A5.2 in the Appendix). I therefore rely on 
the original, non-instrumented measure of fiscal rules. 
Fiscal rules during the Great Recession
The model used to examine the impact of fiscal rules during the Great Recession is 
as follows: 
"fiscal outcome =  # + $1L.GDP i,t + $2L.debt i,t + $3L.AS i,t  + $4Election i,t + 
$5Herfgov i,t + $6Herfopp i,t + $7Left i,t + $8Fisrulei,t + % i,t
The coefficient for the fiscal rules index (Fisrule) is not significant in any of the 
model specifications, as shown in Table 6.2. This finding echoes that of Poterba 
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(1995: 2), who argues that ‘while the budgetary institutions and political climate in a 
state may be determined by the same factors that influence the long-run choice of 
spending level, these factors may have less impact on the way states respond to fiscal 
stress’. Including the same variable in the model for the 1999 to 2007 period 
suggests that fiscal rules curbed fiscal policy outcomes in the EU (see Table A6.2). 
How then can we explain the insignificance of domestic fiscal rules in times of 
crisis? 
Insert Table 6.2 here
One explanation for the insignificant coefficient of the fiscal rules index takes into 
account the exceptionality provisions/escape clauses of existing fiscal rules.112 This 
means that even high scores on the fiscal rules index may be relatively meaningless, 
as rules do not fully apply in times of severe recession. The exceptionality provisions 
of fiscal rules are considered in the Commission’s questionnaires, which have 
‘exclusions from the coverage of the rule’ as one criterion. Yet the random weighting 
of the rule does not change if escape is sought, that is to say when the exceptionality 
clause applies. On the one hand, even the German debt brake, a self-proclaimed stern 
rule to be emulated across Europe (Merkel 2010), allows for exceptions in the event 
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112 The role of escape clauses in macroeconomic policy is to enable policy-makers to reap the 
advantages of following a rule on average, while still retaining some flexibility in defining policies in 
response to exceptional circumstances (Drazen 2000: 127). The inherent trade-off between flexibility 
and commitment poses the challenge of identifying the optimal level of commitment in a stochastic 
world. According to Larch et al. (2010: 23) not only the credibility but also the sustainability of a rule-
based system hinge on the existence of escape clauses that permit policy-makers to react to especially 
severe circumstances in times when compliance with rules is no longer a feasible option. As Elster 
(2000: 163) puts it, ‘tight constitutional self-binding may be incompatible with the flexibility of action 
required in crises’ – that is to say, a rule-based system should account for various eventualities that are 
outside the forecast for normal economic and/or political conditions. Otherwise, any political 
agreement will be forced to catch up with realities and its credibility, as well as sustainability, will be 
undermined by revisions.
of natural catastrophes and emergencies that are beyond the government’s control.113 
Likewise, the Swedish debt break is flexible; it allows room for counter-cyclical 
policy since the government can, if needed, run a structural deficit during a downturn 
provided it is offset by a correspondingly greater surplus during the next expansion 
(Fischer 2005). However the absence of exceptionality clauses does not necessarily 
mean that policy-makers are bound to the (too) restrictive fiscal rules of better times. 
In the UK, for example, existing rules – a golden rule114 and a debt ceiling (both 
holding over the economic cycle) – were not equipped with an exceptionality clause 
similar to the German one. As a result, existing British fiscal rules under the Code for 
Fiscal Stability have been put on hold during the economic crisis. In its November 
2008 Pre-Budget Report the UK government announced a temporary departure from 
its rules until 2015/16 and the implementation of a new temporary operating rule 
which requires the government ‘to improve the cyclically-adjusted current budget 
each year, once the economy emerges from the downturn, so it reaches balance and 
debt is falling as a proportion of GDP once the global shocks have worked their way 
through the economy in full’ (HM Treasury 2008: 4). The suspension of existing 
rules is reflected in the largest drop in the fiscal rules index since the start of the 
recording in 1990 for all 27 EU Member States (from a score of 2.06 in 2008 to -1.02 
in 2009). The Finnish and Slovak governments announced less drastic suspensions of 
budget rules during the crisis (European Commission 2011). Schick (2010: 3) 
identifies a broader trend here, noting that in many OECD countries ‘fiscal rules 
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113  The idea of a ‘German debt brake’ for Europe may be popular amongst politicians in Berlin, yet it 
bears little resemble to the actual dynamics of fiscal rules in Europe. To begin with, various countries 
had already adopted budget balance rules before 2008. In Spain for example, the general government 
and its sub-sectors were requested to show a balanced budget or a surplus (this rule covers 100 per 
cent of general government finances – far more than the 53 per cent covered by the German debt 
brake). Moreover, it was the European Commission that worried that existing fiscal rules were open 
‘to some accounting creativity’ (Public Finance in EMU 2007: 256). In light of Germany’s non-
compliance with the SGP and insufficient national rules, the Ecofin Council had previously repeatedly 
suggested the creation of a ‘national stability pact’ in order to boost compliance with the Maastricht 
criteria and to make the attainment of the Medium Term Objectives within the SGP framework more 
credible. See ‘Council opinion of 28 February 2000 on the updated stability programme of Germany 
for the period 1999 to 2003’ and ‘Council opinion of 27 November 2000 on the updated stability 
programme of Germany for the period 2000 to 2004’.
114 Critics argue that the Golden Rule, which Chancellor Gordon Brown set himself in 1997, was only 
met by ‘moving the goalpost’, that is adjusting the economic cycle to fit within the Golden Rule’s 
expenditure targets (IFS 2009: 82). 
have been vitiated, at least temporarily, by the global economic crisis’. This does not 
come as a surprise, especially in the context of executive crisis management 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Strong fiscal councils in charge of surveillance contribute positively to the FRSI, 
which is then thought to reduce deficits. However in times of crisis, when there is a 
convincing case to be made for expansive fiscal policy, fiscal watchdogs may 
advocate less and not more fiscal restraint, especially since they often also monitor 
stabilisation efforts. Calmfors (2012) analyses the interesting case of the Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council which was created in 2007; the watchdog has the authority to 
offer specific advice, in addition to evaluation of fiscal policies, employment and 
growth developments and monitoring how well the government explains its policies. 
In 2008 the Council considered that ‘the Government was then so heavily influenced 
by the doctrine that active use of discretionary fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool 
should normally be avoided that it failed to realise that the extraordinary 
circumstances motivated another stand’ (ibid. 15). The Council criticised government 
policy as harmful, especially given the comparatively strong position of Swedish 
public finances. Calmfors argues that, analogous to central bank independence in 
monetary policy, independent fiscal councils, by enhancing the credibility of sound 
public finances, increase the scope for activist fiscal policy in downturns; because 
‘the Council is less likely [than the government] to be suspected of having political 
motives for fiscal stimulus, which could lead to deficit bias, […] it could be freer to 
make recommendations on such stimulus in a downturn and this way increase the 
scope for efficient stabilisation policy’ (ibid.). Along similar lines, the corollary of 
effective fiscal rules may be an increase in fiscal space (European Commission 
2009). This could then lead governments to have more room for expansion in bad 
times and, accordingly, to implement larger stimulus packages. As such, this might 
suggest why strong fiscal rules, as in the case of Sweden, may lead to more and not 
less fiscal expansion.
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The preceding discussion suggests that the impact of fiscal rules on stimulus 
decisions is likely to be nuanced and contingent on a country’s specific economic 
and political profile as well as the particulars of fiscal rules. Crisis budgeting is, 
according to Schick (2009: 9) ‘inherently improvisational’. This means that ‘[r]ules 
and procedures are devised to accommodate the needs of the moment, and frequent 
adjustments are made along the way. Ad hockery is necessary because established 
procedures get in the way of dealing with the crisis, and new players are brought into 
the process (ibid.)’ It may well be that the FRSI employed in the empirical analysis 
does not accurately reflect either the ‘ad hockery’ of crisis budgeting or the variation 
of existing escape clauses. 
EU rules: the European Economic Recovery Plan and the Stability and Growth 
Pact
The EERP, discussed in the introductory chapter, represents a considerable shift for 
fiscal policy coordination in the EU. Particularly, this crisis agreement breaks away 
from former commitments to fiscal constraints and encourages stimulus spending 
across EU Member States to combat the worst financial crisis since the 1920s. I 
empirically test the impact of this agreement alongside the SGP by augmenting the 
sample size and including 5 OECD countries in the main model; Switzerland, 
Norway, Japan, Canada, Iceland and the United States.115 This inclusion makes it 
possible to ask whether countries which signed up to the EERP and are, at least in 
theory still subject to the SGP, adopted identifiably distinctive response strategies to 
the financial and economic crisis. Specifically, the variable EU takes the value 1 for 
all EU countries in the 2008 to 2010 period and 0 for the 5 non-EU OECD countries. 
Controlling for the economic climate and the political landscape, I would expect that 
EU Member States adopted larger stimulus programmes than their non-EU 
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115 These countries were selected based on their status as developed countries and data availability 
from AMECO. Related summary statistics can be found in Table A6.1 in the Appendix. 
counterparts, being spurred on by the creation of EERP and the flexible 
implementation of the SGP. Two related caveats apply. The first is that the EU 
variable is a crude, binary measure of any incentives stemming from this vague 
commitment. It could just as well measure EU membership per se or the underlying 
attitudes to government intervention, which may be different from Japan or the 
United States. Put simply, the variable is likely to capture much more than the EERP 
and the crisis-mode of the SGP. However in the absence of more sophisticated 
measurements, this empirical strategy is well established in the existing literature on 
the determinants of fiscal outcomes. The majority of empirical studies on the effect 
of EMU membership rely on similar dummies to capture the impact of various EU 
agreements.116 
A further caveat concerns the direction of causality; did the EERP impact on public 
finances or did public finances determine the content of the EERP? Did the explicit 
flexibility of the SGP cause fiscal outcomes, or did the fiscal positions of Member 
States lead to a system of greater flexibility? The majority of Member States 
announced their own national stimulus programmes prior to the launch of the EERP. 
Spain was the first country to implement stimulus policies in line with election 
promises in the spring of 2008 and announced new stimulus measures on 26 October  
(New York Times 27.10.2008). Germany announced its first stimulus package 
(Konjunkturpaket 1) three days later (FAZ 2008). The UK’s Chancellor of the 
Exchequer set out the UK’s anti-recession plan on 14 November (Financial Times 
14.11.2008) and the Italian government unveiled an !80bn fiscal package on 18 
November (New York Times 19.11.2008). Instead of forging an EU-wide coordinated 
economic stimulus, governments did not wait for the ‘green light from 
Brussels’ (author interview, April 2011) to simultaneously announce independently 
designed national fiscal policies in the winter of 2008-09. This raised concerns from 
former Eurogroup chair Jean-Claude Juncker who called for better European 
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116 On the ‘Maastricht effect’ and the ‘SGP effect’ see inter alia Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Busemeyer 
2004; Annett 2006; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2008.
economic coordination, worrying that ‘Member State after Member State is 
arranging its own plans and programmes’ (Euractiv 10.2.2009). Perhaps the 
relationship between the EERP and fiscal outcomes should best be modelled as bi-
directional. But in light of the large potential coverage of the EERP, multi-causality 
should be not much of a problem. After all, the dummy also provides a measurement 
of EU membership per se, which was (as of late 2013) not changed by the scope and 
design of stimulus programmes. 
Empirical results
The inclusion of the five non-EU OECD Member States results in a slight change in 
model specification. Due to data availability and different accounting standards from 
different institutions, the costs of the financial sector bailout as well as the size of 
automatic stabilisation are no longer included. The model used is as follows: 
"fiscal outcome =  # + $1L.GDP i,t + $2L.debt i,t + $3EU i,t  + $4Election i,t + 
$5Herfgov i,t + $6Herfopp i,t + $7Left i,t + % i,t
As can be seen from Table 6.3, the variable EU is not significant in any of the model 
specifications. To nuance the investigation I also included a dummy for eurozone 
membership first in the sample of EU and second in the sample of EU and non-EU 
countries. This is thought to capture the fact that the pressures for fiscal policy 
coordination are potentially greater for eurozone Member States than for eurozone 
outsiders (see chapter 2). Again the variable is not significant in any of the 
specifications (see Table A6.3 and A6.4 in the Appendix). These findings suggest that 
the EU’s fiscal agreements, be it under the EERP or under the SGP, did not influence 
fiscal outcomes during the Great Recession. Instead, stimulus spending as a response 
to the economic downturn seems to have been a default option for developed and, to 
a lesser extent, developing countries (Velde 2011). It would be a mistake to assume 
that just because Member States predominantly resorted to an increase in public 
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expenditure to combat recession that these policy choices were driven by EU-level 
incentives. This echoes the challenges of the claim that the Maastricht treaty brought 
about a period of fiscal consolidation by Member States eager to comply with the 
entry criteria for monetary union. Hercovitz and Strawczynski (2005: 822) for 
example, support Galí and Perotti’s view (2003) that government spending 
adjustment in the 1990s should be ‘characterized as an OECD phenomenon rather 
than as a phenomenon specific to countries participating in the Maastricht Treaty or 
the Stability and Growth Pact’.
Insert Table 6.3 here
As far as the strength of the separate and selective incentives at the EU-level goes, 
the insignificance of the EERP (EU) coefficient does not come as a surprise. Verdun 
and Heipertz (2010:189) describe the overall approach to fiscal policy coordination 
during the Great Recession as ‘one of pronounced national action and limited 
European coordination, the communication of which bordered on the meaningless’. 
Evaluating the impact of the EERP, virtually all Commission officials interviewed 
described it as an acknowledgement of Member States’ unilateral crisis policies; a 
‘salmagundi of national plans’ (author interview, April 2011) amounting to ‘what 
Member States were comfortable doing anyway’ (author interview, May 2011), 
‘merely stated the existing state of play’ (author interview, March 2011) and ‘merely 
rubber-stamped the policy initiatives that Member States had already in their 
pipelines’ (author interview, April 2011). This throws up the questions of why the 
EERP was launched in the first place and why the SGP was still applied. How can we 
reconcile the SGP’s survival with the creation of the EERP? 
Reconciling the EERP’s creation and the SGP’s survival
Schelkle (2012a: 377) argues that ‘the opening the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
[EDP] became less of a regulatory process than a weak substitute for binding fiscal 
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policy coordination’. Various interviewees supported this position: ‘for the 
Commission it was important to give at least a resemblance of normality and to go 
through the motions, no matter whether they would have an impact on public 
finances or not’ (author interview, May 2011). The opening of the EDP is not a sign 
of the SGP’s ‘resilience’ as Hodson (2010: 232) put it, but its inconsequentiality. 
During the Great Recession, as deficits were neither small nor temporary, 24 EDPs 
were opened. In setting and extending the deadline for correcting these excessive 
deficits, Member States gave themselves considerable room for manoeuvre in the 
face of ‘special circumstances’ and ‘unexpected adverse economic events’ (Article 
126.7). Since the initial (re)opening of the procedure, the already delayed deadlines 
for correcting an excessive deficit have been further set and frequently revised.117 
Prior to 2011 all decisions related to the SGP’s preventive and dissuasive arms were 
subject to unanimous voting. With all but three (Sweden, Estonia, and 
Luxembourg118) EU Member States in excessive deficits during the Great Recession, 
a scenario where sanctions would bite was deemed ‘absurd’ (author interview, May 
2011): ‘dogs do not eat dog’ (author interview, May 2011). What is more, the cost of 
sanctions is higher. Not only are sanctions more counter-productive for a country 
facing a major economic downturn, the possibility of retaliation also increases these 
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117 For example the initial deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in Spain was revised 
from 2012 to 2014. The ultimate impact of the EDP on public finances remains to be seen. One 
interviewee from within the Commission was however sceptical: ‘Nobody in the current climate 
[referring to the Sovereign Debt Crisis] reads the opinions on the stability programme as we moved 
from exit strategy to survival strategy’ (author interview, April 2011). Amidst the overall ‘extremely 
generous’ (author interview, May 2011) application of the EDP, the case of Greece stands out. Here 
the national government had little success in appeals to exception. After establishing an excessive 
deficit in April 2009 the Council decided, as of November 2012, to move to the next stage of the EDP 
procedure, four times giving notice under Article 121 (4) and reinforcing fiscal surveillance under 
Article 126(9). This represents the first time the two provisions have been applied together. Greece 
was the only country where the ‘exceptionality argument’ was not accepted; ‘the situation in Greece 
was a crisis on its own and had very little to do with the economic downturn’ (author interview, April 
2011). It was therefore argued that in 2009, ‘the Greek public finances have worsened much beyond 
what could have been expected to result from the downturn and the financial-sector support 
measures’ (COU 2010). The application of the dissuasive arm of the SGP points to the 
intergovernmental nature of the ‘appeal to exception’, which relies on the evaluation of the 
justificatory circumstances taking place in the Council. Given the spreading Sovereign Debt Crisis and 
the mounting evidence of fraudulent statistics, the general reasoning within the Council was ‘to come 
as hard down on the Greek government as possible, without making matters worse’ (author interview, 
August 2011).
118 Luxembourg however exceeded the 3 per cent threshold. Because the deficit was temporary and 
stayed close to the reference value no EDP was opened.
costs for a punishing country likely to breach the SGP. Anderson and Putterman 
(2006) as well as Carpenter (2007) have elicited a demand function for punishment 
by a systematic variation of the prices of punishment. These studies show that the 
law of demand holds: the quantity of punishment demanded is lower with a higher 
price. Following this argument one would expect the likelihood of sanctions under 
the EDP to decrease with an increase in cost. Furthermore, empirical research also 
suggests that the deliberative nature of fiscal policy coordination may precipitate a 
general environment of non-compliance. For instance, de Haan et al. (2003) show 
that the probability of eurozone Member States being sanctioned under the EDP is 
inversely related to the number of countries that breach the SGP. This could have a 
herd or contagion effect: ‘it is hard to imagine that Member States on the verge of 
breaching the deficit criterion sometime in the not so distant future will take a tough 
stance with regard to those countries that already have an excessive deficit’ (ibid. 
20). Steclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2007) reach a similar conclusion; in their 
game theoretical analysis of SGP compliance, they argue that if governments know 
that enough of them will not comply with the Pact and that they can constitute a 
blocking minority, compliance is unlikely. This means that if a large number of 
countries run high deficits simultaneously, it also weakens the incentives for other 
countries to comply with the SGP.
The tensions surrounding the suspension of the EDP in 2003 have shown that it may 
be politically more harmful to suspend the rules than it is to open an EDP with 
generous correction targets (Meyer 2004). Opting for an application of the SGP 
whilst specifically allowing for excessive deficit spending encouraged by the EERP, 
the Commission improved its relationship with Member States (author interviews, 
April and May 2011). Larch et al. (2010: 21) assume that if ‘the Commission had 
stubbornly insisted on the strict application of the Pact, including the ban of 
discretionary fiscal expansions, a severe confrontation with the Member States 
within the Council would have been very likely’. This echoes Howarth’s (2008: 42) 
assessment of the 2005 reform which ‘far from undermining the potential for 
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Commission leadership, may increase it by decreasing the potential for member-
government-Commission conflict’.
The 2005 reform, with a more lenient reading of exceptional circumstances, 
increased the Pact’s flexibility. In so doing, the reform legitimised the weak 
compliance with the SGP ex ante but hardly prepared for the storms ahead. Crucially, 
the flexibility introduced by the 2005 revision was not the type of flexibility needed 
to address serious unanticipated events (Larch et al. 2010: 5). Even though equipped 
with an escape clause, the SGP is ‘too cumbersome and retrospective in its 
procedures to permit an early and aggressive response to a major slump’ (Lane 2003: 
568). When the economic crisis spread throughout Europe, the SGP lacked specific 
provisions for excessive stimulus spending which would lead public finances further 
away from the criteria of ‘temporariness’ and ‘closeness’. The SGP was not equipped 
with a crisis-fit Sollbruchstelle, that is ‘the built-in capacity to self-correct and break 
down graciously’ (Lohmann 2003: 104), in exceptional times.
From the very beginning of the Great Recession, it became apparent that the vast 
majority of Member States considered EU rules to be void in extraordinary times.119 
Given the magnitude of the economic and financial crisis, many Member States ‘did 
not even see that their stimulus plans were at odds with EU legislation’ (author 
interview, April 2011).120 Notably the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the 
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119 This was not only true for the fiscal rules but also more broadly for State Aid law (see Andreangeli 
2012). Mirroring the unilateral design and implementation of the first stimulus spending in autumn 
2008, the Commission felt ignored with respect to competition policy. Thus undertaking the quick 
approval of state aid was not guided by the question of whether or not Member States ‘are throwing 
money out of their windows or whether a particular measure could have done more effectively, but 
solely, whether or not this measure would have a distortional effect on the internal market’ (author 
interview, April 2011). In approving state aid, DG Competition was not concerned with guiding fiscal 
policy or limiting wasteful public spending (author interview, March 2011). Given that the 
Commission feared that the Council might decide to put state aid regulation on hold for the duration 
of the financial crisis, there was a palpable incentive within the Commission to act quickly and present 
a flexible framework (author interview, March 2011, see also Reuters 4.12.2008). In so doing the 
Commission was conscious of not putting too many restrictions in the temporary crisis framework, 
out of fear that ‘Member States would not listen to it in the first place’ (author interview, March 2011). 
120 See also Francois Fillon, then Prime Minister of France, who stated that ‘the stability allows 
[deficit spending] because it foresees that in exceptional circumstances one can go beyond 3 per 
cent’ (quoted in Barber 2008b). 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy published a joint letter calling for stimulus 
programmes across the EU, justified by exceptional circumstances as provided for in 
the SGP (Merkel and Sarkozy 2008). These packages were seen to be ‘the 
responsibility of the national governments’ (ibid.) and should be coordinated in the 
Council. The role of the Commission in fiscal policy coordination was not 
mentioned. Given these signals and the unilateral announcements of national 
stimulus plans, the Commission thought that ‘it was running behind the train’ (author 
interview, April 2011). With member states deciding unilaterally how to read and 
apply the Pact in times of exceptional crisis, the Commission saw a need to respond. 
According to one interviewee, without these national crisis responses ‘we [the 
Commission] would never have voluntarily recommended any fiscal stimulus 
[breaching the SGP] at all’ (author interview, March 2013). The EERP was therefore 
an attempt to ‘get back behind the steering wheel’ (author interview, April 2011); it 
created an ad-hoc Sollbruchstelle to excuse non-compliance.
Hence, the EERP was above all an institutionally strategic policy choice for the 
Commission. Crucially, the Commission considers the SGP as ‘hard law’, that is, 
‘legally binding obligations that are precise’ (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Based on this 
understanding ‘the problem was not whether countries actually needed stimulus 
policies, but that according to the [rules] it was simply not allowed. Inasmuch the 
EERP was an attempt to make the impossible possible’ (author interview, May 2011). 
The creation of the EERP and the survival of the SGP were deliberate political 
decisions that were taken, above all else, to justify preceding fiscal policy choices. 
As such the statistical insignificance of the EERP coefficient should be viewed in 
these terms.
Market discipline
Given the role of financial market participants in the on-going Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
the inclusion of market discipline as a constraint on public finances is an obvious 
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choice. As was briefly discussed in chapter three, the literature on market discipline 
has considered both market signals as a response to fiscal policy changes, and 
governments’ responsiveness to these signals. Further complicating the relationship 
between market punishment and government responsiveness is the fact that 
borrowers may anticipate an increase in borrowing costs and adjusting policies 
accordingly, see Figure 6.1. This anticipatory mechanism does appear to be at work 
for example in the UK’s austerity policies, despite low borrowing costs (Corsetti 
2012).121 The majority of empirical studies point to a significant effect of market 
punishment for ‘excessive’ fiscal policy. In other words, ‘excessive’ public finances 
are modelled as a determinant of a country’s borrowing conditions (i.e. market’s risk 
pricing). However for this study I consider market discipline as one of Olson’s 
separate and selective incentives. I am therefore not primarily interested in whether 
or how strongly market participants react to fiscal policy outcomes, but in the 
response of governments to market punishment.
Insert Figure 6.1 here
Quantifying market discipline
Interest measures the current debt servicing costs (see Table 6.1 for summary 
statistics).122 It is measured as the interest payments as percentage of GDP. 
Surprisingly a (variant of the) debt-servicing variable is comparatively infrequently 
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121 This pre-emptive strategy has been notably criticised by Martin Wolf (Financial Times 27.5.2010), 
who argued against ‘giving the markets what we think they may want in future – even though they 
show little sign of insisting on it now’.
122 The independent variable measuring the ‘market punishment effect’ (e.g. change in interest rates/
debt servicing costs) is included only in its linear form; the square of the same variable is not 
included. I tested for the inclusion of the quadratic transformations as well as the log transformation of 
Interest to account for the potentially non-linear relationship between interest penalties and fiscal 
outcomes. Government reaction to higher interest rates is likely to display nonlinearities in the sense 
that the severity of the punishment may increase borrower’s responsiveness. If however a certain 
threshold is reached at which the solvency is put into question, then it is possible that market 
punishment may lead to deterioration in the budgetary position. Testing the misspecification of the 
functional form, the regression equation specification tests (see Ramsey 1969) reject the use of 
quadratic, cubic and log forms of the variable Interest. As such, I model market punishment as a linear 
relationship.
featured in studies on the determinants of fiscal policy. One exception is Hallerberg 
et al. (2007) who for example argue that the ‘debt servicing costs capture the impact 
of interest payments as well as political pressures that might emerge from high levels 
of interest payments on governments’. Yet their empirical analysis on the impact of 
fiscal governance institutions in 15 EU Member States from 1985–2004 shows that 
high debt servicing costs lead to higher deficits. Given the substantial size of most 
government debt burdens, even small variations in bond prices may entail significant 
real costs for taxpayers, as well as political costs for governments (see Manganelli et 
al. 2009). However, reactions of the financial markets translate only slowly into 
higher debt servicing costs, as higher interest rates are only to be paid for newly 
issued debt (Somogyi 2006). Although the residual maturity of debt in the eurozone 
converged prior to the financial and economic crisis, notably with high-debt 
countries seizing the opportunity to expand long-term financing at a cheaper cost 
(Wolswikij and de Haan 2005), there is still (and increasingly so) considerable 
variation in the average debt maturity structure of the government bond market 
(Lojsch et al. 2011). Government reactions to such market punishment are then 
likely to be delayed and contingent on the country specific maturity structure of 
sovereign borrowing as well as broader issues of debt management more broadly. 
Hence, actual interest payments are the measurement of choice to capture market 
punishment. The empirical model used is as follows:
"fiscal outcome =  #  + $1L.GDP i,t + $2L.debt i,t + $3L.AS i,t  + $4Bailouti,t + 
$5Election i,t + $6Herfgov i,t + $7Herfopp i,t + $8Left i,t  + 
$9Interest + % i,t
The econometric techniques used and tests carried out are identical to those 
described in the previous chapter. Adding the interest variable to the main model, I 
find strong evidence for government responsiveness to market signals (Table 6.4). 
The results suggest that the responsiveness of governments is not contingent on the 
degree of discretion of their policy measures. The coefficients for Interest in the BB, 
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PB, PSB are statistically not different from one another. Overall the empirical results 
suggest that market punishment has constrained national governments in their fiscal 
response strategies. Notably, this incentive takes the form of rewards for an 
improvement in the budgetary position and increasing borrowing costs in the case of 
deterioration in public finances. This means that market punishment is only an 
incentive against stability free-riding, not growth free-riding.
Insert Table 6.4 here
Robustness tests
Again, the market discipline hypothesis has two sides. The first stipulates that 
financial markets react to fiscal policy outcomes; the second argues that policy-
makers react to changes in financial market indicators. This twin logic means that 
causality is difficult to establish and raises concerns over simultaneity and 
consequently, the endogeneity of the regressor and heterogeneous dynamic of the 
error term. The vast majority of studies consider only one side of the MDH and often 
fail to address the contemporaneous feedback effects between rising interest rates/
payments and fiscal policy choices; not considering the feedback effect might lead to 
misleading conclusions. To rule out the endogeneity of market punishment I 
instrumented the interest rates variable with its t-1 lagged value. The instrument was 
found to be correlated with the endogenous regressors and uncorrelated with the 
structural error term. The null hypothesis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is that the 
coefficient estimates of the standard regression model and the instrumental variables 
model are both consistent and do not differ. As shown in Table A5.2 of the Appendix, 
the null cannot be rejected at standard significance levels, suggesting that 
endogeneity is not a problem in this case.
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Market discipline and EMU membership
Existing studies suggest that there are important differences in market discipline 
between non-eurozone and eurozone EU Member States, without necessarily 
agreeing on their implications. The literature on market discipline in the EMU can be 
categorised broadly into two groups: upgrading and downgrading. The first group 
argues that monetary union weakens market discipline, but improves EMU Member 
States borrowing conditions. The second group assumes that monetary union 
strengthens market discipline, and leads to a deterioration of EMU Member States’ 
borrowing conditions, downgrading countries that, similar to developing countries, 
borrow in a ‘foreign currency’ and therefore suffer from ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen 
and Hausmann 2005).
In the upgrading literature, there is evidence that the forces of market discipline were 
weakened in the wake of monetary union. According to Eichengreen (2009) ‘life for 
small European countries is more comfortable inside the euro area than outside’ as 
being part of a liquid eurozone-wide market in euro-denominated bonds sheltered 
them from strong market discipline. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) find support 
for the ‘convergence trade’ hypothesis for the pre-2007 period, according to which 
market participants were assuming the best-case scenario of full convergence to 
German fundamentals, even for countries with a clear deterioration of their macro-
fundamentals.123 Bernoth et al. (2004) ascertain that the liquidity risk premium, 
which reflects the risk that an investor might not be able to liquidate his investment 
within an expected time period, is reduced with EMU membership (for similar 
findings see Faini 2005). What is more, prior to the Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2009, 
eurozone Member States have had a lower default risk premium than they had had 
before joining EMU. These findings suggest that ‘markets may anticipate fiscal 
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123 Convergence of bond yields should not be equated to the absence of market discipline; although 
market pressure was low prior to 2008, pressure did exist and spread in basis points further reflected 
different evaluations of domestic fiscal institutions (Hallerberg and Wolff 2008).
support for EMU countries in financial distress’ – despite the No-Bail-Out clause of 
the Maastricht Treaty (Bernoth et al. 2004: 18). Furthermore, Bernoth and Wolff 
(2008) present evidence that both deficits and creative accounting are penalised less 
in EMU by financial market participants.
Conversely, the downgrading literature argues that the responsiveness of borrowers 
increases in a monetary union. First, governments can no longer print their own 
money as a means of repayment, which renders fiscal consolidation more important 
as a policy choice to address growing debt burdens. Second, market participants may 
be more wary of unsustainable fiscal policies because default risks are higher in the 
absence of debt monetisation (Favero et al. 2000; Missale 2001; Antzoulatos and 
Klinaki 2002). This ‘original sin’ sentiment is echoed by a fund manager asked about 
the implications of monetary union in Mosley’s (2003) study on the relationship 
between government and financial markets after EMU: ‘There is no default risk 
when the government runs its own printing presses, so the risks associated with 
bonds will change with EMU’ (ibid. 193).124 Given that default is often an abrupt and 
unpredictable event for investors, markets favour debt monetisation as means to 
reducing the burden of a high public debt: ‘the high probability of a low impact event 
(a bit of inflation) is not equivalent to the low probability of a high impact event 
(default)’ (Gross 2012:42). 
To investigate whether eurozone governments are more responsive than non-
eurozone governments, I interact the Interest variable with a eurozone dummy. 
Results are presented in Table 6.5. The findings suggest that eurozone governments 
are more responsive to market signals125, confirming the downgrading view of 
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124 Generally applied, this point is nonsensical. Governments around the world have defaulted despite 
having their own printing presses (Rogoff and Reinhart 2011). Since 1997, 20 sovereign states 
defaulted: Mongolia, Venezuela, Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador (twice), Turkey, Ivory Coast, 
Argentina, Moldova, Paraguay, Uruguay, Domenica, Cameroon, Grenada, Dominican Republic, 
Belize, Seychelles and Jamaica (Financial Times 1.10.2011).
125 In all models presented in Table 6.5 the coefficients capturing market discipline are statistically 
different from one another. 
existing studies. This is in line with Rommerskirchen (2013b), which analyses the 
dynamics of market discipline for all 27 EU Member States between 1996 and 2012. 
This study finds evidence in favour of both market reaction to excessive deficits and 
government responsiveness to market signals. Notably, both mechanisms are found 
to be stronger for eurozone Member States. 
Insert Table 6.5 here
Overcoming group latency
Again the main premise of the provision of separate and selective incentives is that 
they can turn a collective-action situation in which cooperation is irrational into one 
in which collective action is rational. Investigating three sources of separate and 
selective incentives, it seems that only market discipline has a statistically significant 
effect on fiscal policy outcomes and by proxy, on group oriented behaviour. The 
‘superiority’ of market discipline to overcome group latency can be found in three 
features, which are problematised in the literature. First, market discipline in contrast 
to domestic fiscal rules or EU-level agreements relies both on punishment and 
rewards. Second, market discipline is not burdened by second-order free-rider 
problems (see below). Thirdly, and related to the second feature, market discipline 
does not rely on decentralised incentives and therefore does not face the 
implementation problems associated with self-regulation. 
Carrots and sticks
The asymmetry of EMU’s fiscal rules has been a matter of discussion ever since the 
1990s. Larch (2010) points out that there are alarm bells and sanctions if countries 
breach (or fail to converge to) the deficit and debt reference values, but there are no 
rewards for doing better than this. This has frequently been referred to the ‘all sticks 
and no carrots’ problem (Bean 1998). The implicit carrot for well-behaved EU 
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Member States, that they have room for the automatic stabilisers to operate freely 
during downturns without being hit by the stick of sanctions, was apparently not 
‘tasty’ enough (Buti van den Noord 2003: 740).126 What is more, ‘the carrot of entry 
has been eaten while the stick of exclusion has been replaced by the threat of 
uncertain and delayed sanctions’ (ibid. 741)’. This is true for both current eurozone 
Member States as well as those without ambitions to join the currency union. 
However the ‘carrot of entry’ may still motivate other Member States seeking to 
adopt the euro. Estonia is an interesting case in point; during the Great Recession its 
government implemented radical budget adjustments of approximately 9 per cent of 
GDP. This considerable consolidation effort was motivated and justified by the 
Maastricht 3 per cent budget criterion. The adoption of the euro was explicitly 
recognised as ‘an award or compensation for all the efforts’ (Jogiste et al. 2012: 
193). Similarly, Raudla and Kattel (2011) argue that ‘the prospect of joining the 
euro-zone made the political actors more willing to inflict pain through austerity 
measures, in the hope that the arrival of the euro would compensate the painful 
measures in the eyes of the electorate’. To this end, two budget analysts reported on a 
weekly basis to the senior management of the Ministry of Finance on the current 
position of state finances vis-à-vis the 3 per cent Maastricht criterion. (Jorgiste et al. 
2012: 190). The Estonian case suggests that EMU entry as a ‘vincolo 
esterno’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1997) can still impose an external constraint for 
economic discipline. It remains to be seen whether the Sovereign Debt Crisis has 
rendered the carrot less appetising (e.g. Epstein and Johnson 2010).
Using the public good game as a testing ground, numerous studies have analysed the 
suitability of sanctions or rewards to overcome collective action problems (e.g. Fehr 
and Gachter 2000; Masclet et al. 2003). In general punishments to deviators and 
rewards to compliers are said to increase levels of cooperation (e.g. Ledyard 1995). 
There is no clear consensus on whether or not rewards or punishment offer superior 
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126 A similar asymmetry applies to domestic fiscal rules, whose compliance triggers no additional 
reward other than the benefit of fiscal space.
incentives for collective action. Early analyses tend to argue that in general rewards 
change people’s behaviour more effectively than punishments (e.g. Krasner 1971), 
however a more recent wave of studies predominantly argues that in direct 
comparisons, punishment is more successful than rewards in fostering cooperation. 
Sefton et al. (2007) show that rewards seem to be less suitable for sustaining high 
levels of cooperation, as the decay of contributions over time is faster with the 
‘reward option’ than with the ‘punishment option’. In other words, using the carrot is 
said to be less efficient for enhancing cooperation in a group than the stick. Fehr and 
Gachter (2000) obtain a similar result, showing that punishment is more effective 
than reward in mitigating the free-rider problem (see also Sutter et al. 2010). 
Based on this more recent body of evidence, the fact that fiscal policy coordination 
amongst EU Member States relies on non-monetary (peer pressure) and in theory 
monetary (fines under the EDP for eurozone Member States) punishment but not 
rewards, should prima facie not weaken the incentives available.127 Yet, Andreoni et 
al. (2003) argue that both rewards and punishment should be available as incentives 
to increase group-oriented behaviour. Rewards and punishments are seen as 
complementary to one another; based on a series of two person proposer-responder 
games,128 they show that when devising incentive systems, the absence of a reward is 
not equivalent to a punishment. Thus it is important that both tools be present. In a 
similar vein, Sefton et al. (2007) show that allowing for both punishment and reward 
leads to higher contributions than punishment alone. The carrots and sticks of market 
discipline are inseparable from one another. They are, in essence, two sides of the 
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127 Both monetary and non-monetary punishments are found to increase levels of cooperation, the 
former slightly outperforming the later (e.g. Masclet and Penard 2003).
128 Specifically the authors examine punishments and rewards both separately and jointly. Proposers 
choose how much to share of a fixed pie. Responders are given one of the following four options: 
punish and/or reward, reward only, punish only, or neither. By looking at rewards and punishments 
both separately and jointly the authors are able to discern interaction or complementarity. The findings 
indicate that rewards alone are relatively ineffective in moving the pie-share offer away from the most 
selfish one possible. Second, punishments improved cooperation by eliminating extremely selfish 
offers, pushing proposers in the Stick treatment to modest degrees of cooperation. Thirdly, in the 
Carrot-Stick treatment the offer was the most generous one possible, often leading to rewards by 
responders. Even though generous offers were not punished, such offers appeared only when the 
options of punishments existed.
same coin. These studies then suggest that market discipline, which is thought to 
reward and punish fiscal policy choices via interest rates adjustments, is a superior 
incentive. 
Second-order free-riding
The choice of a pure punishment strategy for fiscal policy coordination in the EU 
makes sense if we think of separate and selective incentives as additional public 
goods that need to be provided by the group. This creates the problem of second-
order free-riding. Here, some group members do not contribute to the provision of 
incentives (reward or punishment), but if the incentive is able to induce group-
oriented behaviour, they are able to benefit from the provision by other group 
members. Instead of solving the initial collective action problem (e.g. why should the 
individual not cross the picket line?) a new one appears (e.g. why should anyone beat  
up the persons who cross the picket line?) (Elster 1985: 146). Oliver (1980) first 
scrutinised how the use of a selective incentive to motivate others to act collectively 
is itself a form of collective action. The starting point is the idea that selective 
incentives must affect the decisions of all players in the situation. Positive and 
negative selective incentives are given to different people with rewards are given to 
those who cooperate and punishments to those who defect. The cost of providing a 
given reward is an increasing function of the number that cooperate, but a decreasing 
function for punishment. As a result, negative incentives are cheaper to use the more 
successful they are at inducing cooperation. In the ideal scenario, punishment creates 
a situation where everyone cooperates and this negative incentive does not have to be 
used at all. Its only cost is that of a threat. ‘Thus negative incentives are often less 
costly than positive ones when unanimous cooperation is sought’ (ibid. 1368). This is 
the case for fiscal policy coordination. All Member States are expected to comply 
with the SGP, and all Member States are expected to stimulate their economies, 
albeit to different degrees under the EERP. A similar logic holds for domestic fiscal 
rules, where all sub-sectors of the regional and federal governments are required to 
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comply. In brief, a pure punishment strategy is more cost-efficient in the context of 
fiscal policy coordination. 
That being said, the problem of second-order free-riding still poses a problem for the 
implementation of negative incentives. Why should the leader of one country vote in 
favour of a fine for the leader of a country violating fiscal agreements? Particularly 
in the context of package deals and issue linkages (Weber and Wiesmeth 1991), 
where trade-offs of benefits and costs are sought over different issues areas, voting 
on the EDP became quickly a vote about more than just compliance with the SGP. 
Voting was regarded as a ‘matter of diplomacy’ (author interview, June 2011). In 
contrast to EU rules, the incentives offered by market discipline are not subject to 
second-order free-riding. This is due first to the fact that market discipline is no 
second-order public good. The main purpose of market discipline is not rewarding 
and punishing sovereign borrowers. Market discipline is instead a by-product of risk 
pricing. In other words, what is referred to in this thesis as market punishment is not 
the result of a normative or pedagogical agenda of market participants, but instead, 
first and foremost, the result of any portfolio model with standard preferences for 
risk and return. Put crudely, market discipline is therefore primarily concerned with 
supply-and-demand, not crime and punishment.129 It follows that in contrast to 
punishment and reward options amongst members of a latent group, there are no 
additional costs for production of market punishment and rewards.
The limits of self-regulation
The second, closely related reason why market discipline does not suffer from 
second-order free-riding is that it is an external source of punishment and reward. As 
such it is not provided within the group facing coordination problems. External, also 
called centralised, institutions are shown to improve cooperation in common-pool 
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129 I owe this point to Waltraud Schelkle. 
problems (e.g. Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and Gächter 2000). In Baland and Platteau’s 
words (1999: 345) external sanction systems are usually necessary ‘to make up for 
several deficiencies of decentralized punishment mechanisms, whether the latter are 
embodied in strategies of conditional co-operation or involve payoff transfers among 
agents’. Given the reciprocal nature of sanctions in the Council, it is no surprise that 
no fines were ever agreed upon. The de facto suspension of the EDP since 2003 has 
cast doubt over the assumption that ‘self-governance is possible’ in EU fiscal policy 
coordination (Ostrom et al. 1992).130 The politicised fiscal surveillance amongst EU 
Member States has been frequently described by observers as ‘turkeys deciding on 
the menu for Christmas’ (Schelkle 2009: 835), ‘[coming] close to asking turkeys to 
vote for Christmas (Begg 2003: 3), and ‘like asking the turkey what we have for 
Christmas dinner’ (Eijffinger 2004). Game-theoretical accounts of collective action 
stress that players seek to assess the intention of the other players. Consequentially 
they are said to be prone to reward players that intend to reward them and they are 
inclined to punish players that intend to punish them (Gürerk et al. 2006). In 
addition, Nikiforakis (2008) shows by means of a public good experiment that, in the 
presence of counter-punishment opportunities, co-operators are less willing to punish 
free riders. It follows that they are also, as in the case of the SGP, likely to refrain 
from punishing other ‘players’ who have previously not punished them or are in the 
future not likely to punish them for transgressing. In the case of market discipline 
there is no immediate possibility for retaliation, as market participants are not group 
members. Although governments can restrict and, to a certain extent, shape 
borrowing conditions (for example via financial repression; Reinhart et al. 2011), the 
relationship between sovereign borrowers and financial markets is not reciprocal. 
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130 Perhaps the most glaring example of the weak post-crisis application of the Pact can be seen in 
Ecofin’s decision in June 2007 to close an EDP against Greece despite ‘what transpired to be, 
widespread inaccuracies in the country’s official statistics’ (Hodson 2012: 58).
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the effectiveness of different incentives to motivate group-
oriented behaviour. Based on the empirical findings, domestic fiscal rules did not 
impact on the fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession. Similarly, E(M)U’s 
fiscal agreements, the proxy for the SGP and the newly created EERP, did not impact 
on fiscal policy choices. In contrast to these fiscal rules and intergovernmental 
agreements, the incentives provided by market discipline are found to steer public 
finances. Importantly, this effect is stronger for eurozone Member States, whose 
fiscal policy choices in the absence of debt monetization are viewed more critical by 
financial market participants. 
These findings do not come as a surprise. First, the majority of domestic fiscal rules 
were equipped with exceptionality clauses. Consequently, they did not impose stern 
constraints on fiscal policy choices in times of crisis. And even where those escape 
clauses were not in place, policy-makers – in the mode of executive crisis 
management – loosened the rules to enable them to mitigate the economic fallout. 
Empirically, this is problematic for the strength of the Commission’s FRSI. One the 
one hand, a lawful evocation of an escape clause did not show up as a change in the 
fiscal rules index. However on the other, a suspension of existing rules, as in the case 
of the UK, did lead to a deterioration in the FRSI. The result in terms of fiscal 
outcomes may nevertheless be similar. Put simply, a given score in the fiscal rules 
index in good economic times is not automatically equivalent to the same score in 
bad economic times when exceptionality clauses are evoked. To better investigate the 
impact of fiscal rules in times of crisis it would be interesting to develop an index 
that takes into account the evocation and scope of exceptionality clauses.
Secondly, the role of EU rules and agreements in shaping fiscal policy choices has 
been placed under scrutiny ever since the creation of the SGP; the history of the 
SGP matters. Accounts of collective action tend to be pessimistic with regards the 
possibility of group-oriented behaviour in the case of anonymous and infrequent 
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interactions. The coordination of fiscal stimulus policies should be seen against a 
backdrop of a patchy first decade for fiscal policy coordination in the EU, which 
imparted the impression that agreements on fiscal matters were not binding. The 
choice of ‘right’ fiscal policies remains contested among EU Member States and 
ultimately they responded to the crisis in a way that ‘suited governments’ (author 
interview, April 2011), but which had ‘nothing’ (author interview, April 2011) or 
‘very little’ (author interview, August 2011) to do with EU agreements. The vague 
commitments under the EERP and the generous implementation of the EDP further 
speak to the reluctance of sovereign policy-makers to coordinate fiscal policy in 
times of crisis. The recovery plan did not establish an ‘agreed rule of the game in the 
macroeconomic sphere that constrain, or determine, at least some instruments of 
macroeconomic policy’ which then can ‘be regarded as a form of policy 
coordination’ (Currie et al. 1989: 14). Member states did not ‘pursue different 
policies than they would have chosen had policy-making been unilateral’ (Webb 
1995: 11).
In contrast to budgetary rules and the EERP, market discipline offers both negative 
and positive incentives, via a change in the borrowing costs. Ideally, sound public 
finances are rewarded, whilst unsustainable budgetary positions are punished. There 
is evidence that this diversification of incentives may increase government 
responsiveness. Perhaps more importantly, market discipline is not subject to the 
second-order free riding problem and is not a decentralised incentive provided within 
the collective action group. Markets do not punish governments to prompt budgetary 
consolidation; market punishment is instead a by-product of risk pricing. 
Market participants’ punishment points to an alternative explanation for the creation 
of the EERP. Mosley (2000) presents the use of the Maastricht convergence criteria 
as a case where governments influenced financial market behaviour.131 She (ibid. 
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131A similar point is made in Schuknecht (2004: 19).
752) argues that by setting the deficit ceiling of 3 per cent, policy-makers established 
the very criteria by which they were later judged:
Prior to the mid-1990s, market participants took a “less is better” view of government budget 
deficits: four per cent was better than 5 per cent, and 5 per cent was better than 6 per cent. They 
did not expect governments to meet a specific deficit target or to do so by a particular date. The 
Maastricht recommendations served as a specification – and an ‘above or below 3 per cent’ 
dichotomization—of an otherwise fuzzy concept.
So far the EERP has only been considered as an internal signalling device; important 
to convey to other Member States the need for stimulus policies and for creating a 
system of fiscal rules that was compatible with the economic fallout of the Great 
Recession. Yet, is it possible that the EERP was in part created to provide a ‘judging 
yardstick’ similar to that of the Maastricht criteria? Whereas numerous interviews 
pointed to the role of financial market participants in curbing government spending 
during the financial and economic crisis, only one interviewee linked market 
punishment to the creation of the EERP: ‘in times of crisis when there is big 
uncertainty on parts of the market and lack of information, having something like the 
EERP […] played a positive role’ (author interview, March 2011). An interesting 
direction for future research might be to investigate the relationship between EMU’s 
old and new fiscal rules and market discipline by paying particular attention to the 
various numerical thresholds set in those rules.
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CHAPTER 7: FREE-RIDING – STABILITY AND GROWTH 
Introduction
The preceding chapters have described how EU Member States’ stimulus packages 
varied considerably, depending not only on a country’s economic situation, but also 
on a host of other ‘political’ factors. These findings suggest that the coordination of 
fiscal response strategies to the crisis may be hampered by a high degree of group 
latency. Latent groups face difficulties in managing collective action, which 
subsequently gives rise to concerns about free riding. In economic terms, free-riding 
refers to a collectively produced good being used by a group member without 
contributing his share in producing it. This becomes a problem if free-riding has a 
negative impact on the production of this public good. In the context of fiscal policy 
coordination, free-riding behaviour can be divided into stability free-riding and 
growth free-riding. The previous chapter suggests that stability free-riding was 
punished by the existence of separate and selective incentives in the form of market 
discipline. However there is no evidence for the working of other incentives to limit 
growth free-riding. Whereas markets punished Member States for deficit spending by  
imposing higher debt servicing costs, neither fiscal rules, be they EU or domestic in 
nature, nor market participants, disciplined policy-makers that failed to stimulate the 
national economy. 
This bias is interesting given that prior to 2010 the discourse on free-riding (or 
beggar-they-neighbour strategies) focused predominantly on growth free-riding. For 
example, Wyplosz (2009) warns that ‘[given] the high degree of trade integration 
within the EU, the danger of free-riding is acute’. Is this concern justified? At first 
glance it seems that the answer is yes. According to the ECB measurement of 
stimulus spending in 11 EU Member States did not meet the EERP call to implement 
fiscal packages of 1.2 per cent of GDP. According to my own comparison of data 
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available (chapter two), I suggest that the figure should realistically read 9 Member 
States – still a third of the total. Given that Member States agreed on the 1.2 per cent 
only after most had already designed their national stimulus plans, this high figure is 
noteworthy.
To put this figure into context, this penultimate chapter will analyse the evidence for 
and against free-riding behaviour relying on qualitative, quantitative and qualitative 
comparative methods. The next section will briefly present the political climate of 
(alleged) fiscal free-riding during the Great Recession, reviewing some of the main 
accusations and defences. In the second section, I will test two of the main 
characteristics of free-riding states as presented in the literature (see chapter three): 
trade openness and economic/political power. Given the small sample size of this 
study I will do so by relying on fuzzy Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fQCA). The 
results based on fuzzy set analysis suggest that larger and more open economies had 
more substantial stimulus programmes, despite their greater ability to free-ride. The 
third part of this chapter considers fiscal response strategies in relation to a country’s 
fiscal space. To do so, the concept of fiscal space is first introduced before an 
original composite indicator based on the EU’s Excessive Imbalances Procedure 
(EIP) is proposed. Results show that by and large Member States stimulated their 
economies in line with their fiscal room for manoeuvre, as laid out in the EERP. 
These findings are contrasted with the political discourse of late 2008 and 2009 when 
accusations of (particularly German) growth free-riding were wide-spread. 
Fiscal free-riding
The EERP (2008) stipulates that stimulus policies had to be targeted towards the 
source of economic difficulties with measures that supported businesses, labour 
markets, investment activities, and households' purchasing power (including 
vulnerable groups). For national policy-makers the spending target clearly had one 
additional dimension that is, naturally, not mentioned in the EERP; their electorate. 
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The political discourse on discretionary spending does not even attempt to conceal 
potential conflicts of the clear national stimulus targets with the principles of the 
internal market and more elusive notions of European solidarity, which are evoked in 
the EERP. During the parliamentary debate on the 2009 stimulus package in Austria, 
for instance, the Socialist (SPÖ) parliamentarian Gerald Klug (2008), warned ‘in 
order that we do not repeat mistakes of the past, the stimulus package should 
exclusively focus on measures that work domestically’. Similar concerns could be 
heard from the erstwhile CDU shooting star Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg who 
demanded that ‘our stimulus package should secure jobs in Germany and not jobs in 
the Far East’ (Reuters 26.01.2009). This nationalistic nature (e.g. welfare 
protectionism, Morris 1997) is inherent in public spending regardless of the 
underlying economic conditions. The aim of fiscal policy is to promote the welfare 
of those contributing to it, and in the absence of a ‘European demos’ (Marquand 
2011, see also Cram 2012) or a ‘EU taxman’ this erects easily identifiable goalposts 
for public spending. In the context of the crisis, with the state in charge of ‘a major 
injection of purchasing power into the economy’ (EERP 2008) – or as one 
interviewee put it prompting the ‘renaissance of industrial policy’ (author interview, 
May 2011) – the discriminatory potential of public spending becomes more apparent. 
The latter point calls to mind Gourevitch’s ‘visibility of hard times’ (see Chapter 1).  
This was especially the case with respect to large-scale subsidies to the automobile 
industry. One of the most blatant cases of nationalist intervention could be found in 
the plan of then French President Sarkozy to support the French car manufacturer 
Renault under the condition that it repatriated production from Slovenia in early 
2009. Unimpressed with criticism, Sarkozy announced that if the French government 
gave ‘financial aid to the automotive industry we [the government] do not want them 
to set up a factory in the Czech Republic again’ (Rippert 2009). He furthermore 
urged the carmakers to support French industries involved in supplying parts and 
services to French automobile manufacturers (Financial Times 4.02.2009). Along 
similar lines the German government’s rescue package for Opel raised concerns 
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about possibly discriminatory protection of jobs in German plants. The then acting 
EU Council president, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, warned of a 
‘protectionist race’ in Europe, whilst the then Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik 
Reinfeldt, whose country assumed the rotating EU presidency after the Czech 
Republic, said that he was ‘very worried at the growing tide of protectionist 
economic measures in Europe’ (euractiv 10.02.2009). 
The majority of stimulus policies can hardly be considered an outright violation of 
the principles of the common market. Protectionism and nationalism often overlap. 
The surge in soft protectionism via investment policy measures aimed at keeping 
demand and capital at home went largely unsanctioned under the crisis framework 
for competition policy. It is important to point out that in the EU as well as in the 
global economy, the financial crisis has not resulted in a widespread increase in 
protectionism via tariff policies, – although evidence with regards the magnitude of 
the rise in protectionism during the Great Recession is patchy (e.g. Baldwin 2009; 
Bown and Crowley 2012). 
It is to be expected that stimulus programmes funded by national means would 
benefit those who contributed to them in the first place. However the unhidden call 
for explicitly nationalistic spending programmes is, albeit not strictly against the 
letter of the EERP, still in stark contrast with the spirit of the plan whose fundamental 
principle was agreed to be ‘solidarity’. This leads to the question of whether there is 
much empirical evidence for free-riding. The rest of this chapter seeks to scrutinise 
the evidence in favour and against the existence of fiscal free-riding during the Great 
Recession.
The question of free-riding can be analysed by methods similar to those employed in 
the proceeding chapters, that is by relying on regression analysis techniques. To 
further test for free-riding behaviour I add three “free-riding variables” (population, 
trade openness, and economic power) to the main model of the previous chapters. 
Arguably, if I were to find that, for example, export countries implemented less 
184
discretionary fiscal policies, this would be evidence for the charge that those 
countries have a greater incentive (i.e. capability) to engage in fiscal free-riding. I 
find that none of the variables has a significant impact on a country’s fiscal response 
strategies to the Great Recession. An arguably better way to test for free-riding 
behaviour is to consider compliance with the EERP. Crucially, the EERP sets an 
absolute, cumulative reference value for the fiscal programmes and not an annual 
value (as for example the SGP). Because of this, the number of observations 
available is limited to 27. With so few observations it is not feasible to use 
appropriate techniques, such as a probit model. What is more, it would be difficult to 
attribute causal factors to the accumulative outcome. Take for example the variable 
for the partisan orientation of government. In the case of government change it 
would be difficult to clearly assign a share of responsibility in the given outcome. A 
solution for small-N research designs that is increasingly applied throughout the 
social sciences is the QCA approach (e.g. Schneider and Wagemann 2008; 
Emmenegger 2011). Ragin (1987) developed QCA initially in order to formalize 
comparative case study research with small- and moderate-N datasets. This approach 
is not only advantageous in the light of small numbers of observations, but also given 
the causal complexity which calls for the necessary modelling of interaction effects 
and the related loss of degrees of freedom (Ragin 2000). 
The logic of QCA
QCA is distinct from other case-oriented methods due to its use of Boolean algebra 
and set-theoretical insights to operationalise comparison and detect causal 
185
complexity (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009).132 While it only allows binary variables, its 
fuzzy-set variant (fQCA) makes it possible to examine continuous and interval-scale 
variables. The use of fQCA calibrates the causal conditions into sets, which allow for 
partial membership in a set. Specifically, the membership of each case in a set of 
conditions may vary between full membership (value 1) and non-membership (value 
0) in a set. The value 0.5 describes the crossover point indicating the border between 
cases that could be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of a set, whereas 0 is a full ‘out’ and 1 represents a 
full ‘in’. Given that many of the variables of interest are more complex than binary 
coding would account for, the fQCA approach is an obvious choice. Using a fQCA 
based research process which is able to detect empirical patterns in the data at hand, I 
seek to scrutinise fiscal free-riding.
Variable description
As discussed in Chapter 3, I pursue two related methods to measure compliance with 
the EERP. The first yields a simple dummy, which takes the value one if the total 
stimulus package (2009-2010) is estimated as 1.2 per cent of GDP or larger, as the 
threshold of the EERP states, and zero otherwise. The second accounts for the 
relative compliance with the EERP and measures the total size of the stimulus 
package (calculated by the European Commision 2010). The outcome variables used 
in the presentation of the main results are based on the EC’s estimations. Results for 
a crisp (binary) outcome variable are virtually the same. As a robustness check, I also 
ran the QCA using the ECB’s stimulus measurement. All results hold.
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132 Boolean algebra can formalise the maximum number of systematic comparisons that can be made 
in terms of the presence or absence of attributes of interest, across the cases under analysis. Rather 
than estimate the net effects of single variables, QCA employs Boolean logic to examine the 
relationship between an outcome and all binary combinations of multiple predictors. Its underlying 
understanding of causation is that of multiple conjunctional causation which relies on a 
configurational approach to causation. It identifies the different conjunctions of conditions or ‘causal 
paths’, leading to a certain outcome. In so doing, it allows for the identification of multiple 
conjunctional causation and the distinction between sufficient or necessary as causally relevant 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2008).  More specifically, QCA differentiates between causal conditions 
being necessary but not sufficient, sufficient but not necessary, or necessary and sufficient. The co-
existence of various combinations of causal paths that lead to an outcome has been referred to as 
equifinality of outcomes (Ragin, 2000).
The preceding chapters have argued that the preferred measurement for discretionary 
fiscal policy is the cyclically adjusted budget balance. This chapter, although still 
corroborating findings with reference to this indicator, focuses on the stimulus data 
as presented by the European Commission. This is reasonable since I am interested 
in the total size of the stimulus package. The addition of differences in fiscal 
outcomes (e.g. the change of the primary budget balance) used in the two previous 
chapters would not yield reliable results. Furthermore, collective action theory 
stipulates that information about other group members’ intentions is crucial in the 
provision of a public good (Olson 1965). The communication of stimulus 
programmes on a policy-maker and a public (newspaper etc.) level was dominated 
by the stimulus figures identical, or at least readily comparable, to those published by 
the European Commission, other international organisations and think tanks (such as 
the IMF and the OECD). Focusing on the realities and accusations of free-riding, it is 
advantageous to work with the same data that Member States used in their EU level 
meetings (author interview, May 2011).
Based on the literature review in chapter three, the two conditions thought to 
influence Member States’ free-riding behaviour and subsequently compliance with 
the EERP are trade openness and political power. In addition, I control for economic 
distress. To measure the trade position I take the average trade position (value of 
imports + value of exports) as a percentage of GDP for 2008-2010. Other variables 
were considered as well (per cent of world export, per cent of intra-EU export) 
yielding virtually identical results. The political clout of a Member State is measured 
by its share of EU GDP. Gross domestic product as a proxy for economic and 
political power is frequently used in the IPE literature on international policy 
cooperation (e.g. Martin 1992). Alternatively, I also tested the size of the population 
as an indicator for economic/political power, and obtained very similar results. The 
third measurement indicates economic distress (taking the value 1 for these 
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countries). It is a (albeit crude) way of indicating the health of the economy and by 
implication, the possibility that stimulus spending occurs. 
The first group of countries that are qualified to be under economic distress are under 
IMF conditionality (Hungary, Romania, Latvia) and the second group belongs to the 
now infamously dubbed ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). 
Although the difficulties faced by these countries are not identical, they are 
compatible in that they clearly experienced severe economic distress. Table 7.1 
displays the fuzzy set scores for the outcome and the three conditions, as well as the 
best fit for each country case.133 Results are presented using letters as abbreviations 
for the conditions and the outcome. C represents compliance with the EERP/the size 
of the total stimulus package, T trade openness, P political power, and D economic 
distress. Capital letters indicate the presence of a condition, while small letters 
indicate the absence of a condition – that is, T indicates a high level of trade 
openness, and t indicates a low level of trade openness.134 
Insert Table 7.1 here
Compliance with the EERP
To test for free-riding behaviour, I perform a test of each configuration’s y-
consistency versus its n-consistency and a test between each set’s y-consistency and 
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133 The transformation of the variables into a fuzzy-value scale was undertaken by creating rank orders 
of the variable and then standardising this ranking to range from 0 to 1. For a comprehensive, largely 
nontechnical discussion of the acquisition of membership values in fuzzy set analyses, see Verkuilen 
(2005). The equation for this standardisation is (rankedvar - min(rankedvar))/(max(rankedvar) -min
(rankedvar)). An exception are the dummy variables for compliance and the existence of economic 
distress, they are treated as crisp sets.
134 Results are evaluated using both graphical representations as well as descriptive measures such as 
consistency and scores. Consistency assesses the degree to which a subset relation has been 
approximated, while coverage assesses the empirical relevance of a consistent subset (Ragin 2006: 
291). It is important to note that coverage is only interpreted for consistent results. Coverage for 
inconsistent results is not a meaningful indicator (Schneider and Wagemann 2008: 209). Consistency 
and coverage are calculated using the ‘fuzzy’ command in stata (Longest and Vaisey 2007), an add-on 
command that is capable of creating, testing, and performing logical reductions on both fuzzy and 
dichotomous (crisp) set-theoretic data.
the consistency of all other configurations. I look for the configurations with y-
consistencies that are significantly greater than .7 (a conventional threshold, 
Wagemann and Schneider 2008), as well as significantly greater than their n-
consistencies. TPd is the most highly consistent configuration for compliance with 
the EERP (coverage=.502, consistency=.940). Figure 7.1 presents the result 
graphically. Note that for a condition or a combination of conditions to be sufficient, 
all cases should be located around or above the bisecting line/ the diagonal (Ragin 
2000: 236). While the consistency of the sufficient condition (TPd) is very high, the 
coverage is less strong.135 This is visualised in Figure 7.1 by the proximity of country  
cases to the diagonal vs. the Y-axis. The closer a country case is to the diagonal, the 
higher the degree of coverage. Overall, the graphical representation of the fQCA 
analysis does not support the finding that Member States with open economics and 
more economic/political power experienced less economic distress or implemented 
larger stimulus packages (i.e. had better compliance scores). This is in contrast to the 
implicit or explicit portrait of big, powerful countries as being prone to free-riding. 
Insert Figure 7.1 here
Visualising this relationship, the scatter plot in Figure 7.2 plots ordered pairs in a 
coordinate plane to show the statistically significant correlation between the trade 
openness (TO) and the total stimulus package (FS). At first glance it appears that the 
strong results might be driven by the inclusion of Luxembourg. However, when this 
country is excluded the results still hold (rho= .46, statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level). In addition, I transformed the four main variables in question (FS, TO, 
POP, ECO) into ranks to see whether the same findings also hold for Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficients; results are virtually identical.
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135 Again, consistency trumps coverage. What is more, it is very rare for graphical representations of 
fQCA analysis to display a ‘perfect fit’ (with all observations being close to the diagonal), see Ragin 
2000; Schneider and Grofman 2006.
Insert Figure 7.2 here
Few studies have empirically analysed the problem of fiscal free-riding during the 
Great Recession. Fuest et al. (2010) report a negative correlation (-.4) between the 
average annual discretionary fiscal measure and their indicator for openness. Yet 
there is a limited extent to which these findings are comparable. First, the authors use 
the average ratio of exports to GDP for the 2000 to 2004 period, whereas I construct 
a measure for the time span of the financial and economic crisis that is congruent 
with the period of the implemented stimulus packages. Their choice of timeframe is 
not justified in the text. Secondly, the motivation for the selection of countries is not 
clear; Fuest et al. (2010) analyse 18 EU countries, plus the USA. The inclusion of the 
USA and the exclusion of 7 EU countries are likely to impact upon results. Thirdly 
the source for the estimation of the size of stimulus packages differs. Indeed it is not 
entirely clear what their source is. In the text the authors state that they use the 
estimations of an IMF staff note, yet said note lists only the stimulus packages of the 
G20 countries. 
A second analysis into the relationship between openness and fiscal response 
strategies is offered by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010). The authors perform 
regression analyses looking at the variation in the fiscal stimuli during 2009-2010 in 
112 countries (including 25 EU Member States).136 Specifically, they find higher 
trade openness (measured by the 2000-2006 average trade to GDP ratio) to be 
associated with a lower fiscal stimulus. Unfortunately, the authors do not run 
separate regressions for country groups (i.e. the EU), and given the inclusion of 87 
other countries, results are not comparable.
Which countries did not comply with the EERP’s call to stimulus? Identifying the 
fiscal ‘laggards’ is an obvious step towards identifying the reasons for non-
compliance and further shedding light onto the accusations of free-riding behaviour. 
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136 Using simple OLS, tobit, and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimation.
Based on the comparison of official documents in chapter 4, it seems that the 9 non-
compliers with the EERP’s 1.2 threshold are: Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Italy, France, Ireland and Belgium. The results of the fQCA have already 
suggested that there is a positive relation between the size of stimulus packages and 
the absence of economic distress. The countries in the group of non-compliers, with 
the notable exception of France and Belgium, do all also belong in the group of 
‘crisis countries’, which face exceptional economic distress in a much greater 
magnitude than the other EU Member States. In line with the idea of ‘stability free 
riding’, is it therefore not in the interest of the Union as a whole that these countries 
should implement substantial stimulus packages? The EERP (2008: 7) states this 
explicitly:
 ‘To maximise its impact, the budgetary stimulus should take account of the starting positions 
 of each Member State. It is clear that not all Member States are in the same position. Those 
 that took advantage of the good times to achieve more sustainable public finance positions 
 and improve their competitive positions have more room for manoeuvre now.’
The stimulus package should be consistent with a country’s fiscal space so as not to 
threaten the sustainability of public finances, which could have negative spillovers 
for other Member States as well, especially amongst eurozone countries. In order to 
better distinguish between stability and growth free-riding, the next section will 
investigate whether Member States’ fiscal response strategies matched their room for 
fiscal manoeuvre.
Fiscal space
Fiscal space can be defined as 'the capacity of a government to provide financial 
resources for a desired purpose, subject to the constraint that the fiscal position is 
sustainable, both over the medium and long-term' (Heller 2005)137. Heller’s 
definition gained influence among IMF officials and was originally predominantly 
applied to developing countries. In the EU, the term ‘fiscal space’ came to replace 
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137 Schick (2009) suggests a different definition for developing countries according to which fiscal 
space ‘is an estimate of the growth-enhancing investment in physical and human capital that a 
government can finance with borrowed funds without prejudicing the long-run sustainability of its 
fiscal position’.
the previously preferred ‘room for manoeuvre’ in 2009 (author interview, March 
2011). The discussion within the G-20 and the strong presence of the IMF during the 
Great Recession made the term ‘fiscal space’ respectable and stripped it from its 
association with developing or emerging market economies. Whilst the EERP 
mentions the ‘fiscal room for manoeuvre’, a year later DG Ecfin’s Public Finances in 
EMU (European Commission 2009: 192) called on ‘countries with limited fiscal 
space [...] to engage in particularly cautious fiscal policies’. The logic of fiscal space 
not only had implications for the extent of economic stimulus spending but also for 
its timing. Focusing on fiscal exit strategies, Marco Buti (2009), Director-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission since December 2008, 
considered that ‘while accelerated fiscal consolidation is the immediate priority for 
the countries with no or little fiscal space, others with better fiscal space can 
maintain less restrictive stances in the short term, for the sake of growth and jobs in 
Europe’. 
From a technical perspective, Heller (2005) argues that there are no readily available 
comprehensive indicators that can be used to measure the availability of fiscal space. 
In an IMF Staff Position Note, Ostry et al. (2010: 4) reach a similar conclusion, 
namely that in the absence of a clear operational definition of the concept, ‘the talk 
about fiscal space [...] has so far been rather fuzzy.’ The vagueness of the term fiscal 
space did raise concerns. The ECB was notably sceptical of the term and feared that 
in the absence of clear targets and thresholds, countries would interpret the meaning 
according to their own preferences.138 The term ‘room for manoeuvre’ is prima facie 
no less vague. But during the first decade of EMU, Member States reached a 
common reading of the semiotics of this term, namely fiscal policies in line with the 
SGP. In discussions on public finances it became clear that Member States had ‘quite 
different’ understandings of their own fiscal space (author interview, March 2011). 
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138 Based on a systematic review of archival material from the ECB, it appears that the ECB did not 
use the term fiscal space at all prior to 2008. After that the term is used sparingly, mostly in reference 
to existing literature employing the term and mostly with quotation marks (even when no source of 
quotation is given). The ECB’s preferred term remained fiscal sustainability.
As one interviewee from the Commission put it; ‘for Finns, fiscal space is there if 
you can meet all your fiscal obligations for the next 50 years, for some Southern 
countries, fiscal space is there if you need to spend more’ (author interview, April 
2011). Arguably the meaning of fiscal space was further obscured by the ‘bizarre 
situation, where a country entering the EDP had also a level of deficit spending that 
still left fiscal space’ (ibid.). 
Among the most prominent proxies for fiscal space is the ratio of public debt to 
GDP.139 It is much less problematic for countries with a balanced budget and low 
debts to stimulate the economy by increasing demand through increased spending 
than it is for countries with high debts and deficits. It is argued that in countries with 
high public sector debt to GDP ratios, lack of fiscal space not only restricts the 
government's ability to implement discretionary fiscal policies, but also weakens the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus spending (Baldacci et al 2009). Accordingly there 
should be a negative relationship between the debt burden and the stimulus measures 
adopted. Aizenmann and Jinjarak (2010) construct a variable for the ‘de facto fiscal 
space’ of a country, measured as the inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay 
the public debt. Alternative methods construct a sustainability indictor comparing the 
current and future debt levels to identify the fiscal gap (e.g. Buiter 1985; Auerbach 
and Gale 2011). Problematically, these indicators are based on long-term projections, 
which are necessarily subject to wide margins of error (Balassone and Franco 2000). 
An indicator that is based on present and past economic performance has therefore 
the advantage of being not only more reliable but also to offer greater signalling 
power for policy-makers. This higher visibility is an important asset in the 
intergovernmental challenge of EU-level policy cooperation.
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139 For a discussion of this indicator see Escolano (2010).
Operationalising fiscal space
Given that the fiscal space of a Member State is an important determinant of their 
exposure to risk pricing and therefore for ability to pursue fiscal stimulus, it is 
important to consider a measurement of fiscal space when analysing fiscal policy 
coordination during the Great Recession. In its annual publication on public finances 
in EMU, the European Commission presents a fiscal space indicator comprised of 
five variables 1) the initial public debt, 2) the contingent liabilities vis-à-vis the 
financial sector, 3) the expected revenue shortfalls stemming from the unwinding of 
the real estate and construction boom, 4) the current account position and 5) the 
share of discretionary expenditure in the government budget. Accordingly a large 
government debt, high contingent liabilities, potentially high tax revenue shortfalls 
and a large share of non-discretionary expenses are expected to reduce a country’s 
fiscal space and thus enter the composite indicator with a negative sign. The 
meaningfulness of the indicator is questionable because some of the scores obtained 
do not accurately reflect a country’s fiscal sustainability – for example according to 
this study, Bulgaria has a larger fiscal space than Germany and Finland, or Romania 
more room for manoeuvre than Sweden and Finland. 
There are two main reasons for the apparent miscalculation of the indicator. First, the 
standardisation method of the indicator relies on z-scores.140 This ‘rewards’ 
exceptional behaviour. A very good performance in few sub-indicators leads to a 
higher value for fiscal space then a lot of average scores. The low debt burdens in 
Romania and Bulgaria, for example, are likely to lead to an overestimation of the 
country’s fiscal space. On a related note, it may be asked whether debt levels and 
payments of social benefits are a good indicator of a country’s fiscal space. The 
Sovereign Debt Crisis has bought the old levels of debt sustainability (usually set at 
60 per cent of GDP, in line with the Maastricht criteria) into bolder relief. Spain and 
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140 Z-scores are a standardisation method, which converts indicators to a common scale with a mean 
of zero and standard deviation of one.
Portugal faced financing difficulties, despite their economies being ‘widely seen as 
fundamentally solvent’ (Gros 2012: 37). Eastern European countries in particular 
have low debt burdens, which do not indicate high fiscal room for manoeuvre. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of social benefits is likely to introduce a bias in the 
indicator. First, by focusing merely on social benefits rather than social transfers in 
kind, the measurement is hardly complete. As Bambra (2005) and Adema and 
Ladaique (2009) note, public expenditure in kind is a substantial part of the costs of 
the welfare state. More problematically, the link between the size of the welfare state 
and fiscal sustainability is dubious. On the one hand, Nordic countries are in 
particular famous for their generous social benefits without this negatively impacting 
their fiscal space. On the other hand, the comparative paucity of welfare state 
provisions in Eastern European countries should not be seen as a predictor of fiscal 
sustainability.
One way to correct the bias of sub-indicators would be to omit the best and worst 
sub-indicator scores from inclusion in the index or by assigning differential weights 
based on the importance of the sub-indicator scores. Secondly, given the high 
complexity of the estimation of a country’s fiscal space, it may be advantageous to 
create a larger set of sub-indicators from which to construct the fiscal space score. 
Seeking to obtain an appropriate indicator, I will introduce new sub-scores based on 
the EIP and use a different weighting strategy based on factor analysis. 
Increasing the sub-scores
Three elements of the Commission’s fiscal space composite indicator also appear in 
the scoreboard for the EIP. Amidst the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, a series of 
new regulations to enhance economic governance in the EU, proposed by the 
Commission, were agreed by the European Parliament and the Council. One of them, 
as part of the so-called Six-Pack, established a surveillance procedure to prevent and 
correct macroeconomic imbalances. Specifically, the new regulations established a 
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scoreboard to provide an early-warning signalling device of potentially harmful 
macroeconomic imbalances in Member States. Analogous to the SGP, the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure has a preventive arm, where policy 
recommendations can be issued by the Council to tackle imbalances early on, and a 
corrective arm where ‘excessive’ imbalances have been identified and a corrective 
action plan is requested from the Member State concerned. Non-compliance with the 
Council recommendations can eventually lead to financial sanctions. In the 
‘Scoreboard for the Surveillance of Macroeconomic Imbalances’ (DG Ecfin. 2012), 
the Commission stresses that the indicators are neither policy targets nor policy 
instruments. Instead the results of the scoreboard are interpreted from an ‘economic 
perspective’, with thresholds for the indicators merely being a starting point to serve 
as alert levels. The scoreboard contains 10 indicators:
1) 3 year backward moving average of the current account balance as percentage of 
GDP, with a threshold of +6 per cent of GDP and -4 per cent of GDP; 
2) net international investment position as a percentage of GDP, with a threshold 
of -35 per cent of GDP;  
3) 5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a 
threshold of -6 per cent; 
4) 3 years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9 per 
cent for eurozone countries and +12 per cent for non-eurozone countries;
5) 3 years percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on 
Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) and Consumer Price Indices 
(CPIs) deflators, relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5 
per cent for euro-area countries and -/+11 per cent for non-eurozone countries; 
6) private sector debt in per cent of GDP with a threshold of 160 per cent; 
7) private sector credit flow in per cent of GDP with a threshold of 15 per cent;  
8) year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, 
with a threshold of 6 per cent;  
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9) general government sector debt in per cent of GDP with a threshold of 60 per 
cent;
10) 3-year backward moving average of unemployment rate, with the threshold of 
10 per cent. 
The scoreboard does not only identify potentially ‘harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances’ but also yields a useful indicator for the identification of fiscal 
sustainability, which is a country’s fiscal space. For the sake of clarity it is important 
to add that neither the purpose of the EIP nor its presentation in official documents 
establish the bridge between macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal sustainability. In 
an accompanying document (European Commission 2011) the Commission 
emphasises that ‘the sustainability of public finances will not be assessed in the 
context of the EIP given that this issue is already covered by the SGP’. The 
Commission did not want to be seen as replacing or weakening the existing EDP: 
‘there may well be a loss of clarity, first we had only one clear indicator and now all 
of a sudden there are ten. What if the verdicts of the EIP are not in line with the EDP, 
which recommendations should Member States follow?’ (author interview, April 
2011). Yet from an economic point of view the artificial differentiation between 
macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal sustainability is impractical. In its justification 
of the choice of indicators, accompanied by a comprehensive review of the literature 
(European Commission 2011), the link between each indicator and fiscal 
sustainability, default, and crisis incidences is meticulously presented. 
Despite this reluctance, the EIP may be seen as a direct consequence of the main 
lesson of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: ‘Fiscal profligacy is neither the sole 
nor the main origin of Europe’s fiscal crisis’ (Buti and Carnot 2012: 903). Critiquing 
the sub-scores of the EIP, Buti and Carnot (ibid.) argue that indicators of ‘fiscal 
vulnerability’ which take into account variables for financial and competitiveness 
developments give a better picture of risk of fiscal crises than purely fiscal indicators. 
A broader measurement of fiscal space/fiscal sustainability is needed to capture 
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relevant macroeconomic fundamentals. To obtain a ‘more complete’, theoretically 
grounded, measure of fiscal sustainability, I follow Knedlik and Schweinitz’s 
recommendation (2012) to ‘combine as many meaningful single indicators as 
possible into one composite indicator’. 
A new fiscal space indicator
One shortcoming of the Commission’s fiscal space indicator is that it fails to apply 
appropriate weights to the sub-scores. This is especially problematic given the likely 
presence of high correlation between the respective indicators. Factor analysis has 
however been established as a suitable weighting technique to deal with this issue.141 
The weights listed in the last column of Table A7.1 of the Appendix represent the 
final weight to be used for the fiscal space composite indicator.
These weights are then applied to the fiscal space sub-indicators based on the MIB 
scoreboard.142 Note that the scores are not perfect predictors for the multi-causal 
outcome of fiscal distress. Notably, the comparatively high scores for Romania and 
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141 In the first instance, factor analysis is able to reveal how different variables change in relation to 
each other and how they are associated. Specifically, factor analysis transforms correlated variables 
into a new set of uncorrelated variables. In so doing it groups together individual indicators which are 
collinear, to form a composite indicator that captures as much as possible of the information common 
to individual indicators. Bear in mind that the weighting corrects for the overlapping information 
between two or more correlated indicators and is not a measure of the theoretical importance of the 
associated indicator. I follow the procedure described in OECD (2008) and begin with the full set of 
10 variables of the EIP. The first step is to derive a set of eigenvectors and their associated 
eigenvalues, restricting myself to those components that are associated with an eigenvalue greater 
than one (as suggested by, for example, Joliffe 1986). Next I checked the correlation structure of the 
data, to ascertain that correlation between the indicators is indeed strong. This is confirmed by the 
results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (.78). The second step is to generate 
the factors. Following existing practice I retain only factors whose eigenvalue is greater than one 
(Dunteman 1989:22-3), which leaves me with three factors. In the third step I compute the rotation of 
factors to minimise the number of individual indicators that have a high loading on the same factor. 
Rotation changes the factor loadings and hence the interpretation of the factors. Next I construct the 
weights from the matrix of factor loadings after rotation using the square of factor loadings, which 
represents the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator, which is explained by the factor.
142 For the composite indicator the individual scores are transformed into fuzzy sets ranging from 0-1 
(stata command setgen stdrank). Note that the all findings related to the fiscal space indicator hold 
true if equal weights are used for the construction of the composite indicator to reflect the uncertainty 
about the origin of fiscal sustainability.
Latvia come as a surprise.143 Although the overall fiscal situation of both countries 
was dire, they still scored highly on some of the indicators such as private debt, 
house prices and government debt. What is more, five out of ten of the fiscal space 
sub-scores take annual averages (3-5 years) and the brisk economic downturn that 
lead to liquidity problems is therefore less strongly registered then it would be with 
annual indicators. Note also that Romania and Latvia score well in the Commission’s 
previous fiscal space indicator (EC 2009) as well as that of Aizenmann and Jinjarak 
(2012).
By and large however, the indicator (see Figure 7.3) is in line with what one would 
expect; Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria have the highest scores, 
whereas Portugal, Spain, Greece (which has the lowest score in 2009 and 2010), 
Hungary, Ireland, and Bulgaria have the lowest scores. Furthermore the EIP fiscal 
space indicator correlates negatively with a country’s risk premium paid on 
government bonds.144 In other words limited fiscal space is linked to higher interest 
rates. This is not to suggest that market participants are superior judges of fiscal 
sustainability; whether markets adequately price government bonds remains an open 
and contested question.
Insert Figure 7.3 here
Fiscal space and the size of stimulus spending
Did a country’s fiscal space correlate to the size of the fiscal stimulus package? 
Descriptive statistical analysis suggests that the answer is yes; Figure 7.3 summarises 
correlation results. There is a strong positive link between the size of the average 
199
143 The Latvian government applied in late 2008 to the EU, IMF and regional neighbours for financial 
assistance amidst a rapidly deteriorating economic situation and short-term liquidity pressure linked to 
the ailing financial sector. Likewise Romania needed financial assistance.
144 Measured as the interest rates paid on government bonds with 10 year maturity, for the 2008-2011 
period (n=107, rho= -.35, significant at the .01 level). 
fiscal space (2007-2010) and the size of the stimulus package as estimated by the 
Commission (n =27, rho = .48)145. This finding is congruent with Cameron (2012), 
who shows that countries in which the government had a surplus in the years prior to 
the crisis generally made more substantial stimulus efforts. Put differently, countries 
with larger fiscal space such as Germany and Luxembourg implemented substantial 
stimulus packages, whereas countries with less fiscal space such as Greece and 
Ireland engaged in virtually no stimulus policies even before austerity conditionality 
in their rescue programmes.
A large mismatch between a country’s individual fiscal space score and its stimulus 
package should not be seen as automatic evidence for free-riding behaviour. Taken 
together, it seems that member states implemented stimulus policies with their fiscal 
space in mind. Indeed the recommendation of the Commission makes a case for 
stimulus free riding if a member state has limited fiscal space. In its Report on 
Slovakia, the Commission (SEC 2009, 1276 final: 8) found the Slovak government’s 
anti-crisis measures adequate given ‘the limited fiscal space due to external 
imbalances’. In its recommendation on the existence of an excessive deficit (SEC 
2009, 1271 final: 9), the Commission argues that Italian stimulus package is ‘not 
expected to appreciably weigh on the government balance, as [it is] planned to have 
an overall neutral budget impact […]. The package is an adequate response to the 
economic downturn in view of the very high debt ratio’. Along similar lines, in the 
assessment of the Belgian Stability Programme, the Commission points out ‘that as a 
result of the openness of the economy, foreign packages should also contribute 
considerably to the recovery of the Belgian economy’ (ECFIN/52791/09-EN). No 
EDP-related publication, be it authored by the Commission or the Council, 
encourages any of the 9 EERP non-compliers to shoulder more substantial stimulus 
measures. This is less evidence for successful coordination of fiscal crisis responses 
under the EERP, as for the accommodating EDP application in times of crises. 
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145 Significant at the .5 per cent level, results for the ECB stimulus estimations are virtually identical. 
Free-riding: Accusations and realities
The challenge of growth free-riding is not supported by the evidence presented in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. In addition to the quantitative evidence, all 
interviewees were asked about the occurrence of fiscal beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies; none thought of growth free-riding as a serious concern.146 Member States 
with limited fiscal space that effectively abstained from discretionary spending, were 
not accused of growth free-riding. Ireland is a case in point. On 21 November 2010, 
Ireland officially requested financial assistance from the EU, the euro area Member 
States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In an emergency session of 
European finance ministers and officials from the ECB and the IMF, a joint financing 
package of !85bn was agreed (Financial Times 22.11.2010). In exchange, the Irish 
government agreed to ambitious fiscal policy and structural reform. In fact, Ireland 
had already begun consolidation measures in 2009, amounting to 5 per cent of GDP 
in 2009, followed by 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2010 (OECD 2011). 
However three interviewees (author interviews, April and June 2011) pointed to 
Spain as an example where a country had clearly shot beyond its fiscal space in 
stimulating demand. The EIP fiscal space score corroborates this impression. 
According to this indicator, Spain had one of the EU Member States’ worst fiscal 
space scores but one of the largest stimulus policies.147 During 2008 and 2009, the 
Spanish debt burdens increased by 3 per cent of GDP due to direct bailouts of the 
financial sector and the government amassed a significant stock of liabilities linked 
to financial market support operations worth around !20bn (EC Public Finances 
201
146 This finding might be biased due to the timing of interviews. A majority of interviews took place in 
the spring of 2011 when fiscal consolidation and concerns over the spreading Sovereign Debt Crisis 
dominated the calendar of the people interviewed. The focus was therefore likely on stability free-
riding and not on growth free-riding. To corroborate the absence of growth free-riding accusations in 
interviews I systematically reviewed newspapers and official EU and domestic government 
documents of that period and also found no accusations of free-riding apart from the example of 
Germany which is discussed in the next paragraph. 
147 According to the EIP based fiscal space indicator, Spain is placed at the bottom four for the 
2003-2010 period.
2010).148 Crucially, both the Spanish government and the European Commission 
initially claimed that Spain had fiscal room for manoeuvre to engage in discretionary 
stimulus spending. During the first decade of the euro, the Spanish economy had 
been one of the fastest growing and most successful economies in Europe (Royo 
2009). Presenting his government’s stimulus policies in parliament, the then Prime 
Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero argued that the Spanish government was in a 
strong position to stimulate the economy due to its relatively small debt burden and 
‘the fiscal prudence of the Socialist government over the past four years’ (FT 
28.11.2008). This optimism was echoed in the Commission’s (EC 2009) evaluation 
of Spain’s fiscal stimulus package, which although at first glance seemed excessive 
in the light of its output gap, was considered to ‘be viewed in Spain's comparatively 
favourable fiscal space’. Dullien (2008) was one of the few cautious voices warning 
that ‘a stimulus package in Spain risks just to cover up the country’s economic 
problems without solving them’. In his opinion this amounted to a ‘stimulus in the 
wrong country’ (ibid.). 
Fuelled by public disagreements between Sarkozy and Merkel, the free-riding debate 
of 2008/2009 focused on Germany. What stands out here is the discrepancy between 
allegations and realities of free-riding in the French and German fiscal crisis 
responses. Whereas the Sarkozy-led French government was seen as a motor for 
fiscal policy coordination both at the EU and the international level 
(Rommerskirchen 2011), the German government faced criticism for doing too little 
to stimulate domestic growth and obstructing economic cooperation. Within the EU, 
Sarkozy orchestrated numerous summits and sought a coordinated crisis response. 
Whereas Sarkozy was praised for his efforts, Merkel was dubbed ‘Madame Non’ in 
the international press because her government was not only hesitant in its domestic 
crisis response, but also because she was reluctant to call for all Member States to 
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148 This first wave of interventions in the financial sector was considerably less costly than the 
injection of !100bn into the banking sector under the financial assistance from eurozone Member 
States via the European Financial Stability Facility in the summer of 2012.
implement substantial stimulus programmes (der Spiegel 14.03.2009). In addition, 
she vetoed the plan for a more coordinated stimulus in the form of a general 
reduction of VAT, which the Commission had supported (Schelkle 2012a).149 A 
Financial Times article (26.11.2008) called for EU officials to name and shame 
countries not pulling their weight, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Germany 
was accused of engaging in beggar-thy-neighbour policies, ‘waiting for other less 
well-placed countries to do most of the work and reaping the benefits once exports 
pick up’ (ibid). In addition to the difference in political status, the German and 
French economies were quite differently affected by the crisis. Export dependency 
and the current account position is one of the main factors in determining the 
contraction of the economy (Commission 2009). In particular Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria, where export demand had been strong, were more exposed 
to the contraction in world trade. The sharp decline in German exports had a 
devastating effect, notably on investment in plant and machinery, which fell by 21.8 
per cent in the first six months of 2009 alone (Zolnhöfer 2011). The Economist 
(7.5.2009) claimed that with the export-led model sputtering more than most in times 
of recession, ‘the title of export champion may have lost its glitter’. Along similar 
lines, in a speech in front of the G20, Sarkozy (2009) prided himself that the ‘French 
economy is holding up better than those of its major partners’. Although this portrait 
of an ailing German economy and a resistant French economy was short-lived (see 
below), it shaped the free-riding discourse during the Great Recession. 
Against this backdrop, the realities of stimulus spending hardly live up to the free-
riding discourse. Germany had one of the largest stimulus packages both in absolute 
and in relative terms. Notably it announced a first set of stimulus measures prior to 
the EERP agreement. When asked how far EU pressures and agreements shaped 
Germany’s crisis response, interviewees across the board were sceptical as to 
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149 The remark of the then German finance minister, Peer Steinbrück (2008), who called the UK’s cut 
in VAT ‘crass Keynesian’ should be seen as a reaction to his government’s position against similar 
EU-wide tax cuts.
whether they mattered at all; ‘do you really think German politicians needed 
someone to tell them that they should help their automotive industry?’ (Author 
interview, March 2011). Yet the initial announcements of stimulus programmes were 
timid (by December 2008 France had announced a !39bn plan, whereas the German 
package pledged only !12bn; Spilimbergo et al. 2008). Arguably, German policy-
makers are largely responsible for this misconception of a passive government due to 
their reluctant embracing of Keynesian style demand-management and inconsistent 
communications as discussed in chapter five. If accusations of free-riding were not 
justified given the size of the stimulus packages, they were certainly provoked by a 
government that in public refused to acknowledge the need for discretionary fiscal 
spending. Most of this reluctance stems from domestic paradigms of macroeconomic 
policies. There is however also a European dimension to the repeated disavowals of 
stimulus spending. The German government initially opposed the EERP, as it would 
encourage ‘states to spend money that they do not have’ (author interview, March 
2011). 
The EERP came at a time when German policy-makers were concerned with a 
restoration of the SGP at the EU level and a reaffirmation of Germany’s position as a 
paragon of fiscal prudence. During the 2005 election campaign, reinvigorating the 
SGP on a European level and fiscal prudence on a domestic level were essential 
elements of centre-right CDU election strategy. Merkel demanded ‘a new Stability 
Culture’ during election rallies (der Spiegel 14.09.2005) and the election manifesto 
of the CDU declared to ‘put an end to the calamitous march towards the debt state’, 
the need for ‘strict fiscal discipline’ and ‘no shaking of the SGP’ (CDU et al. 2005). 
The new fiscal course for the Grand Coalition which came to power in autumn 2005 
can be found in the joint contract between the CDU, CSU and SPD: ‘Consolidating 
the budget and meeting the Maastricht deficit criteria by 2007 is 
indispensable’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2005). Reinforcing the SGP, it would be a logical 
step for German politicians to publicly renege political ownership of the EERP.  
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Two recent analyses comparing the French and the German crisis responses to the 
Great Recession suggest that while the German stimulus was adequate (albeit poorly 
communicated), the French stimulus was arguably sub par (see Table 4.1). Schelkle 
(2012a: 5) argues that despite the fact ‘the French asked for decisive joint 
action’ […] ‘in practice, the French government relied heavily on the in-built 
stabilisers of their tax-transfer system with largely symbolic extra spending’. Vail 
(2012: 10) argues that the modest French stimulus ‘was particularly surprising given 
France’s relatively dire economic situation’, shown by French and German 
unemployment rates (9.5 per cent and 7.8 per cent of GDP in 2009). The underlying 
logic is perhaps flawed. First, the author cites only the 2009 figures, whereas the 
difference for 2008 is less stark (7.8 per cent in France and 7.5 per cent in Germany). 
More importantly, the causality of unemployment rates and stimulus spending is not 
unidirectional as Vail assumes. In other words the German stimulus was not high 
despite low unemployment rates, but unemployment was kept at bay because of 
generous stimulus spending. The German Kurzarbeit (short-term work) programme, 
for example, is estimated to have subsidised more than 1.5 million employees, 
‘which helped keep unemployment relatively low’ (Zohlnhöfer 2012). Furthermore, 
the unemployment rate is, albeit an important, not the sole trigger for stimulus 
policies. On the one hand, the German economy was particularly severely affected if 
one looks at other indicators such as GDP or the output gap. On the other hand, 
France was able to cushion the recession better than other EU countries. Moreover, if 
one accepts the notion of fiscal space dependent stimulus, then the French response 
was in line with its fiscal room for manoeuvre. Despite being less vulnerable to the 
decline in export markets, the French economy faces considerable structural 
challenges, which may threaten the long-term sustainability of public finances 
(European Commission 2012).
The French government is not the only one to have ‘play[ed] up the extent of 
intervention’ (Schelkle 2012b). In November 2008, the Italian prime minister 
announced an !80bn stimulus package (Financial Times 30.11.2008). This (fictional) 
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figure was widely circulated not only in public speeches but also official documents 
such as the country’s annual Stability and Convergence Report: ’The Government 
aims to mobilise resources of roughly !80bn, through the resumption of a series of 
investment projects and active use of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP),150 
consistent with its view that, in the short run, fiscal stimulus is needed to support 
demand and growth’ (Italian SCP 2009). Yet, official estimates show the Italian 
stimulus to be virtually non-existent (estimated at 0 by the ECB and the OECD, and 
at 0.3 per cent of GDP by the IMF). In light of Italy’s limited fiscal space (see Table 
7.3), the absence of a de facto stimulus package was welcomed.151 As one 
interviewee said: ‘We were quite relieved that Berlusconi’s big announcements 
amounted to nothing more than hot air’ (author interview, April 2011). In the 
Council’s 2009 country recommendation it notes that ‘given the already very high 
debt ratio, any large budgetary deterioration could elicit a reaction from the financial 
markets, causing a further widening of the already significant spreads between Italian 
and German bonds. This would result in higher interest rates for the entire economy, 
outweighing the benefits from the fiscal stimulus.’ 
The public charges of German stimulus free-riding were eventually dropped given its 
substantial discretionary spending, merely to be replaced by a new kind of beggar-
thy-neighbour accusations. 152 In 2010, French criticism of the strong German trade 
surplus made headlines amidst clear indicators that the recovery of the German 
economy was stronger than that of France. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, then adviser to 
Sarkozy, argued that ‘the German economic strategy built on growth of exports is 
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150 The CDP is a joint-stock company under public control with a major role in public investment 
projects (Salvemini 2007).
151 Italy faced record high borrowing costs in 2011 amidst domestic political tensions and contagion 
starting with the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
152 Likewise at the international level a growing interest surrounding global imbalances took place at 
the G20. The debate within the G20 focused almost entirely on the two biggest surplus countries, 
dubbed ‘Chermany’ by the media, China and Germany (Financial Times 16.3.2010). The US 
delegation sought to discuss imbalances first and foremost to put pressure on China to appreciate the 
renminbi faster. ‘Originally the issue of imbalances was a way for the US to bash China within the 
G20, yet for political reasons the Obama administration did not want to single out China and therefore 
Germany got in the line of fire as well’ (author interview 12.4.2011). The German government 
therefore faced criticism for its strong export model both at the EU and the international level.
uncooperative’ (Financial Times 16.2.2010). Christine Lagarde, then Finance 
Minister, urged the German government to boost domestic consumption to help 
current account deficit members in the eurozone (ibid.). Again, the communication of 
Germany’s government was not particularly sensitive. In an online presence 
(Germany Trade & Invest)153, the Economic Ministry maintains a list of stimulus 
packages in over 60 countries to help the German ‘Mittelstand154 to seize 
opportunities to enter new markets and thus emerge with new strength out of the 
economic crisis’ (see also Schelkle 2012). Specifically, the website offers detailed 
descriptions of stimulus programmes including the relevant sector and contact 
information. If however German policy-makers had any free-riding intentions, it 
seems odd that they vocally denounced the effectiveness of stimulus spending. 
Franzese and Hays (2008: 5) portray free-riding as arising because of policies being 
strategic substitutes, that is ‘when policy changes in one jurisdiction create incentives 
for governments in others to adopt change in the opposite direction’. In the case of 
fiscal stimulus policies, this means that the increased expenditure of one country in 
response to the crisis, leads to less stimulus spending in another country, given the 
possibility of (especially for small and open economies) free-riding. The German 
efforts to dissuade other countries from stimulating their economies therefore runs 
contrary to the claims of Germanys’ free-riding tactic.
Conclusion
Despite severe problems of communication, accusations of stimulus free-riding are 
not borne out by factual evidence. The findings of this chapter suggest that countries 
with open economies, a larger population and a larger economy implemented larger 
stimulus programmes. This is in contrast to the literature, which presents these as 
characteristics of both a bigger capacity and incentive to free-ride on group-oriented 
behaviour. What is more, countries with limited fiscal space, as set out in the EERP, 
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153 The page in question has been taken down as of December 2012.
154 The German Mittelstand comprises Germany’s small and medium-sized enterprises. 
by and large abstained from large stimulus programmes. This is an important finding 
since it suggests that Member States did shoulder more or less stimulus burden 
depending on their economic means - thereby eschewing uniform contributions 
across Member States. With the benefit of hindsight, the effective growth free-riding 
of countries with limited fiscal space should be seen as preferable to an otherwise 
likely scenario of stability free-riding. An exception to this trend is Spain. The 
generous – and from EU-officials, approved – Spanish stimulus shows that stability 
free-riding was simply not a dominant concern of fiscal policy coordination in the 
EU prior to the outbreak of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. This is in line with the 
presentation of the EERP as a carte blanche for deficit spending. 
The main accusations of growth free-riding were levelled against the German 
government. Benefiting from other Member States stimulus programmes, and 
actively seeking to do so as the call from Germany Trade & Invest suggests, is 
something that net exporting countries are structurally better positioned to do then 
net importing countries. Yet it is not the same as free-riding. This chapter has shown 
that given the substantial German stimulus, the government certainly contributed its 
share to the production of the collective good.155
The free-riding debate of 2008/2009 marks a shift in EU fiscal policy coordination, 
given that the Maastricht Treaty coordination aimed at restraining deficits and 
reducing debt levels. Various charges of stability free-riding have thus dominated the 
political landscape. The Great Recession has changed this. Firstly, German 
politicians’ belated embracing of stimulus measures as a response to the sharp 
economic downturn has cast Germany as a free-rider on other Member States’ 
stimulus efforts. Secondly, it became clear that, after a decade of sluggish growth and 
painful economic adjustment, the German economy weathered the crisis better than 
most of its EU partners. This comparatively easy, export-fuelled recovery, in parallel 
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155 Although the characterisation of this contribution as the ‘lion‘s share’ (Steinbrück 2009) seems 
exaggerated.
with the on-going fiscal crisis in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, has caused 
macroeconomic imbalances to gain prominence in the EU’s nascent economic 
governance.
One might argue that the post-Great Recession policy coordination has reached a 
free-riding equipoise, which recognises both growth and stability free-riding as 
potentially harmful behaviour, whereas the pre-crisis EU was mainly focused on 
stability free-riding. Given the rising inequality within EU Member States’ 
economies, charges of free-riding are likely to remain a constant feature of the 




This thesis contributes to the wide literature on EU fiscal policy coordination by 
focusing on the challenges of fiscal policy coordination in ‘hard times’ during the 
2008-2010 period. Fiscal policy during the Great Recession was not coordinated; 
Member States adopted largely unilateral fiscal crisis responses. In so doing, national 
governments showed little concern for EU-level agreements or EU-wide stability and 
growth. Yet despite this lack of coordination, which represented ‘a significant 
modification of national policies in recognition of international economic 
interdependence’ (Wallich 1984: 85), I find no strong evidence for free-riding 
behaviour. On the one hand, the overarching consensus on the need for counter-
cyclical fiscal policies prevented growth free-riding (i.e. stimulating too little). On 
the other hand, discipline imposed by financial markets contributed to policy-
makers’ awareness of their limited ‘fiscal space’, which meant that by and large, 
stability free-riding (i.e. stimulating too much) was not an issue either. The first 
finding speaks to the importance of shared policy ideas in achieving collective 
action, whilst the second highlights the role of financial markets in constraining 
fiscal policy. 
This concluding chapter will proceed as follows: I begin with a summary of the key 
findings of this thesis, before turning to a discussion of future developments in fiscal 
policy coordination. I argue that as ‘stressful heterogeneities’ between EU Member 
States are increasing, the importance of Olsonian incentives to induce group-oriented 
fiscal policy outcomes will increase. Next, I examine the wave of economic 
governance reforms post-2011, which currently prioritises concerns of stability over 
growth free-riding. However, some elements of the new economic governance 
architecture, particularly the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), may pave 
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the way towards a comprehensive system of macroeconomic policy coordination that 
covers both forms of free-riding. I will then analyse the emergence of a new 
paradigm for fiscal policy coordination, which may provide an incentive for 
collective action. Whilst such a paradigm extension could address both stability and 
growth free-riding, the forces of market discipline are point exclusively  to the 
former. In a third section, I discuss market discipline and stability free-riding 
post-2011 and seek to chart some of the future challenges and tensions in financial-
market-sovereign state relations. This chapter will conclude by challenging the claim 
of the powerless EU Member State (cf. Martin 1998).
Key findings
The EU-level framework for fiscal crisis responses, the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP), is introduced in Chapter 1. This recovery plan sought to 
provide a programme for counter-cyclical policies amounting to a total of 1.5 per 
cent of EU GDP (1.2 per cent of GDP at the national level) to mitigate the global 
economic fall-out of the international financial crisis. After decades of championing 
low deficits and debt levels, the Commission emerged as an unlikely advocate of 
stimulus policies throughout the European Union, calling for a relaxation of the 
application of existing rules under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The crisis 
framework laid out in the EERP presented an attempt to coordinate not fiscal 
constraint, but for the first time fiscal expansion. With the declaration that ‘[w]e sink 
or swim together’, the EERP (2008) provides a clear economic rationale for the 
coordination of fiscal response strategies – interdependence. The basic argument in 
favour of fiscal policy coordination, presented in Chapter 2, is found in the need to 
internalise the externalities arising from spillover effects. Fiscal policy is treated as a 
matter of common concern and its coordination thus emerges as a means to achieve 
outcomes in a more efficient and optimal manner. This is particularly true for 
eurozone Member States sharing a common monetary policy. In times of crisis the 
externalities of fiscal policy choices are potentially bigger due to an increased scope 
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for government action. The challenge for fiscal policy coordination during the Great 
Recession was then to prevent two types of free-riding behaviour. The first type, 
growth free-riding, regards benefiting from other countries’ expansive fiscal policies. 
The second type, stability free-riding, considers the hazard of too much fiscal 
expansion, which might threaten the stability of the eurozone in particular and the 
EU more generally. Prior to 2008, fiscal policy coordination was seen as a means to 
prevent stability free-riding and, more concretely, to prevent monetary or fiscal 
bailouts. This changed during the Great Recession. On the one hand, the economic 
fallout prompted a brief ‘Keynesian moment’ in the EU, as well as across the 
developed and developing world. This brought the coordination of stimulus 
packages, and consequently concerns over growth free-riding, to the top of the EU 
fiscal policy agenda. On the other hand, the recession of 2008 and, even more 
forcefully, the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis have brought the so-called ‘Sound Money 
paradigm’ into bold relief. Macroeconomic stability could no longer be reduced to 
low inflation rates and low deficit levels. This lead to a reappraisal of what sound 
fiscal, and more broadly sound macroeconomic policy constitutes of. Forging a new 
policy paradigm, the old schism between good fiscal policy (low deficits) and bad 
fiscal policy (high deficits) has come under attack. Indeed the notion of growth free-
riding was institutionalised alongside a strengthening of stability free-riding 
provisions (see below). 
Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual framework, research hypotheses and methods 
employed in this thesis, beginning with an introduction to the theoretical centre of 
this research: collective action theory. Olson’s (1965) body of work is the starting 
point of the three main hypotheses considering the EU’s group latency, incentives for 
collective action and free riding behaviour. These hypotheses follow systematically 
from a three-step testing design. In a first step I examine whether, in terms of fiscal 
policy coordination, EU Member States can be characterised as forming a latent 
group for which collective action is inherently challenging. Specifically, I am able to 
draw inference on group latency by identifying the determinants of fiscal policy 
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outcomes. The existence of group latency is said to render the provision of separate 
and selective incentives necessary in order to motivate group members to contribute 
to the production of the collective good in question. Hence, in a second step I analyse 
the working of different separate and selective incentives, identified in fiscal rules/
fiscal policy agreements and market discipline. Here the focus is on whether or not 
these incentives mattered for public finances in times of crises. Weak incentives, in 
turn, would imply a high likelihood of free-riding behaviour – collective action 
failure. The third hypothesis of this thesis therefore considers evidence in favour or 
against stability and growth free-riding during the Great Recession. These 
hypotheses are tested using a mixed-methods approach consisting of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. This combination of nuanced interview material with 
arguably more blunt econometric techniques demonstrates the methodological 
pluralism embraced in this thesis. 
Before engaging in hypotheses testing, Chapter 4 considers different measurements 
for fiscal policy outcomes for the timeframe of this thesis. Finding appropriate 
indicators that are able to reflect fiscal crisis responses is challenging given the 
substantial size of automatic stabilisers, dubious aggregation techniques used to 
compile stimulus figures and the debatable accounting standards of financial sector 
rescue operations. Meeting these challenges, this study adopts a centripetal 
measurement approach, relying on different measures with diminishing policy 
discretion. The four dependent variables measuring fiscal policy outcomes are the 
budget balance, the primary budget balance, the structural balance and the primary 
structural balance. 
Chapter 5 sets out to examine the determinants of fiscal policy outcomes and tests 
whether or not the EU can be, in terms of fiscal policy coordination, considered a 
latent group. In so doing, I analyse time-series cross-sectional data from the 27 EU 
Member States over a 3-year time period (2008-2010). The empirical analysis 
confirms that the deficit bias attributed to contemporary public finances was stronger 
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during the Great Recession and that political factors have indeed shaped public 
finances. I argue that fiscal policy outcomes were not apolitical products of the harsh 
economic logics of compulsion, but a complex result of intervening political 
features. Faced with a common shock, Member States responded not merely to the 
economic imperative of crisis management, but identified different solutions to 
similar problems, which were co-determined by the political landscape: namely the 
electoral calendar, political fragmentation and executive partisanship. The 
heterogeneity of political conditions has implications for the latency of the EU 
Member States and in turn the coordination of fiscal policy choices. Member States 
without election years falling in the 2008-10 period for example, were more likely to 
implement smaller stimulus programmes than Member States where policy-makers 
faced the electorate imminently. Conversely, right-leaning governments were more 
likely to have designed larger stimulus plans than their left-leaning counterparts. This 
suggests that being part of a latent group, Member States may have either under- or 
over-stimulated their national economies, depending on their political profile.  
Solutions to free-riding, be it stability or growth free-riding, are thought to be found 
in the provision of separate and selective incentives. Chapter 6 tests the second 
hypothesis, namely whether separate and selective incentives kept free-riding at bay. 
Specifically, I analyse two types of incentives, which are thought to affect fiscal 
policy outcomes: fiscal rules and market discipline. The empirical findings suggest 
that domestic fiscal rules, such as debt brakes, did not impact on the fiscal policy 
responses to the Great Recession. Similarly, EU level fiscal agreements, the SGP and 
the newly created EERP, did not impact on fiscal policy choices. I argue that these 
findings do not come as a surprise. First, the majority of domestic fiscal rules were 
equipped with exceptionality clauses. As a result, they did not impose stern 
constraints on fiscal policy choices in times of crises. And even where those escape 
clauses were not in place, policy-makers loosened the rules to enable them to 
mitigate the economic fallout. Secondly, the role of EU rules and agreements in 
shaping fiscal policy choices has been placed under scrutiny ever since the creation 
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of the SGP. The vague commitments under the EERP and the generous 
implementation of the EDP further speak to the reluctance of sovereign policy-
makers to coordinate fiscal policy in ‘hard times’. Wyplosz’ conclusion (2013) that 
there ‘has been zero effort at coordination’ seems somewhat harsh, especially in light 
of numerous crisis summits, the agreement on the EERP and the Commission’s 
subsequent monitoring of stimulus packages. In this thesis I argue instead that the 
efforts of fiscal policy coordination during the Great Recession were lacking in 
success.
It would be a mistake to assume that just because Member States predominantly 
resorted to an increase in public expenditure to combat recession, these policy 
choices were driven by EU-level incentives. Instead, discretionary stimulus spending 
as a response to the economic downturn seems to have been a default option for 
developed, and to a lesser extent developing countries (e.g. Velde 2011). I argue that 
in terms of fiscal policy outcomes, the EERP was meaningless; Member States 
essentially adopted stimulus programmes as they saw fit with little concern for EU-
level agreements or EU-wide aims of stability and growth. This assessment is echoed 
by Verdun and Heipertz (2010:189) who describe the overall approach to fiscal 
policy coordination during the Great Recession as ‘one of pronounced national 
action and limited European coordination, the communication of which bordered on 
the meaningless’. Despite its deficient steering power for public finances in times of 
crises, the EERP was a meaningful policy-choice for the Commission. The EERP 
created an ad-hoc Sollbruchstelle (Lohmann 2003) to excuse non-compliance with 
the SGP and uphold the appearance of fiscal policy coordination. 
In contrast to fiscal rules and intergovernmental agreements, the incentives provided 
by market discipline (measured as interest payments) are found to have an impact on 
fiscal crisis responses. Importantly, this effect is stronger for eurozone Member 
States, who suffer from original sin (cf. Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005) and 
whose fiscal policy choices and outcomes are viewed more critically by financial 
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market participants. In contrast to budgetary rules and the EERP, market discipline 
offers both stick and carrot, via a change in borrowing costs. I argue that key to the 
disciplinarian success of market discipline is the fact that it is not faced with the 
second-order free riding problem (Oliver 1980), i.e. it is not a decentralised incentive 
provided within the collective action group. Markets do not punish governments 
primarily to prompt budgetary consolidation – market punishment is a by-product of 
risk pricing. These findings suggest an asymmetry; whereas stability free-riding was 
punished by the existence of separate and selective disincentives in the form of 
market discipline, growth free-riding was not subject to effective (dis)incentives, be 
they in the form of market discipline or fiscal agreements at the EU and domestic 
level. 
Building on the findings of group latency and asymmetric incentives to induce 
group-oriented behaviour, Chapter 7 tests whether fiscal policy coordination was 
marred by free-riding. Specifically, both stability and growth free-riding behaviour 
are investigated. The central claim of this chapter is that accusations of stability or 
growth free-riding are not borne out by factual evidence. Given that markets 
provided an Olsonian incentive against stability free-riding, growth free-riding is 
expected to be more prevalent. First, I rely on fuzzy Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis to show that despite their greater ability to free-ride, larger and more open 
economies implemented larger stimulus programmes. To better distinguish between 
growth and stability free-riding, I consider fiscal response strategies vis-à-vis a 
country’s fiscal space. This allows me to ask whether countries stimulated too much 
in relation to their small fiscal space (stability free-riding) or too little in relation to 
their large fiscal space (growth free-riding). In so doing, I construct a new composite 
indicator based on the EU’s Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP) and correlated its 
score with Member States fiscal crisis responses. Results show that, by and large, 
Member States stimulated their economies in line with their fiscal room for 
manoeuvre as laid out in the EERP. These findings are contrasted with the political 
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discourse of late 2008 and 2009, when accusations of growth free-riding were wide-
spread.
Stressful heterogeneities and the future of fiscal policy coordination
Fiscal policy concerns the collection and distribution of revenue across people and 
generations; it is at its core political. Thus it is hardly surprising that setting, or 
perhaps more to the point respecting, upper and lower limits for public finances is a 
formidable task for EU Member States – no matter how urgent or compelling the 
underlying logic of interdependence may be in suggesting a need for (greater) fiscal 
policy coordination. I have argued that fiscal policy outcomes do not emerge in a 
political vacuum, but are instead best described by a host of what are often called 
‘political-economy’ factors emerging from the interplay of politics and economics. 
Economic conditions in Europe, although not granted explanatory sufficiency or in 
some instances even primacy, set the scene for fiscal policy coordination. Ever since 
its creation the EU has aspired to cosmopolitan liberalism that is ‘united in diversity’. 
The past crises have revealed the limits of applying this motto to an ‘ever closer’ 
economic and monetary union, as the destabilising effects of a diversity found in 
macroeconomic imbalances became apparent. Economic diversity is increasing: in 
2012 growth developments in the EU diverged more strongly across Member States 
than in the previous years (European Commission 2012).156 While some Member 
States’ economies are growing, others still remain in, or are re-entering, recession. 
Yet this disparity points to more than just different economic growth trends; it is 
indicative of vastly different political challenges facing EU policy-makers in times of 
enduring financial instability and fiscal consolidation. The obvious division line 
separates debtor (programme) and creditor countries (cf. Dyson 2010), in addition to 
old parameters (eurozone and non-eurozone, north and south, core and periphery, old 
and new Member States). Different country groups have vastly different, even 
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156 See also Orriols (2013) on the merging ‘ideological divorce’ in the EU.
diametrically opposed, views on the scope and directionality of fiscal policy 
coordination, as well as the importance of and remedy for growth or stability free-
riding. Given the growing trends of fiscal adjustment and economic growth, that is 
growing ‘stressful heterogeneities’ (Varughese and Ostrom 2001: 762), it is unlikely 
that the latency of EU Member States will decrease in the near future. Building on 
Olson (1965), Member States would be well-advised to look for ‘innovative 
institutional arrangements well matched to their local circumstances’ (ibid.) in order 
to overcome these heterogeneities. Indeed, EU Member States have set out to reform 
economic governance and complemented the institutional arrangement in place to 
boost not only fiscal but also economic policy coordination more broadly. 
SGP 3.0 
The key reform piece, the so-called ‘Six Pack’, denotes a new set of rules for fiscal 
and macroeconomic surveillance in the EU. On paper, the Six Pack potentially 
strengthens the role of the Commission in both the corrective and the preventive arm 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. Much has been written about the possibility of 
sanctions under the EDP with the newly introduced reversed majority voting (e.g. 
Chang 2013; Hodson 2013b; Palmstorfer 2013). Specifically, the Commission 
recommendations to impose sanctions under the EDP may be over-ridden by the 
Council only by qualified majority. This modification harks back to 2003, when the 
Council voted to suspend the Commission’s recommendation to launch an EDP 
against France and Germany. Overriding the Commission is still possible; doing so 
simply requires a larger coalition of Member States.157 There is little reason to 
assume that SGP 3.0, as Larch et al. (2010b) call it, will exert more substantial 
pressures. The recent experience of the EDP shows that Member States are cautious 
not to escalate the procedure and avoid moving it up to the newly introduced reverse 
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157 It is speculative to assume that the 2003 vote in favour of Germany and France would not have 
succeeded under qualified majority, given that voting was endogenous to the threshold in place.
majority voting (Hodson 2013b).158 Crucially, reverse majority voting is not 
extended to all decisions taken by the Council. The key decision to place a country 
under EDP in the first place continues to be governed by the old qualified majority 
process. Since (re-)opening a wave of EDPs in 2008-2009, the delayed deadlines for 
correction of the excessive deficit have been set and generously revised, which 
involves commending EDP countries for having ‘complied’ with Council 
recommendations. The corollary of this practice may well be that ‘peer pressure’ 
erodes further as Member States congratulate themselves on actions taken. In sum, 
fiscal policy coordination under the SGP 3.0 remains subject to political capture by 
the Council. 
Domestic fiscal framework
Reinforcing domestic fiscal frameworks has emerged as a key response to the fiscal 
legacy of the crisis. Member States have been urged to strengthen domestic fiscal 
rules in line with the SGP ever since the 1990s. Indeed following the Commission’s 
recommendations, the Ecofin Council had repeatedly advised on the creation of a 
‘national stability pact’ in Germany to boost compliance with the SGP prior to the 
Great Recession.159 With the Fiscal Compact (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance),160 participating Member States committed to government budgets 
being at least close to balance in structural terms. Although the Stability and Growth 
Pact includes very similar requirements, the Fiscal Compact requires the inclusion of 
‘German style’ debt brakes in national law. The solutions identified in the Fiscal 
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158 It is telling that in the case of Hungary, the Council decided in 2012 to freeze its EU structural 
funds because Hungary did not take the necessary steps to correct its excessive deficit. Yet this move 
was more concerned with the democratic values of the EU, which were considered under threat by the 
nationalistic Orban government (see Johnson and Barnes 2013), than with concerns over fiscal policy 
coordination.
159 See ‘Council opinion of 28 February 2000 on the updated stability programme of Germany for the 
period 1999 to 2003’ and ‘Council opinion of 27 November 2000 on the updated stability programme 
of Germany for the period 2000 to 2004’.
160 The intergovernmental Fiscal Compact was signed by 25 Member States (all EU countries except 
the United Kingdom and Czech Republic) on 2 March 2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013 
following its ratification by Finland (the twelfth Member State to do so).
Compact offer an old disciplinarian remedy to fiscal policy coordination and are 
biased towards preventing stability free-riding. A more comprehensive ‘fiscal 
governance’ approach, championed by the Commission (2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b), 
also considers the role of independent fiscal institutions. As the Swedish case 
considered in Chapter 6 has shown, such a body of independent auditors may not 
only reign in creative accounting and overly optimistic forecasting (Hagemann 
2009), but can also address growth free-riding. That is to say, Fiscal Councils can 
offer a more balanced approach, considering not only the necessity for fiscal 
constraint but also the merits of fiscal expansions. 
Critics of the Fiscal Compact have pointed out that the debt brake’s cyclical 
component will render it open to political manipulation (Cottacorelli 2012; Hamker 
2012; Truger and Will 2012). What is more, there is compelling evidence that this 
type of numerical ceiling is not equally efficient for all types of governments 
(Hallerberg et al. 2009).161 And even where the fiscal governance mode corresponds 
to a country’s polity, it is not clear that ‘debt brakes’ provide a fiscal cure in the light 
of endemic financial instability and growing macroeconomic imbalances. Spain 
offers a case in point; in line with its underlying political environment, the country 
moved to a delegation mode of fiscal governance in the early years of the euro and 
implemented a debt brake which covers 100 per cent of general government finances 
– far more than the 53 per cent currently covered by the German debt brake. In 
Spain, gross central government debt as a percentage of GDP has risen from 40.2 per 
cent in 2008 to 91.3 in 2013. More broadly speaking, advances in fiscal rules have 
clearly not effectively counteracted developments in debt levels post 2007. Whereas 
the average Fiscal Rules Index improved steadily from -.66 in 1997 to .53 in 2011, 
debt levels have arrived at an all-time high (with an EU average of 83.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2011). As Chapter 6 has highlighted, in times of economic and financial 
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161 According to Hallerberg et al. (2009), the suitability of fiscal governance types hinges on the 
prevailing type of government in a given state. Single majority governments, regularly present in 
majoritarian electoral systems, should have a different type of fiscal governance than coalition 
governments, unusually present in highly proportional electoral systems.
crises, fiscal rules tend to fall by the wayside to make room for stimulus policies or, 
in many instances more importantly, financial sector rescue packages. Without 
addressing the underlying causes for exploding debt levels, which a ‘common pool’ 
view of public finances alone cannot account for, there is little reason to assume that 
the debt brake solution will go a long way towards improving compliance with the 
SGP.
The economic governance reforms of 2011-2013 have fallen ‘short of what the 
Commission itself had initially supported’ (Cottacorelli 2012: 370) and fail to create 
a system of strong separate and selective incentives to overcome stressful 
heterogeneities. In this thesis I argue that institutional arrangements during the Great 
Recession were weak; neither domestic nor EU-level agreements on fiscal policy 
outcomes provided a meaningful incentive for group-oriented behaviour. However 
shared policy ideas on public finances, as well as market discipline, have been shown 
to restrain free-riding behaviour. Firstly, a broad consensus on the need for stimulus 
politics to boost demand by and large meant that Member States did not free-ride on 
other countries’ discretionary spending despite having the fiscal space to introduce 
stimulus packages themselves (i.e. growth free-riding). Second, the discipline 
imposed by financial markets’ sovereign risk pricing meant that Member States were 
constrained in their stimulus efforts and by and large did not introduce stimulus 
packages that exceeded their fiscal space (i.e. stability free-riding). Both can thus 
function as a substitute for strong institutional commitment to shape group-oriented 
behaviour. 
A new paradigm for fiscal policy coordination? 
It would be precipitous to seek to arrive at a verdict on the overall impact or 
significance of the Great Recession in terms of a new fiscal policy paradigm. Yet, it 
is not premature to identify emerging patterns and to consider their potential 
importance for the future of EU fiscal policy coordination. The paradigm adaptation 
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prompted by the upheaval of the economic and financial crisis can be best described 
as a paradigm expansion. This expansion covers two interrelated aspects. First, fiscal 
policy coordination during the Great Recession was for the first time concerned not 
only with the mutual management of coordinated constraint but also of coordinated 
expansion. Second, the old consensus on the ‘sound money and finance 
paradigm’ (also called ‘Great Moderation’ paradigm) has not survived the economic 
fallout unscathed. Faced with its limitations in explaining, let alone preventing, the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, policy-makers at the domestic and EU level were 
increasingly looking for more nuanced guidelines on macroeconomic 
management.162 As will be discussed below, both characteristics are reflected in the 
post-crisis reforms and in the first round of fiscal policy coordination under the new 
economic governance framework. 
After the Great Moderation
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 has been widely heralded as a fundamental 
challenge to models of neoliberal governance. As Peck et al. (2010: 94, own 
emphasis) put it, ‘[n]ever before has the question of neoliberalism’s political, 
economic, and social role – culpability might be a better word – been debated with 
such urgency, so globally, and in such a public manner’. Within the G20, for 
example, the broadening of the Great Moderation paradigm was expressed by the 
newly created Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), which essentially establishes a 
toned down version of the EU Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(Rommerskirchen 2011). The search for ‘better’ policy paradigms and lessons to 
draw from the economic fall-out in the wake of the Great Recession can thus hardly 
be portrayed as an exercise confined to the EU. Yet the EU stands out in this quest in 
that it responded to the challenges to the Great Moderation paradigm with an 
institutional reform unparalleled at the international level. Indeed the Great 
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162 Financial regulation is experiencing a comparable paradigm adaptation described under the 
heading of ‘macro-prudential regulation’ (Baker 2012).
Recession, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis in particular, has triggered the most 
substantial economic governance reform since the Maastricht Treaty. The Six Pack 
institutionalises a paradigm expansion, which can be referred to as ‘the Great 
Stability’ paradigm. The past crises have refuted the existing belief that the sound 
fiscal (according to the SGP) and monetary policy (according to the ECB) would 
ensure macroeconomic stability. Of course, for all EU Member States but Greece, the 
fallout during the crises years was not a direct result of fiscal profligacy. This 
obvious finding is at odds with the German remedy to the two interrelated crises, 
which championed fiscal rules (as defined in the Fiscal Compact) and a commitment 
to a renewed Stability Culture (meaning low inflation and low deficits) as the 
panacea for the EU’s current woes (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). Yet there is 
reason to believe that the German “Stability Culture view” of economic stability is 
losing support in Europe. Within academia there is a broad consensus that neither the 
financial crisis of 2008 nor the Sovereign Debt Crisis can or should be cast as a 
cautionary tale of governments living beyond their means (e.g. Armingeon and 
Baccaro 2012; Blyth 2013; de Grauwe 2013; Streek 2013). Moreover within the 
Commission, the political business cycle theory of exploding debt levels (Buchanan 
1958) is losing ground. This is perhaps clearest in Buti and Carnot’s article (2012) on 
the early lessons and reforms of the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis. Indeed since the 
eruption of the financial and economic crises in 2008, the Commission has 
considered the Great Recession as a multi-layered crisis (see European Commission 
2009) and the dramatic increase of government deficits and debt as ‘not essentially 
of a fiscal nature’ (European Commission 2012: 67). Looking beyond ‘fiscal 
indicators’, addressing the causes and consequences of ‘imbalances’ has, once again 
(Bordo 2005), gained momentum in international macroeconomic policy 
coordination, amongst both policy-makers (the G20’s MAP being a key example) 
and IPE scholars (e.g. Frieden 2009; Bird 2013; Willett and Chiu 2012).  
The SGP can no longer be credibly perceived as a safeguard against instability or the 
need to bail out other Member States (see Chapter 2). Fiscal policy coordination, 
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with its focus on low deficit and debt levels, did not address the structural problems 
in the financial sector that caused both the economic and financial crisis of 2007 and 
the subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis. Wyplosz (2013) attempts to rescue the ‘sound 
fiscal policy’ paradigm by redefining fiscal discipline: ‘the Sovereign Debt Crisis is 
the result of a lack of fiscal discipline broadly defined to include adequate banking 
supervision’. This definition is not helpful; the attempt to bring the experience of the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis under the mantle of the SGP risks confounding financial 
regulation and public finances, that is the causality between fiscal policy outcomes 
and financial sector bailouts. Sound fiscal policy is hardly possible without sound 
financial regulation. The real threat to macroeconomic stability was found in the 
financial-fiscal feedback loop (Schelkle 2012), not in corybantic policy makers 
seeking to buy electoral favour. Critics of the post-crises reforms have been quick to 
point out that the reforms exclude vital elements to ensure the stability of both the 
eurozone and the EU economies as a whole (e.g. Katrop and Ebert 2012; Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff 2012). Yet the Six Pack signals a substantial shift from a narrow 
surveillance of fiscal headline indicators towards broad macroeconomic surveillance. 
Even prior to the crisis, fiscal policy coordination under the SGP was failing (see 
Chapter 1). The experience of the crisis has shown that the underlying cause for this 
is not because Member States refuse to accept a deficit limit that would constraint 
their public finances. Member States are not prepared to accept rules for fiscal 
stimulus policies as well. In other words, the failure covers both fiscal constraint and 
fiscal expansion. The SGP was created to prevent other Member States from 
requiring a bailout either from the ECB or from one another. It did not succeed on 
either account. Ultimately the Pact has not fulfilled its purpose and should be 
disbanded. This is neither a radical, nor a novel suggestion (e.g. Enderlein 2004). In 
principle, low budget deficits are desirable; countries running excessive deficits need 
to consolidate public finances. The problem is rather that the Pact signals a hierarchy 
of policy goals that is not justified. Disbanding the SGP can be done relatively 
straightforwardly. The MIP establishes the bridge between macroeconomic 
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imbalances and fiscal sustainability. In an accompanying document (European 
Commission 2011), the Commission emphasises that ‘the sustainability of public 
finances will not be assessed in the context of the MIP given that this issue is already 
covered by the SGP’. From an economic point of view, the artificial differentiation 
between macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal sustainability is impractical. In the 
Commission’s justification of the choice of indicators, accompanied by a 
comprehensive review of the literature (European Commission 2011), the link 
between each indicator and fiscal sustainability, default, and crisis incidences is 
meticulously presented (e.g. Kaminzki et al. 1998, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1996, 
Jorda et al. 2011, ECB 2010). Currently the scoreboard includes the general 
government sector debt in percentage of GDP, with a threshold of 60 per cent. By 
complementing this indicator with a (structural) deficit measure, the MIP could 
replace the SGP. Doing so would allow the Commission, as the guardian of the Pact 
to keep face and continue the work of the SGP. The European Semester 
recommendations already read like a more detailed and nuanced version of the EDP. 
Resolving the SGP into the MIP and the European Semester would uphold the idea 
of fiscal restraint while at the same time increasing the profile of these new 
processes. The Stability and Growth Pact can and should go gently into that good 
night. 
Growth and Stability: the challenge of growth-friendly consolidation
A tension between the prioritisation of and relationship between economic growth 
and economic stability was manifest in EU fiscal policy coordination ever since its 
inception. Considering the on-going challenge to consolidate both goals, the EU has 
come a long way. Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact was single-mindedly 
concerned with the achievement of low budget deficits, the economic governance 
landscape of 2013 strives to balance both interdependent policy goals. The 
recommendations for fiscal consolidation are not imposing a hard doctrine of 
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austerity that depicts fiscal consolidation as the harbinger of growth (see Blyth 
2013). In the words of EU President Barroso (2013):
‘The Commission […] will never propose a policy that is only based on the correction of the 
deficits. […] We  need to combine the indispensable, I underline indispensable, correction of 
the disequilibria in public finances, namely huge deficits, huge public debt, fiscal rigour, this 
is indispensable, we need to complement this with proper measures for growth, including 
short term measures for growth, because we know that some of those reforms take time to 
produce effect.’
The post-reform application of newly created or modified institutional tools suggests 
that Barroso’s statement amounts to more than the strategic appeasement of an 
audience weary of painful austerity measures. The post-2008 flexibility was endorsed 
by Ecfin Commissioner Rehn (2012): ‘contrary to the misleading impression […] 
that the EU fiscal framework forces all Member States into a 'one-size-fits-all' 
consolidation straightjacket, the Stability and Growth Pact is not stupid.’ But then 
again, stupid or not, the current SGP is neither a suitable nor an effective tool for the 
coordination of fiscal polices. Secondly, the experience of the European Semester in 
2012 suggests that growth concerns are present. This is already expressed in the 
design of the process; country-specific recommendations for each Member State are 
based on both the Stability and Convergence Programmes and on policy measures to 
boost growth and jobs (as identified in the National Reform Programmes). European 
Semester recommendations explicitly caution against overly drastic austerity efforts. 
The communication to the Czech government for example, warns that ‘swift and 
durable recovery is hindered in the Czech Republic by repeated cuts in public 
investment expenditure’ (COU 2013a); similarly the communication to the Polish 
government advises that ‘a low share of growth-enhancing expenditure (education, 
research and innovation) and declining public investments hamper long term growth 
prospects’ (COU 2013b). 
Still the EDP and the European Semester are primarily concerned with ‘sound public 
finances’. The discussion of economic growth differs fundamentally from the debates 
on ‘growth free-riding’ during the Great Recession. The recommendations to the 
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Czech and Polish government illustrate this point. Crucially, both governments are 
not cautious about easing austerity measures to boost economic growth throughout 
the EU, but because specific policies work against the goal of meeting the EDP 
targets. In other words, concerns about economic growth (or growth-friendly 
consolidation, see below) are a means to an end: respecting the SGP. Note that 
surplus countries, or Member States who are currently not subject to an EDP, were 
not recommended to ease their consolidation efforts.163 The public good in question 
is not the economic recovery of neighbouring states, or free-riding on other Member 
States by weakening domestic demand, but again stability as expressed by ‘sound 
public finances’. This logic re-imposes the hierarchy of pre-crisis goals. 
Of all the new processes for macroeconomic surveillance and coordination, the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure has the strongest potential to address growth 
free-riding. The selection of cases is a matter of discretion for the European 
Commission. The aim of the scoreboard is to filter countries that warrant in-depth 
studies, in order to determine whether the potential imbalances identified in the 
early-warning system are benign or problematic. In its publication ‘Scoreboard for 
the Surveillance for Macroeconomic Imbalances’ the Commission (DG Ecfin. 2012) 
presents a clear focus on account deficit countries: 
‘In particular, unlike current account deficits, large and sustained current account surpluses do 
not raise the same concerns about the sustainability of external debt and financing capacities, 
concerns that can affect the smooth functioning of the euro area (which is a key criterion for 
triggering the corrective arm of the MIP). This means that surveillance under the MIP will 
encompass all Member States, but that a greater degree of urgency is required in countries with 
large current account deficits and competitiveness losses.’ 
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163 This is essentially what is proposed by Wyplosz and Ji (2013: 38): ‘The creditor countries that have 
stabilized their debt ratios should stop trying to balance their budgets now that the eurozone is 
entering a new recession’.
This emphasis can be traced back to the Van Rompuy Task Force164 report (2010) 
which concludes that ‘given vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment 
required, the need for policy action is particularly pressing in Member States 
showing persistently large current-account deficits and large competitiveness losses’. 
This means that surplus countries set the benchmark for good behaviour to be 
emulated by Member States running an external deficit (Heise 2011: 14). Out of the 
2012 in-depth EIP countries, the Netherlands and Sweden were surplus countries. Yet 
this was not the reason for their selection (the cause being concerns over private 
sector/household debt). The evaluations state that ‘the competitiveness and export 
performance of the Dutch economy appears to be benign overall’ (COU 2013c) and 
that ‘the Swedish current account surplus is large, but it does not seem to point to an 
underlying imbalance in the economy’ (COU 2013d). The country selection of the 
2012 EIP clearly shows that imbalances are considered ‘an asymmetrical 
problem’ (Schwarzer 2012: 38) which places the burden of correction on the deficit 
countries. Hodson (2013) characterises this as ‘a politically convenient asymmetry 
given the reluctance of German authorities to countenance measures that could 
hinder the country's external competitiveness’. Against this backdrop, the decision of 
the European Commission to launch an in-depth review against Germany in 
November 2013 came as a surprise to many. Following statistical revisions, the 
external surplus indicator has exceeded the threshold each year since 2007, with the 
surplus expected to remain above the indicative threshold over the forecast horizon. 
Opening an in-depth review against ‘the euro area’s unofficial leader, hub economy 
and chief creditor’ (the Economist 16.11.2013) suggests a willingness from the 
Commission’s side to address ‘growth-free riding’ under the MIP.
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164 In March 2010, Member States, with the German Chancellor taking the lead, appointed the Council 
President Herman van Rompuy as the chief mediator under the Van Rompuy Task Force (VRTF), to 
work on a proposal to reform the existing economic governance architecture. The task force was 
composed of the finance ministers of the 27 Member States, thus making it a distinctly 
intergovernmental group. In parallel to the VRTF, the Commission was working on its own proposal. 
The Great Stability Paradigm
The MIP, though still in its infancy, has the potential to provide not only a broad 
review of economic policy surveillance, but also support the twin notion of free-
riding. This could take place both in terms of the interpretation of the account surplus 
threshold as well as the modification of the scoreboard.165 A provocative Economic 
Papers article, written by the Commission’s Jan in ’t Veld (2013), estimates the 
impact of fiscal consolidation measures undertaken in the 2011-13 in the eurozone 
periphery and core. In ’t Veld shows that spillovers from consolidations in Germany 
and core eurozone have worsened the overall economic situation (see also Chapter 
2). The degree of consolidation in Germany and other core countries is considered to 
be in contrast to the fiscal space these countries had in the crisis and ‘have made 
adjustment in the periphery harder, and have further exacerbated the temporary 
worsening of the debt-to-GDP ratios in programme and vulnerable countries’ (ibid.
15). In ’t Veld’s findings point to post-crisis growth free-riding (i.e. too much 
consolidation in the light of sufficient fiscal space) by Germany and other core 
countries in the aftermath of the Great Recession. According to the author, ‘optimal 
policy coordination in the euro area would have required a differentiation of 
consolidation efforts depending on the fiscal space to minimise the negative 
spillovers’ (ibid.). This paper, although not necessarily reflecting the Commission’s 
views, is interesting in that it suggests a broader appreciation of fiscal free-riding 
behaviour within the Commission than Oli Rehn’s rebuke on the negative fiscal 
multipliers166 would suggest. 
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165 The Commission specifically concedes this point: “The composition of the scoreboard indicators 
may evolve over time” (European Commission 2011).
166 In February 2013 Oli Rehn, the Commissioner of Economic and Monetary Affairs, sent a letter to 
EU Finance Ministers criticising a recent IMF publication that suggested that the size of fiscal 
multipliers was larger then previously assumed and that fiscal consolidation could worsen public 
finances. According to Rehn (2013) this ‘debate that has not been helpful’ and the Commissioner 
sought to swear Member States to the grim necessity of continued austerity politics.
The current state of fiscal policy coordination (that is, at the time of writing, almost 
exclusively the coordination of fiscal consolidation) shows that the emerging ‘Great 
Stability Paradigm’ is far from being universally accepted. How large should 
consolidation efforts be? Should surplus countries be expected to run a temporary 
fiscal stimulus to boost output and help reduce their current account surpluses? How 
much should national taxpayers pay for other EU countries in need of financial 
assistance? These questions remain contested among EU Member States and unless a 
new fiscal policy consensus can be forged, there is little reason to assume that policy 
ideas can serve as an Olsonian incentive, which could prevent stability or growth 
free-riding.
Market Discipline and stability free-riding
I have argued in Chapter 6 that de facto market discipline constrained public finances 
and limited stability free-riding behaviour during the Great Recession: by and large, 
Member States’ fiscal crisis responses did not exceed their fiscal space. Since the 
eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis erupted in 2009, market punishment has featured 
prominently in fiscal policy debates. How much should EU Member States, and 
particularly those inside the eurozone, rely on financial market participants to reign 
in other states’ ‘excessive’ spending and boost consolidation? How can market forces 
be mitigated and be made to work in favour of achieving sound fiscal policies? 
Market discipline, despite its obvious shortcomings, is still attractive for policy-
makers who wish to outsource the politically difficult process of peer discipline (see 
the discussion on second-order free riding problems in Chapter 6). 
Various proposals (for a review see Curzio 2011) on a common issuance of sovereign 
bonds, which would tame market discipline to varying degrees, were met with no 
success. As the Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds 
(European Commission 2011) put it, ‘[the] more extensively credit risk would be 
pooled among sovereigns, the lower would be market volatility but also market 
230
discipline on any individual sovereign’. This in turn means that ‘fiscal stability 
would have to rely more strongly on discipline provided by political 
processes’ (ibid.). Proposals of common bond issuances suggest a long-term solution 
to the ‘too much’ question of market discipline. Eurobonds set clear targets167 for 
sovereign borrowing that should be ‘punished’ (via changes in risk premiums or the 
bond maturity structure) by financial market participants. In this respect they are 
comparable to the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently the Stability and Growth Pact 
which established, albeit temporarily, new criteria of markets’ evaluation of 
sovereign risk (see Mosley 2004). 
The challenge remains to ‘find a way to channel market discipline in a positive 
way’ (Hallerberg 2011: 129). The persisting weakness of the reformed economic 
governance architecture in combination with an explicit endorsement of financial 
market pressure, suggest that EU policy-makers are prepared, for better or worse, to 
continue to rely on market discipline as a means to limit stability free-riding. Despite 
the tremendous upheaval of the eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis, EU policy-makers 
did not agree to discourage discrimination in sovereign risk pricing. On the contrary, 
the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU, 2012) launched into a full-
hearted defence of market discipline at a EU summit: 
‘But we must not simply abandon interest rates as a disciplinary mechanism. Governments 
need the markets. Markets tell governments things that governments don’t want to hear. And 
they force governments to do the right thing, although too often too late and too suddenly. 
For this reason, I am convinced that we cannot do away with the threat of higher interest 
rates for spendthrift states.’168
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167 For instance, according to Delpa and von Weizäcker’s proposal (2010), the bond issue of every 
participating country would be divided into a blue bond part of up to 60 per cent of a country’s GDP 
and a red part for the rest of its outstanding debt. Only the blue bond would be guaranteed by all 
members. This is thought to channel market forces to target (demand risk premiums on) red bonds. 
According to Schelkle’s (2012) Eurobond proposal, Member States agree on the overall volume of 
Eurobonds to be guaranteed collectively and the share of each Member State. If a country wants to 
issue debt beyond the agreed quota it has to do so by borrowing at for some countries presumably 
higher country rates.
168 Wren-Lewis (2013) goes one step further and argues in favour of market discipline formally 
replacing the SGP: fiscal governance can and should reside at the national level, where it can focus on 
both national stabilisation and the control of public debt. 
Moderating market discipline
Ever since the dawn of financial globalisation, policy-makers in the developing and 
developed world have sought to (re)define the relationship between global capital 
markets and government autonomy (Weiss 1998; Jessop 2002; Mosely 2005). For 
EMU policy-makers this challenge is complicated by the unique status of eurozone 
membership. In Chapter 6 I argue that the constraints of market discipline are higher 
inside EMU than outside. The vulnerability of EMU Member States during the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis has certainly lead to an increasing awareness that 
EU Member States and policy-makers can and should moderate market discipline. In 
his foreword to the celebratory publication the EU@10, then ECFIN Commissioner 
Almunia (2008: 2) has already upheld the principle of market discipline while at the 
same time pushing for greater economic surveillance. In his words, the Commission 
‘cannot rely on market discipline alone. We need to deepen and broaden 
macroeconomic surveillance in EMU and encourage structural reforms by 
integrating them into the process of policy coordination’ (ibid.). This view retains, 
and increasingly so, strong currency among EU policy-makers, both at the national 
and the EU level: market discipline needs to be mitigated where it is considered too 
strong and supplemented by macroeconomic surveillance where it is considered too 
weak. The approach of combining market discipline and EU rules has been favoured 
by the architects of EMU from the beginning of the ‘road to Maastricht’, as it was 
thought to addresses the problems of moral hazard and herd behaviour. The first 
concerns the incentives of national policy-makers and financial market participants, 
the second the potential irrationality of market forces. The moral hazard of bailout 
expectations would then alter both the behaviour of market participants and that of 
Member State governments. Concerning the first, the European Commission (1990: 
122), for instance, was concerned that market discipline may not be sufficient ‘due to 
expectations of Community assistance’. This concern was already raised in the 
Lamfalussy report (1989), which pointed out that closer economic integration might 
generate expectations that a country in critical conditions would be bailed out by the 
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other countries. Market discipline, so the argument goes, would be weak and risk 
pricing would not accurately reflect a country’s sovereign risk. In the absence of 
strong market discipline and assuming community assistance, eurozone Member 
States would then run higher deficits then they would if they were outside the 
eurozone. Besides the issue of moral hazard, the architects of EMU were also 
cautious about relying on market forces alone to discipline governments on the 
grounds that financial market participants are prone to herd behaviour (Lux 1995). 
The Delors Report (1989: 20) comes out clearly against enlisting market forces 
because instead of ‘leading to a gradual adaptation of borrowing costs, market views 
about the creditworthiness of official borrowers tend to change abruptly and result in 
the closure of access to market financing’. Here, market perceptions are 
characterised as unreliable and erratic.169 
Kuenzel and Ruscher (2013: 4) argue that ‘underpinning the prevailing pre-crisis 
attitude of “benign neglect” towards wider macroeconomic vulnerabilities may have 
been a tacit belief that the main disciplining role should fall to financial markets’. 
This belief in the rectifying force of market discipline has been called into question 
by the 2008-2013 crises. Part of the problem lies in the narrow focus of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. By setting the deficit ceiling of 3 per cent, policy-makers 
influenced the criteria for fiscal sustainability used in market participants’ evaluation 
of sovereign risk (Mosley 2004). But, again, respecting the SGP neither sufficed to 
ensure sound macroeconomic policies across the EU nor prevented the financial 
sector crises, as risks originated in much broader developments (Buti and Carnot 
2012). The MIP offers a more comprehensive account of stability than the SGP. 
There seems to be an awareness that the MIP can evolve into the same information 
shortcut for markets that the Convergence Criteria did in the mid-1990s. This is 
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169 It appears that even during the Sovereign Debt Crisis .bond yield spreads can still largely be 
explained on the basis of economic fundamentals during the crisis (e.g. von Hagen et al. 2011). What 
is more, despite the political discourse accusing financial markets of ‘running riot’ (Sarkozy 2011) and 
of ‘speculating on the debt that was taken on to save these very institutions’ (Merkel 2010), there is 
‘no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets’ (Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas 2011: 1).
evidenced by the fact that in the first round of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, 
no country (not even Cyprus where a banking crisis erupted in the following year) 
was found to have excessive macroeconomic imbalances. The cautious wording 
(‘very serious’ instead of ‘excessive’) of country reports suggests a guarded 
approach, so as not to alert financial markets and signal credit risks.
The Future of Art. 125
Lane (1993) argues that four criteria need to be fulfilled for market discipline to be 
effective.170 First, financial markets must be free and open. Second, markets must 
have adequate and accurate information about the conditions which they consider 
indicative of sovereign risk. Thirdly, lenders will not be bailed out in the case of an 
impending default, and finally, borrowers are responsive to market signals before 
being excluded from the markets. Of these four conditions, the third one poses the 
biggest obstacle to effective market discipline in the future. Crucially, Lane considers 
this to be not only the most important reason for the failure of market discipline but 
also the most difficult criterion to be met. The reason for this lies in the fact that it 
relates to the credibility of a non-commitment. EU Member States not only have to 
pledge not to bail each other out (see Article 125 TFEU), but market participants 
must also believe that this promise will be kept. 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis has shown that the no-bail-out pledges of the ECB and 
Member States came at a high cost. In the light of policy interdependence, the 
negative economic consequences of not providing financial assistance to a Member 
State in distress made it effectively impossible to ever really enforce the no-bailout-
provisions. Chapter 2 presented policy coordination as a direct result of policy 
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170 The criteria of Hallerberg (2011) are similar to Lane (1993). Specifically, Hallerberg argues that 
markets need to have accurate information, the market valuation of a given state must be an accurate 
valuation of the sustainability of that state’s finances (i.e. including the probability of a bailout); and 
populations need to interpret market discipline as an indication about their government’s competence 
and punish governments that face market pressure. It is this punishment which would induce what 
Lane considers to be the fourth criterion of market discipline, namely policy-maker responsiveness. 
interdependence. Of course interdependence may not only necessitate coordination, 
but also intervention. In recognition of the need for financial assistance, the EU and 
its eurozone Member States set up stabilisation mechanisms consisting of the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF).  The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which builds 
on the EFSF, was inaugurated in October 2012 and will be the primary support 
mechanism to Eurozone Member States.171 Whereas the EFSF was based upon 
backing Member States’ guarantees, the ESM has subscribed capital, providing a 
lending capacity of !500bn by 2014. 
These mechanisms did very little to mitigate market discipline, simply because their 
capacity to bail out countries in distress remains questionable. First, receiving 
financial assistance is based on conditionality and political uncertainty. Member 
States seeking assistance were required to sign the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 
obliging programme countries to implement substantial reforms and fiscal 
consolidation. This austerity mix does not seem to improve sovereign risk in the 
short term. As IMF Chief Economist Oliver Blanchard (2012) put it, ‘financial 
investors are schizophrenic about fiscal consolidation and growth. They react 
positively to news of fiscal consolidation, but then react negatively later, when 
consolidation leads to lower growth.’ Secondly, EFSF involvement may introduce 
‘Private Sector Involvement’ (PSI). PSI was introduced in the financial assistance 
package to Greece and market participants may believe that this sets a precedent for 
similar conditions on EFSF lending in the future. Collignon (2012:32) considers that 
as a result, ‘promises by Member State governments are no longer credible and risk 
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171 Comparable Balance of Payment assistance is available to non-eurozone Member States (in limited 
amounts, with a maximum set by regulation).
adverse investors shy away from holding European sovereign bonds’.172 Thirdly and 
most importantly, the funds are simply not sufficiently leveraged to support countries 
in need. Wyplosz (2012: 16) assumes that ‘the EFSF is a sideshow that provides the 
ECB with an excuse not to act as lender of last resort’.173 Since 2009 the ECB has 
taken numerous initiatives to fight liquidity problems affecting financial institutions 
and ensure a smooth transmission of monetary policy, notably through intervention 
in secondary sovereign markets. Despite these ‘unconventional’ measures, bond 
spreads were still rising. In July 2012, with feasible policy options dwindling and 
inadequate Member State government action, the ECB president Mario Draghi 
(2012a) declared that it would do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’. The 
desired effect of this announcement was almost instantaneous. In Spain, for example, 
the interest rate on ten-year government bonds fell from 7.62 to 6.75 per cent within 
a week of Draghi’s promise and to 5.27 per cent by the end of 2012, with similar 
effects observable throughout the eurozone (Hodson 2013b). Subsequently the ECB 
has become the de facto lender of last resort with the launch of ‘outright monetary 
transactions’ (OMT) that put a backstop to the Sovereign Debt Crisis. These 
transactions, which allow for the purchase of government bonds in the secondary 
market, are essentially a financial assistance mechanism. Similar to the ESM, OMT 
countries are subject to strict conditionality and approval is subject to a similar 
procedure (with the support from the EU and the IMF needed). 
In the short-run Draghi’s pledge has mitigated market discipline; the No-Bail-Out 
Clause is no longer, if it ever was, credible. That does not however mean that market 
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172  It remains to be see how much of a surprise the ‘haircut’ really was and whether loses under PSI 
were already included in investors’ models of risk pricing. Buchheit and Mita Gulati (2010) argue that 
the inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs), which aim at facilitating the process of restructuring 
outstanding bonds, would make little difference provided debt continues to be issued under national 
law and CACs may be difficult to implement in practice or unnecessary. Conversely Hallerberg (2011: 
139) suggests that ‘a real ‘haircut’ is necessary in this worst-case scenario to ensure that markets play 
some sort of disciplining role in the future’. Jens Weidemann (2011), the President of the German 
Bundesbank, expressed his dissatisfaction with the introduction of CACs as they did not go far 
enough in guaranteeing private sector involvement. He instead championed the Bundesbank’s 
proposal to a trigger clause stipulating that maturities will be automatically extended for a fixed period 
of time in the event of ESM assistance for a Member State. 
173 A lender of last resort is the ultimate source of credit for a given country's financial system.
discipline will stop. The main reason for this lies in the fact that current bailout 
arrangements, whether they involve Member States or the ECB, are deeply political. 
Their credibility is, in other words, contingent on the political ability and willingness 
to assist other Member States in crisis. Bond yields for crisis countries in the 
periphery have not fallen uniformly and market participants continue to distinguish 
between Member States’ credit risk (ECB 2013c). Yet given the unresolved 
vulnerability of the EU banking sector and the threat of contagion, it is unlikely that 
a Member State in distress would be denied financial assistance, irrespective of the 
commitment to OMT/ESM conditionality. The treatment of Greece is likely to set the 
tone here. In times of crisis it is simply impracticable to enforce harsh conditionality 
to the point where ‘non-compliance’ with the agreed lending conditions would lead 
to a break of financial assistance.174 Given the persistence of the nexus of financial 
sector and sovereign credit risk (Acharya et al. 2011), financial assistance is likely to 
be a permanent and resilient feature of EU economic governance. This has 
implications for fiscal policy coordination. As one interviewee from the Commission 
concluded, ‘[fiscal policy] coordination was thought to work through peer pressure, 
then it became peer review, and now we reached a phase of peer support’ (author 
interview, Spring 2011).
Issues for the future
Fiscal policy coordination in the near future is not condemned to failure. Despite the 
lack of coordination during the Great Recession and the fact that group latency 
among EU Member States is likely to increase, the incentives for group-oriented 
behaviour are, at least in theory, strengthened. The Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure in particular has the potential to evolve into a comprehensive review of 
Member States’ economic policies, which could address both stability and growth 
free-riding. The latter is particularly relevant as the pre-crises (2008-2010) consensus 
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174 This is not to suggest that past consolidation efforts were not tremendous or painful. 
on the merits of stimulus spending has eroded and EU public opinion is currently 
divided on the right policy mix in times of sluggish economic growth and fragile 
financial systems (Eurobarometer 76.1). In this climate, the emerging ‘Great Stability  
Paradigm’ is far from universally accepted. In principle, the MIP is however well 
suited to help forge a new policy consensus. Pre-crises, the SGP was a predominately  
numerical exercise (honing in on the fiscal deficit criterion of the Maastricht Treaty) 
in the hope of improving compliance if fiscal policy coordination was focused on a 
visible and straightforward number that was not open to contestation within the 
Council. Conversely, the 6-Pack opens up the debate on ‘good’ macroeconomic 
policies and thereby creates a space for policy contestation and learning. This may 
make fiscal policy coordination burdensome, complex and even contradictive in the 
short run. In the long run there is a chance that the new practices and processes of 
fiscal policy coordination may result in a new strong policy consensus. Applying 
McNamara’s (1998) argument of the transformative power of Germany’s monetarist 
ideas, a new post-crises policy consensus may redefine state interests in cooperation 
and the group-oriented behaviour needed to sustain the interdependence reinforced 
by E(M)U membership. 
In the meantime, the 2011 reforms have not moved beyond an incentive system that 
is marred by second-order free-riding problems. Despite this failure stability free-
riding is unlikely to be rampant. I have argued in this thesis that during the Great 
Recession market discipline has deterred Member States from implementing 
stimulus policies that exceed their fiscal space. Although the creation of the ESM/
EFSF and the OMT backstop (with the onus on the latter) have prevented an 
escalation of the Sovereign Debt Crisis, pivotal further steps – notably, fiscal 
integration (i.e. Eurobonds) as well a financial integration (i.e. Banking Union, see 
Howarth and Quaglia 2013) – have escaped agreement to date. The past and current 
design of EMU has thus emerged as the midwife of market discipline. 
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In times of fiscal consolidation, financial markets offer a scapegoat for unpopular 
policy choices. Austerity politics are thus presented as the forced policy of a state 
that has become a residual authority sandwiched between financial market pressure 
and the conditionality of EU financial assistance. This view is echoed by De Grauwe 
and Ji (2013b), who argue that austerity measures in peripheral eurozone Member 
States ‘have been dictated too much by market sentiment instead of being the 
outcome of rational decision-making processes’. Consequently, fiscal consolidation 
is the price for restoring market confidence (Altman 2013). This narrative of the 
powerless state, faced with, as the French President Hollande (2012) put it, ‘the 
enemy [of] the world of finance’, is politically convenient. Extending Schäuble’s 
(2012) logic, financial markets not only ‘tell policy-makers what they don’t want to 
hear’, but also what other Member States cannot or do not want to enforce. Not 
wanting to forgo the disciplinarian effects of sovereign risk pricing, policy-makers 
have amplified the constraints of market discipline (de Grauwe 2011; Gros 2011) 
with considerable costs for national economies and the E(M)U project as a whole. 
This rekindling of market discipline put existing assumptions of credit risks into 
question – ‘old market assumptions have broken down’ (Financial Times 9.06.2010). 
Phillips (2012: 4; see also Barta 2011) suggests that the past crisis years have 
revealed ‘a new paradigm of financial market behaviour in developed countries'. If 
this is indeed the case, EU policy-makers need to reconcile the constraints of 
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Appendices
A1. Data Definitions and Sources
" BB: Change in the budget balance (Source: Ameco 2012).
" PB: Change in the primary budget balance (-interest payments) (Source: Ameco 
2012).
" SB: Change in the structural budget balance (Source: Ameco 2012).
" PSB: Change in the primary structural balance (Source: Ameco 2012).
"GDP: Real GDP annual growth rate in % (Source: Ameco 2012).
"DEBT: Change in general government gross public debt as a share of GDP in % 
(Source: Ameco 2012).
BAILOUT: Direct costs (recorded as an increase in debt) of financial sector 
interventions in % of GDP (Source: Eurostat 2012). 
AS: Size of automatic stabilisers as % of GDP. Calculated as the change in the output 
gap multiplied by the revenue-to-GDP ratio (used as a proxy of the semi-elasticities 
of the budget balance) (Source: Ameco 2012).
HERFGOV: The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government. In 
the case of “other” parties, Herfindahl divides the number of “other” seats by the 
number of “other” parties and uses this average for the size of the “other” parties. 
Independents are calculated as if they were individual parties with one seat each.
(Source: Beck et al. 2001).
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HERFOPP:Calculated in the same manner as the Herfindahl Government. Equals 
NA if there is no parliament. If there are any opposition parties where seats are 
unknown (cell is blank), the Herfindahl is also blank (Source: Beck et al. 2001)
LEFT: A 0-1 dummy, coded 1 if a left government is in power. Variable is for based 
on EXECRLC in Beck et al. (2001) which records the party orientation of the 
executive with respect to economic policy. Left: for parties that are defined as 
communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing.
ELECTION: A 0-1 dummy, coded 1 if an election was held in that year (Source: 
Beck et al. 2001).
FISRULE: Standardised Fiscal Rules Index. The fiscal rules index measures the 
strength of fiscal rules based on their legal basis, coverage, strictness of monitoring 
and enforcement, and media visibility (Source: European Commission 2012).
INTEREST: Debt servicing costs, interest expenditure as % of GDP (Source: Ameco 
2012).
EU: A 0-1 dummy, coded 1 for EU membership.
EUROZONE: A 0-1 dummy, coded 1 for eurozone membership.
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A2. Figures and tables
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Figure 3.1 The three-step testing design 
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igure 4.2 Fiscal stimulus packages and the size f aut matic stabilisers (in % of GDP) in 2009
Figure 4.2 Fiscal stimulus packages and the size of automatic stabilisers (in % of GDP) in 2009
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Table 4.1 Fiscal stimulus figures in comparison
COM a OECD b ECB c ILO d Saha 
&Weiz e
IMF f Watt g
Country total total total total 2009 2009 total total
BE 2.2 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.9
CZ 3.5 3 2.8
DK 2.2 2.5 3.3 0 2.2
DE 4.1 3 3.2 2.3 2.8 1.5 3.6 (3.9) 2.64
IE 1.7 4.4 8.3 1 0
EL 0.6 0.8 0 0
ES 3.2 3.5 3.9 2.9 0.8 1.1 4.6
FR 3 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.5 (2.3) 1
IT 1.6 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.3 (0) 0.2
CY 5.1 0.1
LU 5.6 3.6 3.9 2.6 1.75* 
HU 2.6 4.4 7.7 3.8
MT 1.8 3.2
NL 1.9 1.5 2.5 1.9 0.8 1 1
AT 3.3 1.1 1.2 3.6 1.4 2.4
PL 4.8 1 1.2 0.5
PT 1.7 0.8 0.8 1 1.1 1.2 *
SI 3.3 1.1
SK 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.1
FI 4.3 3.1 3.2 3.4 1.5
SE 4.4 2.8 3.3 1.3 2.4
UK 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 (1.6) 1.5
Note: a) Public Finance in EMU (European Commission 2011), Discretionary stimulus in % of 
GDP, b) Composition of fiscal packages Total over 2008-2010 period as % of GDP in 2008, first 
estimation published 03/09, second estimation published 07/09, c) fiscal stimulus package, % of 
GDP, ECB (2010) d) fiscal stimulus package, % of GDP, ILO (2009) e) fiscal stimulus package, % 
of GDP, Saha and Weizäcker (2009) f) discretionary measures, in per cent of GDP, relative to 2007 
baseline (revision made in the Fiscal Monitor Nov 2010, g) Watt (2010),* 2009 only.
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Fiscal stimulus a .06 .07 .03 54
"BB -.29 *** -0.08 - .22 ** 81
"PB .48 *** -.36 *** -.30 *** 81
"SB .59 *** -.36 *** -.36 *** 81
"PSB .55 *** -.33 *** -.34 *** 81
Note: Correlation coefficients for EU27. Source: Eurostat (2012), AMECO database, * 
Significant at the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1% level. a Stimulus 
estimates from the Commission (European Commission 2011)
Table 4.3 Non-compliance with the EERP’s 1.2 % of GDP stimulus threshold



















Source: European Commission (2011) Public Finances in EMU, ECB (2010) Euro Area Fiscal 
Policies and the Crisis, OECD (2009) World Economic Outlook. Note: ECB estimations do only 
include eurozone Member States (as of 2010). OECD estimations are not available for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia. Non-compliers in bolt.
292
Table 5.1 Selected summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
" PSB -0.94 2.88 -15.07 7.21
" SB -1.00 2.89 -16.21 6.43
" PB -1.97 3.23 -15.79 5.55
" BB 0.10 5.48 -7.40 15.70
L. " GDP 0.18 5.44 -17.70 10.50
L.Debt 48.97 28.87 3.70 129.70
Bailout -0.36 2.27 -20.16 0.43
L.AS -1.16 2.01 -8.15 2.20
Herfgov 0.61 0.26 0.22 1.00
Herfopp 0.51 0.19 0.22 1.00
Left 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Election 0.25 0.43 0 1
Yrcurnt 1.80 1.32 0.00 4
Majelec 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.73
Notes: Based on cross-sectional data available for all 27 EU countries over the 2008-2010 
period. & is the first difference operator. N= 81.
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Table 5.2 Determinants of fiscal policy changes in the EU, 2008-2010
" PSB " SB " PB " BB
L. " GDP -0.23 0.07 -0.24 0.07 -0.17 0.07 -0.16 0.07
*** *** * *
L.Debt 0.20 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.39 0.06
*** *** *** ***
Bailout 0.91 0.09 0.90 0.08 0.83 0.08 -0.14 0.12
*** *** ***
L.AS -0.98 0.19 -0.93 0.19 -0.13 0.26 -0.80 0.26
*** *** **
Herfgov -21.76 7.51 -25.40 7.72 -22.27 6.21 -32.56 10.75
** ** ** **
Herfopp 18.98 6.56 20.98 6.56 15.37 5.94 23.00 10.04
** ** ** **
Left 3.43 0.94 3.47 0.94 2.77 0.82 5.90 1.07
*** *** *** ***
Election -1.09 0.39 -1.02 0.38 -0.99 0.37 -1.07 0.49
*** ** ** *
Constant -14.30 6.59 -9.68 7.30 -13.38 6.37 -39.87 9.72
* * ***
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.91
Wald chi2 1260.85 *** 2025.72 *** 985.84 *** 1145.46 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. Standard errors listed besides coefficients.
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Table 5.3 Macroeconomic determinants of fiscal policy changes in the EU, 
2008-2010
" PSB " SB " PB " BB
1) 2) 3) 4)
L. " GDP !"#"$ "#"% !"#&" "#"$ !"#&' "#"( !"#") "#"$
*
L.Debt "#&* "#"( "#&+ "#"( "#&( "#") "#'( "#"(
* * ** ***
Bailout "#$( "#&" "#$$ "#"% "#$$ "#"% !"#&+ "#&'
*** *** ***
Constant !&+#+$ *#,% !&'#") )#%) !&)#&" +#(( !''#&) *#',
* * *** **
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.60 0.64 0.80 0.87
Wald chi2 717.25 *** 1,029.00 *** 486.26 *** 757.59 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. Standard errors listed besides coefficients.
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Table 5.4 Determinants of fiscal policy changes in the EU, 1999-2007
" PSB " SB " PB " BB
L. " GDP -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.00
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
L.Debt 0.06 ** 0.07 *** 0.04 0.04 *
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
L.AS -0.76 ** -0.71 ** 0.18 0.26
0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23
Herfgov -1.06 -1.24 -0.62 -0.98
1.15 1.11 1.05 1.04
Herfopp 1.24 0.61 0.84 0.02
1.19 1.16 1.08 1.07
Left 0.50 0.44 0.51 * 0.39
0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24
Election -0.82 *** -0.90 *** -0.82 *** -0.85 ***
0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22
Constant -5.28 -4.88 -1.85 -1.54
3.37 3.16 3.05 2.98
N 181 181 181 182
R2 0.33 0.33 0.45 0.41
Wald chi2 99.41 *** 116.21 *** 153.71 *** 141.10 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. Standard errors listed below coefficients.
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Table 6.1 Selected summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Fisrule 81 0.455 0.967 -1.12 2.46
Interest 81 2.184 1.28 0.13 5.95

















Table 6.2 The impact of fiscal rules, 2008-2010
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
1) 2) 3) 4)
L. " GDP -0.20 * -0.22 ** -0.10 -0.17 *
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
L.Debt 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.38 *** 0.19 ***
0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
Bailout 0.88 *** 0.88 *** -0.14 0.86 ***
0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
L.AS -1.03 *** -0.97 *** -0.82 ** -0.15
0.21 0.21 0.27 0.21
Herfgov -24.50 ** -27.47 ** -37.21 *** -20.27 **
8.21 8.39 10.91 7.61
Herfopp 21.85 ** 23.22 ** 28.66 ** 16.66 *
7.26 7.42 10.00 6.92
Left 3.60 *** 3.58 *** 5.21 *** 2.94 **
1.07 1.06 1.10 1.02
Election -1.02 ** -0.95 * -0.43 -0.99 **
0.39 0.38 0.49 0.38
Fisrule 0.04 -0.00 -0.13 0.11
0.33 0.32 0.37 0.33
Constant -11.77 -7.66 -34.95 *** -12.41
7.51 7.31 10.02 7.46
N 80 80 80 80
R2 0.79 0.80 0.92 0.83
Wald chi2 506.55 *** 637.39 *** 2500.00 *** 652.77 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. Standard errors listed below coefficients.
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Table 6.3 The impact of EU membership on fiscal crisis responses
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
1) 2) 3) 4)
L. " GDP !"#&' !"#&( * !"#&$ * !"#&+
"#"$ "#"$ "#"$ "#"%
L.Debt "#", "#"+ "#") *** "#&$ ***
"#"& "#"' "#"& "#&'
Herfopp '#$% (#+" &(#&( ** $#)& ***
+#)+ %#(( )#,% &)#")
Herfgov !+#%, !&+#)) !,(#$+ *** !&+#)"
*#+( &+#)( (#+, &+#+,
Left '#'% ** '#*% +#)+ * +#"( **
&#&' ,#), &#," ,#)(
Election !&#'% ** !"#'' !"#($ !"#,% *
"#+' "#($ "#)) "#*(
EU !"!# $!"%& $'"%( $("%)
'")( ("*% !"*' ("(*
Constant !,#%, !"#*' "#*" !$#'% **
,#&& (#*' &#%+ $#""
N %' %' %' %'
R2 "#)"( "#',* "#$&+ "#),"
Wald chi2 &&)#,&) *** **#,%( ** +(,#*,* *** &"&#($* ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. Standard errors listed below coefficients.
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Table 6.4 The impact of Market Discipline, 2008-2010
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
1) 2) 3) 4)
L. " GDP -0.17 * -0.20 ** -0.07 -0.11 *
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
L.Debt 0.11 * 0.12 * 0.29 *** 0.10
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bailout 0.97 *** 0.94 *** -0.05 0.93 ***
0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09
L.AS -0.80 *** -0.80 *** -0.54 0.03
0.22 0.22 0.29 0.23
Herfgov -29.88 *** -31.05 *** -42.03 *** -25.99 ***
8.32 8.41 11.90 7.51
Herfopp 25.29 *** 25.37 *** 30.60 ** 20.93 **
7.22 7.28 10.83 6.74
Left 3.34 ** 3.41 *** 5.10 *** 2.69 **
1.04 1.01 1.00 0.96
Election -0.96 ** -0.93 ** -0.48 *** -0.88 *
0.36 0.36 0.46 0.35
Interest 2.67 *** 1.86 * 2.66 ** 2.36 **
0.77 0.73 0.96 0.78
Constant -12.00 *** -8.08 * -36.01 ** -11.39 **
7.08 7.10 9.48 7.23
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.85
Wald chi2 743.26 *** 888.05 *** 1900.00 *** 852.25 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
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Table 6.5 Market discipline and eurozone membership
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
1) 2) 3) 4)
L. " GDP -0.17 * -0.21 ** -0.07 -0.12
L.Debt  0.13 * 0.14 * 0.31 *** 0.12 *
Bailout 1.03 *** 1.00 *** 0.02 0.99 ***
L.AS  -0.82 *** -0.82 *** -0.53 0.00
Herfopp  22.64 ** 22.73 ** 28.54 * 18.14 **
Herfgov  -26.27 ** -27.46 ** -39.10 **  -22.18 **
Left 2.39 2.47 4.29 ** 1.70
Election  -0.88 ** -0.85 * -0.43 -0.7875 *
Interest_noneuro  2.57 *** 1.76 * 2.65** 2.25 **
Interest_euro  3.28 *** 2.46 ** 3.27** 2.99 **
Constant -14.87 -10.94 -38.21 *** -14.42
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.82 0.82 0.92 0.85
Wald chi2 111.33 *** 1450.26 *** 1131.28 *** 1692.25 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
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Table 7.1 Fuzzy set scores and bestfit
Country C T P D bestfit
BE 0.246 0.567 0.714 0 TPd
BU 0.443 0.133 0.179 0 tpd
CZH 0.820 0.700 0.393 0 Tpd
DE 0.541 0.800 0.536 0 TPd
GE 0.738 0.733 0.929 0 TPd
EE 0.410 0.867 0.036 0 Tpd
IR 0.295 0.967 0.429 1 TpD
GR 0.000 0.100 0.571 1 tPD
ES 0.672 0.233 0.786 1 tPD
FR 0.361 0.267 0.893 0 tPd
IT 0.000 0.300 0.821 1 tPD
CY 0.164 0.200 0.071 0 tpd
LA 0.475 0.400 0.107 0 tpd
LI 0.000 0.633 0.143 1 TpD
LU 0.623 1.000 0.250 0 Tpd
HU 0.623 0.833 0.321 1 TpD
MA 0.705 0.600 0.000 0 Tpd
NE 0.508 0.933 0.750 0 TPd
AU 0.869 0.767 0.607 0 TPd
PO 0.967 0.367 0.679 0 tPd
POR 0.295 0.167 0.464 1 tpD
RO 0.213 0.200 0.357 1 tpD
SL 0.361 0.433 0.214 0 tpd
SK 0.164 0.500 0.286 0 tpd
FI 0.770 0.667 0.500 0 Tpd
SW 0.902 0.900 0.643 0 TPd
UK 0.574 0.333 0.857 0 tPd
Note: C= compliance, T = trade openness, P = political/economic power, D= economic distress, see 







































































igure 7.1 Sufficient conditions for compliance outcome
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o al Stimulus Package in % of GDP (European Commission 2011)
Total Stimulus Package in % of GDP (European Commission 2011)
gu e 7.2 Relationship between the size of total sti ulus package and trade openness












































































o l ize of stimulus packages (in % of GDP)
Total size of stimulus packages (in % of GDP)
* averag fi cal space (2007-2010) see text; ** based on European Commission (2011)
* average fiscal space (2007-2010) see text; ** based on European Commission (2011)
igu e 7.3 Rel tionship betw en fiscal pace and stimulus packages**
Figure 7.3 Relationship between fiscal space and stimulus packages**
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A3. Supplementary tables 
Table A5.1 Determinants of fiscal policy changes in the EU with lagged dependent 
variable
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
L. " PSB -0.35*
L. " SB -0.34*
L. " BB -0.42 *
L. "PB -0.32
L. " GDP -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.14 -0.18 **
L.Debt 0.20*** 0.18 *** 0.37 *** 0.18 ***
Bailout 0.86*** 0.86 *** -0.20 0.83 ***
L.AS -0.89*** -0.83 *** -0.63 * -0.09
Herfopp 13.79* 15.93 * 17.25 10.91
Herfgov -15.80 -19.77 * -27.75 * -14.14 *
Left 2.52* 2.59 * 4.05 ** 2.04 *
Election -1.14** -1.07 ** -0.65 -1.02 **
Constant -14.03 -9.49 -34.87 ** -12.81
N 81 81 81 81
R2 0.81 0.83 0.91 0.85
Wald chi2 791.05 *** 1253.92 *** 985.43 *** 990.45 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level. 
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Table A5.2 Hausman test for endogeneity of various variables (p-values)
Variables " PSB " SB " BB " PB
Endogeneity of macro-
economic variablesa
0.07 ** 0.05 ** 0.11 0.07 *
Endogeneity of electionsb 0.55 0.45 0.72 0.18
Endogeneity of fiscal rulesc 0.34 0.57 0.39 0.17
Endogeneity of market 
disciplined
0.98 0.14 0.74 0.30
Note: The H0 hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the coefficient estimates of the standard 
regression model and the instrumental variables model are both consistent and do not differ. 
Therefore if we fail to reject H0 endogeneity is thought not to be a problem. a The two macro-
economic variables GDP growth and the change in the public debt are instrumented using the lags of 
these variables as well as US GDP growth and public debt. b Election years are instrumented using 
the constitutionally determined term duration. c Fiscal rules are instrumented using the lagged 
variable. d Market discipline is instrumented using the lagged variable as well as US interest 
payments on debt. 
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Table A5.3 Keynesianism and fiscal policy responses, 2008-2010
" PSB " SB " PB " BB
L. " GDP -0.44 *** -0.45 *** -0.38 ** -0.33 *
L.Debt 0.18 ** 0.15 ** 0.17 ** 0.38 ***
Bailout 0.89 *** 0.88 *** 0.87 *** -0.10
L.AS -1.53 *** -1.48 *** -0.54 -1.52 ***
Herfgov -32.86 * -33.98 * -34.83 * -45.29 **
Herfopp 18.29 * 19.85 * 16.13 24.84 *
Rile 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01
Keynes 1.30 ** 1.16 ** 1.46 *** 1.71 ***
Election -1.05 * -0.94 * -1.09 * -0.58
Constant -7.35 -4.01 -5.80 -33.80 **
N 64 64 64 64
R2 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.92
Wald 575.49 754.34 539.60 5400.12
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
Table A6.1 Descriptive statistics of key variables for Non-EU countries * 
(2008-2010)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
" PSB 18 -1.47 2.49 -8.1 2.2
" SB 18 -1.44 5.82 -21.4 10
" PB 18 -1.99 3.33 -8.16 3.8
" BB 18 -2.33 3.55 -8.2 2.5
L. " GDP 18 0.01 3.41 -6.6 6
L.Debt 18 91.29 56.51 28.49 210.25
Herfgov 18 0.71 0.28 0.26 1
Herfopp 18 0.54 0.25 0.33 1
Left 18 0.28 0.46 0 1
Election 18 0.39 0.5 0 1
* Norway, Canada, USA, Iceland, Japan and Switzerland.
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Table A6.2 The impact of fiscal rules prior to the Great Recession, 1999-2007
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
L. " GDP -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05
L.Debt 0.05 ** 0.06 *** 0.04 ** 0.05 *
L.AS -0.05 -0.06 1.04 *** 1.02 ***
Herfgov -0.01 -0.37 0.28 1.00
Herfopp 1.10 0.22 0.11 1.50
Left 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.05
Election -0.83 *** -0.9 *** -0.83 *** -0.85 ***
Fisru 0.62 * 0.44 0.71 * 1.26 ***
Constant -4.93 -4.98 -2.81 -4.33
N 181 181 182 178
R2 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.30
Wald 55.16 ** 61.01 *** 97.87 *** 94.07 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
308
Table A6.3 The impact of eurozone membership on fiscal crisis responses
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
L. " GDP -0.13 -0.17 * -0.18 * -0.14
L.Debt 0.02 0.04 0.04 *** 0.15
Herfopp 5.71 6.53 14.50 ** 0.08
Herfgov -8.14 -12.87 -23.47 *** 0.34
Left 3.56 ** 3.71 4.41 *** 3.15
Election -1.37 ** -0.37 -0.83 -0.32
Eurozone -0.05 -1.18 -1.49 -0.94
Constant -1.96 -1.30 -0.77 -12.07
N 93 93 93 93
R2 0.51 0.33 0.81 0.51
Wald chi2 107.26 *** 73.12 *** 486.21 *** 98.15 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
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Table A6.4 The impact of eurozone membership on fiscal crisis responses, EU27
" PSB " SB " BB " PB
L. " GDP -0.23 *** -0.24 *** -0.15 * -0.17 *
L.Debt 0.21 *** 0.19 *** 0.40 *** 0.19 **
Bailout 0.91 *** 0.9 *** -0.09 0.88 ***
L.AS -0.98 *** -0.93 *** -0.78 ** -0.13
Herfopp 18.65 ** 20.61 ** 23.59 * 14.84 *
Herfgov -21.16 * -24.74* * -31.41 ** -17.87 *
Left 3.31 ** 3.35 ** 4.68 *** 2.59 *
Election -1.09 ** -1.02 ** -0.63 -0.99 **
Eurozone 0.32 0.35 0.80 0.50
Constant -14.76 -10.19 -40.47 *** -14.15
------------ ------------- -------------- -------------
N 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00
R2 0.79 0.81 0.92 0.83
Wald chi2 539.698 *** 701.697 *** 2000 *** 664.988 ***
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across countries of the error terms are corrected with panel-corrected standard errors. * Significant at 
the 5 % level; ** at the 1 % level; *** at the .1 % level.
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Table. A7.1 Weights for the EIP indicators based on factor analysis
Factor loading Squared factor loading*
F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 Weight**
Current account balance 0.61 0.46 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.09
Investment position 0.55 0.24 0.52 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.06
Export market shares -0.68 -0.25 0.43 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.1
Nominal unit labour 
cost
0.15 -0.84 0.03
0.01 0.36 0.00 0.16
Real effective exchange 
rates
-0.66 -0.31 0.32
0.15 0.05 0.06 0.1
Private sector debt 0.69 -0.39 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.1
Private sector credit 
flow
0.38 -0.1 0.61
0.05 0.01 0.21 0.07




0.04 0.02 0.27 0.1
Unemployment rate -0.69 0.4 -0.2 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.1




Note: * Scaled to unity sum. ** Final weights rescaled to sum up to one. Explained Variance is the 
variance explained by the factor. Explained Variance/Total is the explained variance divided by the 
total variance of the four factors. Weights are squared factor loadings multiplied by the Explained 
Variance/Total.
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